White v. Ahlstrom-Munksjo Nonwovens, LLC

• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: CHAVEY, J.
• Docket Number: HHD-CV25-6196797-S
• Decision Date: 30 December 2025
• Citation: White v. Ahlstrom-Munksjo Nonwovens, LLC, HHD-CV25-6196797-S (Conn. Super. Dec 30, 2025)
• Parties: JEFFREY WHITE v. AHLSTROM-MUNKSJO NONWOVENS, LLC

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JEFFREY WHITE v. AHLSTROM-MUNKSJO NONWOVENS, LLC

No. HHD-CV25-6196797-S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford

December 30, 2025

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REARGUE (Dkt. 115)

CHAVEY, J.

On September 8, 2025, this court granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's one-count complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's claim is barred by the exclusivity of his workers' compensation remedy. The plaintiff had argued, in opposing the motion to strike, that he had pleaded an intentional tort that fell outside the scope of workers' compensation exclusivity. On September 17, 2025, the plaintiff filed his motion to reargue, which the court now denies.

The court assumes familiarity with its memorandum of decision on the defendant's motion to strike.

"[T]he purpose of a reargument is ... to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts... [Reargument] also may be used to address alleged inconsistencies in the trial court's memorandum of decision as well as claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court.... [A] motion to. reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity to have a second bite of the apple or to present additional cases or briefs which could have been presented at the time of the original argument." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Speer v. Brown Jacobson PC, 233 Conn.App. 833, 840-41, 342A.3d 1118 (2025).

Here the plaintiff's central argument is that the court misapplied the four Lucenti factors by requiring that he fulfill all of them to overcome the defendant's motion to strike. See Lucenti v. Laviero, 327 Conn 764, 790-91, 176 A.3d 1 (2018). The plaintiff thus asserts that the court improperly concluded that he had failed to plead sufficient facts to fall within the narrow exception to workers' compensation exclusivity based on "the employer intentionally creat[ing] a dangerous condition that made the [employee's] injuries substantially certain to occur." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Dusto v. Rogers Corp., 222 Conn.App. 71, 81, 304 A.3d 446 (2023), cert, denied, 348 Conn. 939, 307 A.3d 274 (2024).

In granting the defendant's motion to strike, the court did not apply Lucenti to require the plaintiff to satisfy all four factors. Indeed, if the court had done so, the court's analysis would have ended with its statement that the plaintiff did not argue that he had included allegations related to the second and third factors. (Dkt. 113, p. 10.)

Instead, the court carefully analyzed the first and fourth Lucenti factors, which were those at issue here. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not made allegations of the kind contemplated by the first Lucenti factor, insofar as the plaintiff did not plead "prior similar accidents related to the conduct at issue." Lucenti, 327 Conn, at 782. This court continued by noting that, even if there were such allegations, however, the plaintiff had failed to plead facts related to the fourth factor: the defendant's "affirmative disabling of safety devices" (id.), which the Supreme Court made clear is not merely the "failure to provide appropriate safety or protective measures." Id. at 786-87.

In seeking reargument, the plaintiff has identified no allegations that this court overlooked regarding "prior similar accidents" or the...