White v. Beasley
Decision Date | 01 August 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 5,Docket No. 101350,5 |
Citation | 453 Mich. 308,552 N.W.2d 1 |
Parties | Sheila WHITE, Personal Representative of the Estate of Phoebe Obleton, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keith D. BEASLEY, Defendant-Appellant, and Hope Humbert and Ronald Johnson, Defendants. Calendar |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Lopatin, Miller, Freedman, Bluestone, Herskovic & Heilmann by Richard E. Shaw, Detroit, for plaintiff.
City of Detroit by Phyllis A. James and Sharon D. Blackmon, Detroit, for defendant Beasley.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Michael C. McDaniel, Assistant Attorney General, for
the Attorney General, Lansing, Tort Defense Division, amici curiae.
O'Connor, DeGrazia & Tamm, P.C. by Julie McCann-O'Connor and James I. DeGrazia, Bloomfield Hills, for amicus curiae Michigan Municipal League and Michigan Municipal Liability and Property Pool.
Mark Granzotto, Detroit, and Jeffrey T. Meyers, Detroit, for amicus curiae Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
This case requires that we decide if the public-duty doctrine should still be recognized in Michigan and, if it should, to define the limits of the special-relationship exception to that doctrine as applied to police officers. We conclude that the public-duty doctrine remains valid in Michigan. We also conclude that the most appropriate special-relationship test for examining the relationship between police officers and private individuals is the test articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 (1987).
This case comes to us to consider defendant's motion for summary disposition alleging a failure "to state a claim on which relief can be granted." MCR 2.116(C)(8). Therefore, for purposes of deciding if the lower courts correctly ruled on the motion, we accept all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff's complaint as true. Wade v. Dep't of Corrections, 439 Mich. 158, 162-163, 483 N.W.2d 26 (1992).
Plaintiff alleges that defendant, Detroit Police Officer Keith D. Beasley, was grossly negligent when he responded to a telephone call requesting aid on behalf of decedent, Phoebe Obleton. At 12:30 a.m., on Tuesday, October 9, 1990, through the decedent's bathroom window, her neighbors saw her husband attack her. They also heard the decedent screaming for help. Responding to the situation, two of the neighbors telephoned Detroit's 911 emergency dispatch service requesting emergency assistance on behalf of decedent. Further calls to 911 followed. Finally, at 12:40 a.m., neighbors placed a direct call to the local police station.
At 1:30 a.m., Officer Beasley and another police officer arrived at the decedent's residence. 1 Decedent's neighbors met the officers, explained that they had seen the decedent's husband attacking her, communicated that they heard her scream for help, and informed the officers of her apartment number. The complaint alleges that, in response, the officers, "after taking down the witnesses' names, simply circled the building and left without ever attempting to knock on Plaintiff decedent's apartment door, or make any attempt to contact Plaintiff decedent or determine if, in fact, she was being or had been attacked."
At 4:15 a.m., the decedent's husband telephoned Detroit's 911 service to report that he had stabbed his wife to death. At 4:50 a.m., three hours and twenty minutes after Officer Beasley arrived outside the decedent's residence, she died.
Sheila White, as personal representative of the decedent's estate, filed a suit against the City of Detroit, the City of Detroit Police Department, the 911 operator, and both responding police officers. The trial court dismissed the claims against the city and the police department on the basis of governmental immunity. The 911 operator and defendant Officer Beasley moved for summary disposition for failure "to state a claim on which relief can be granted." MCR 2.116(C)(8). Defendants relied exclusively on the public-duty doctrine, arguing that they owed a duty to the public only, not to the decedent as an individual. The trial court denied their motion.
The Court of Appeals reversed with respect to the 911 operator. 2 206 Mich.App. 459, 462, 522 N.W.2d 681 (1994). It reasoned that the public-duty doctrine applied to the 911 operator and that the relationship between the decedent and the 911 operator was too attenuated to satisfy the special-relationship exception to the public-duty doctrine. Id. However, it upheld the trial court's denial of summary disposition for Officer Beasley. Id. at 466, 522 N.W.2d 681. It found that defendant's arrival at the crime scene was sufficient to satisfy the special-relationship exception to the public-duty doctrine. Id. at 462, 522 N.W.2d 681. Defendant appealed to this Court.
Defendant's appeal places two issues squarely before this Court. First, because we have not yet addressed the issue, we must decide if the public-duty doctrine is viable in Michigan. Second, provided that we accept the existence of the public-duty doctrine, we must also define the limits of the doctrine's special-relationship exception when applied to police officers. 3
We hold that the public-duty doctrine applies in Michigan. As defined by Justice Cooley, the public-duty doctrine provides
[t]hat if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support an individual action for damages. [2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed), § 300, pp 385-386.]
Applied to police officers, the public-duty doctrine insulates officers from tort liability for the negligent failure to provide police protection unless an individual plaintiff satisfies the special-relationship exception. See Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937.
Currently, the public-duty doctrine is under attack because some commentators believe that the doctrine unjustifiably creates inequitable and harsh results for plaintiffs. The doctrine has an "all or nothing" character that may deny a plaintiff recovery just because the tort was committed by a public, rather than a private, employee. The problems stemming from the doctrine's "all or nothing" character are compounded by the lack of guidance in defining which duties are public and which are specific individual duties. Partly on the basis of these concerns, some courts have abandoned the public-duty doctrine altogether. 4 See, e.g., Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310, 656 P.2d 597 (1982), and Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 159 (Colo., 1986). While the inequitable and harsh results created by the doctrine are a significant concern when the doctrine is applied to most government employees, we conclude that the dangerous work environment inherent in police activities is a counterbalancing concern when the doctrine is applied to police officers, as will be discussed in part III of this opinion.
Otherwise, there are two basic justifications for retaining the public-duty doctrine. First, the doctrine protects governments from unreasonable interference with policy decisions, and, second, it protects government employees from unreasonable liability.
We agree that the public-duty doctrine serves a useful purpose by protecting governments from unreasonable interference with policy decisions. As noted by the Supreme Court of Illinois, while deciding a suit alleging that the failure to enforce the City of Chicago's housing code led to a child's injury,
If the failure of the city to enforce [an] ordinance should render it liable for injuries sustained thereby, the tremendous exposure to liability would certainly dissuade the city from enacting ordinances designed for the protection and welfare of the general public, and thereby the general public would lose the benefit of salutary legislative enactments. [ Stigler v. Chicago, 48 Ill.2d 20, 24-25, 268 N.E.2d 26 (1971).]
We find the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Illinois persuasive. A convincing justification for the continued recognition of the public-duty doctrine is its purpose of shielding governmental units from liability "when its employees act, or refuse to act, so as to conform to a municipal ordinance and/or a state statute." Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 226, 525 N.E.2d 468 (1988).
Further, tort liability should not be based on statutes and ordinances that are not traditionally relied on to impose liability or do not themselves specifically expose government employees to liability. Such liability may also deter the governmental entity from enacting protective legislation, fearing that the added cost of employee liability will eventually be borne by the governmental entity. Additionally, we note that mechanisms besides the threat of liability in negligence exist to hold employees accountable for failure to conform to statutes and ordinances. See Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn., 1995).
Similarly, we agree that the public-duty doctrine is justified to the extent that it clarifies that a government employee's job title alone does not create a duty between the employee and specific members of the public. For example, police officers should not be liable for insuring the general public's welfare just because their job title lists them as "police officers." Police officers should not be liable "for failing to protect a member of the general public from a criminal act of which they were not aware but should have anticipated and prevented...." De Long v. Erie Co., 60 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 457 N.E.2d...
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