White Hen Pantry v. Buttke
| Decision Date | 16 June 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-1532,79-1532 |
| Citation | 295 N.W.2d 763,98 Wis.2d 119 |
| Parties | WHITE HEN PANTRY, a division of Jewel Companies, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Gerald BUTTKE and Buttke Enterprises, Inc., Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
Review Granted.
Andrew O. Riteris and Charles P. Graupner and Michael, Best & Friedrich, Milwaukee, on briefs, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Alan H. Deutch and Lawrence P. Kahn and Deutch & Hansher, S.C., Milwaukee, on brief, for defendants-respondents.
Before DECKER, C. J., MOSER, P. J., and CANNON, J.
This is an appeal from a final order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. The sole issue involves an interpretation of sec. 135.04, Stats., a provision of the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, secs. 135.01 et seq.
The plaintiff-appellant White Hen Pantry (White Hen) is a division of Jewel Companies, Inc., and is a franchisor engaged in the business of franchising convenience retail grocery stores. The defendant-respondent dealership, Buttke Enterprises, Inc., (Buttke) operates a White Hen outlet in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, pursuant to a franchise agreement. Under the franchise agreement entered into on November 15, 1974, the store premises were sublet to Buttke by White Hen. On May 22, 1979, Buttke received a demand for payment of money owed White Hen. Buttke did not respond. On May 30, 1979, White Hen notified Buttke that unless the money owed was paid within ten days, the franchise would be terminated. Buttke did not make payment, the franchise was terminated, and White Hen demanded return of the sublet store premises. Buttke refused to leave and on June 11, 1979, White Hen commenced an eviction action pursuant to sec. 299.01, Stats., in the small claims division of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court.
Buttke answered, claiming that White Hen did not have a right to terminate his franchise, and filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the notice was defective and that the action was commenced prior to the expiration of the 90-day notice period under sec. 135.04, Stats.
The trial court dismissed the complaint as untimely, and held that White Hen's notice was defective in not specifying a 90-day notice period. We disagree.
Section 135.04, Stats., reads as follows:
Notice Of Termination Or Change In Dealership. Except as provided in this section, a grantor shall provide a dealer at least 90 days' prior written notice of termination, cancellation, nonrenewal or substantial change in competitive circumstances. The notice shall state all the reasons for termination, cancellation, nonrenewal or substantial change in competitive circumstances and shall provide that the dealer has 60 days in which to rectify any claimed deficiency. If the deficiency is rectified within 60 days the notice shall be void. The notice provisions of this section shall not apply if the reason for termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal is insolvency, the occurrence of an assignment for the benefit of creditors or bankruptcy. If the reason for termination, cancellation, nonrenewal or substantial change in competitive circumstances is nonpayment of sums due under the dealership, the dealer shall be entitled to written notice of such default, and shall have 10 days in which to remedy such default from the date of delivery or posting of such notice. (Emphasis supplied.)
In construing a statute, the primary source is the language of the statute itself. Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 81 Wis.2d 344, 350, 260 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1978). The entire section and related sections are to be considered in its construction or interpretation. Omernik v. State, 64 Wis.2d 6, 12, 218 N.W.2d 734, 738 (1974). In determining the meaning of any single phrase or word in a statute, it is necessary to look at it in light of the whole statute. State ex...
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...provision, the entire section and related sections of the statute should be considered. Id. See also, White Hen Pantry v. Buttke, 98 Wis.2d 119, 122, 295 N.W.2d 763 (Ct.App.1980), rev'd on other grounds, citing Omernik v. State, 64 Wis.2d 6, 12, 218 N.W.2d 734 (1974). In determining the mea......
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