White Swan Laundry v. Muzolf, 16956.
| Decision Date | 16 June 1942 |
| Docket Number | No. 16956.,16956. |
| Citation | 111 Ind.App. 691,42 N.E.2d 391 |
| Parties | WHITE SWAN LAUNDRY v. MUZOLF et ux. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Industrial Board.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Steve Muzolf and wife, claimants, to recover compensation for the death of Al Muzolf, employee, opposed by the White Swan Laundry, employer. From an award of compensation by the Industrial Board, the employer appeals.
Reversed with directions.Jones, Obenchain & Butler, of South Bend, for appellant.
Edwin B. Smith, of South Bend, for appellee.
This is an appeal by appellant, White Swan Laundry, from an award of a majority of the full Industrial Board of Indiana, granting compensation to appellees, Steve Muzolf and Stella Muzolf, as partial dependents of Al Muzolf, for the death of said Al Muzolf because of an injury alleged to have resulted from an accident arising out and in the course of his employment by appellant.
Error properly assigned and relied on for reversal is that the award of the full Industrial Board is contrary to law.
It is contended by appellant, first, that there is no competent evidence to sustain the finding that appellees' decedent sustained a personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by appellant; second, there is no competent evidence to sustain the finding that the cause of death was materially aggravated by the injury sustained and that the injury materially contributed to hasten death; third, there is no competent evidence to sustain the finding that appellees were partially dependent upon the decedent.
[1] No eyewitness to the alleged accidental injury testified. Steve Muzolf, the father of decedent, testified that about two weeks after the accident happened, the decedent told him that he lifted a big bundle at the Oliver Hotel and that he was on a special at that time; the driver was waiting for him and he hurried and hit himself on the corner of the desk. The appellant objected to the introduction of this evidence and moved to strike it out for the reason that it was no part of the res gestae. The objection to the introduction of this evidence and the motion to strike out were overruled. This testimony was not a part of the res gestae, but was hearsay. The rule against hearsay testimony has prevailed in Indiana for many years. Columbia Enameling, etc., Co. v. Cramer, 1927, 86 Ind.App. 164, 156 N.E. 467;Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Haufe, 1924, 81 Ind.App. 660, 144 N.E. 844;G. W. Opell Co. v. Phillips, 1929, 90 Ind.App. 552, 169 N.E. 354;Kauffman v. Bardo, 1925, 83 Ind.App. 482, 148 N.E. 496.
[2] It was not reversible error to admit this evidence, but, unless it was corrobrated by some competent evidence, it could not be the basis of an award.
[3] The application for adjustment of compensation alleged that the injury complained of was...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
C.T.S. Corporation v. Schoulton
...(1948), 118 Ind.App. 310, 77 N.E.2d 762; City of Anderson v. Borton (1962), 132 Ind.App. 684, 178 N.E.2d 904; White Swan Laundry v. Muzolf (1942), 111 Ind.App. 691, 42 N.E.2d 391; McCoy v. General Glass Corp. (1938), 106 Ind.App. 116, 17 N.E.2d 473; National Malleable & Casting Co. v. Holli......
-
C. T. S. Corp. v. Schoulton
...more relaxed rule is evidenced by a line of cases represented by City of Anderson v. Borton, supra, and White Swan Laundry v. Muzolf, (1942) 111 Ind.App. 691, 42 N.E.2d 391, which held that admission of hearsay of the nature rejected in McCoy, supra, while not cause for reversal, could neve......