White Motor Corp. v. Moore

• Decision Date: 08 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 76-27,76-27
• Citation: 48 Ohio St.2d 156,2 O.O.3d 338,357 N.E.2d 1069
• Parties: , 2 O.O.3d 338 WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION, Appellant, v. MOORE et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 156

48 Ohio St.2d 156

357 N.E.2d 1069, 2 O.O.3d 338

WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION, Appellant, v. MOORE et al., Appellees.

No. 76-27.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 8, 1976.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In order to establish a right to workmen's compensation for harm or disability claimed to have resulted from an accidental injury, it is necessary for the claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence, medical or otherwise, not only that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, but also that a direct or proximate causal relationship existed between his injury and his harm or disability. (Fox v. Indus. Comm., 162 Ohio St. 569, 125 N.E.2d 1, approved and followed.)

2. Where the issue of causal connection between an injury and the specific subsequent physical disability involves questions which are matters of common knowledge, medical testimony is not necessary in order to submit the case to the jury.

Lonnie H. Moore, appellee, was employed in the assembly of truck frames and cabs at the White Motor Corporation in Cleveland. On the morning of January 19, 1970, while Moore was assembling truck frames, one of the frames slipped from the dolly, struck him on his knees, knocking him down, and pinned him to the floor. The falling frame, which caused a hole in the floor, was removed from atop Moore by an overhead chain hoist. He was then carried by fellow workers to the dispensary where ice packs were applied to his knees, x-rays taken, pain pills administered, and a prescription for Darvon compound given by a physician. Later that same morning he returned to the dispensary, complaining of increased pain and was issued a cease work slip. He went by cab to Mt. Sinai Hospital where he was checked, released, and told to consult his own physician. He was later treated at the Kaiser Foundation Hospital by a family physician. He also saw at least one orthopedist and a neurosurgeon before he returned to work on March 2, 1970. A claim was filed with the Industrial Commission, and, on December 7, 1970, it was 'allowed for left knee injury.' White Motor Corporation appealed to the Cleveland Regional Board of Review. On October 1, 1971, that board modified the previous finding to show that the claim 'be allowed for bruise above left patella.' White Motor Corporation appealed to the Industrial Commission, and, on February 1, 1972, the appeal was refused.

White Motor then filed a notice of appeal pursuant to R.C. 4123.519, on February 16, 1972. On June 5, 1973, the instant cause was filed by Moore in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County to establish his right to participate in the Workmen's Compensation Fund. The cause was tried to a jury of eight which returned a nuanimous verdict on August 26, 1974, finding that Moore was 'entitled to participate in the Workmen's Compensation Fund of Ohio.' Three witnesses, including Moore, testified at the trial, and the deposition of the former medical director at White Motor was read to the jury. The other two witnesses who testified were the employer's supervisor of employee benefits, who had custody of the records and read from an exhibit, which was neither offered nor admitted, concerning the proceedings at the dispensary, and an assistant attorney general, assigned to the Workmen's Compensation division, who had custody of the Industrial Commission's record which also was not received in evidence.

White Motor Corporation, on August 28, 1974, filed an 'Alternative Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial.' On October 15, 1974, the trial court granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On November 8, 1974, moore filed a notice of appeal. On October 30, 1975, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the Court of Appeals granted judgment to Moore.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, David G. Schmidt, Robert H. Gillespy and H. V. E. Mitchell, Cleveland, for appellant.

Spohn & Sanislo Co., L. P. A., and James J. McGarry, Jr., Cleveland, for appellee Lonnie H. Moore.

CELEBREZZE, Justice.

The principal issue to be resolved in this cause is whether, in an R.C. 4123.519 appeal, a claimant, in order to establish a compensable injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act, must present medical evidence substantiating the claimed injury. The appellant contends that it is not sufficient for the claimant to testify, for the reason that his testimony would be self-serving and therefore of insufficient probative value to allow the case to go to a jury. According to the appellant, the trial court properly granted its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the claimant's alleged injury was not corroborated by the testimony of a medical expert witness. In support of this contention, appellant cites the case of Phillips v. Borg-Warner Corp. (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 266, 291 N.E.2d 736. A reading of the first paragraph of the syllabus in that case discloses that the 'injury' which was the subject matter of the claim therein was allegedly caused by an infectious virus 'created by' exposure 'to extreme cold and wind.' That is not the nature of the injury in this cause. We are dealing here with a claim allowed for a 'bruise above the left patella.'

This court is of the opinion that the instant claim falls within the language expressed by Stewart, J., in Stacey v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. (1951), 156 Ohio St. 205, at page 213, 101 N.E.2d 897 at page 901, cited by both sides. Judge Stewart, in delineating under what circumstances expert medical testimony is necessary to submit a cause to a jury, stated as follows:

'There are two types of industrial injury cases, one in which the testimony of lay witnesses does have probative value in establishing the probability of proximate causal relationship between accident and re-resulting injury, and the other where the testimony of lay witnesses is without probative value to establish a proximate causal relationship between the injury and the result claimed and where medical testimony is absolutely essential to prove such relationship. Each case must be decided upon its own facts in reference to this question.'

The Stacey case involved a condition of bilateral cataracts alleged to have resulted from a small particle lodging in one eye.

Succinctly stated, both cases relied on by appellant involved rather complicated medical problems and were cases in which the testimony of medical witnesses was or would be preferred in order to better equip the jury for its determination. Such testimony would hardly seem necessary in a medical problem involving the presence or dimension of a bruise.

As a general rule of law involving complex medical problems, medical evidence is necessary to establish a direct or proximate causal relationship between an industrial accident and the resulting injury. See Fox v. Indus. Comm. (1955), 162 Ohio St. 569, 125 N.E.2d 1. However, as noted in the Staceycase supra, there are two types of industrial injury cases. The instant case involves a 'bruise above the left patella' allegedly caused by a truck frame which fell from a dolly and struck the claimant with such force that he fell and was pinned beneath it. We submit that...