White v. Board of Review of Polk County

Decision Date30 July 1976
Docket NumberNo. 56114,56114
Citation244 N.W.2d 765
PartiesMarjorie F. WHITE and Ankeny Ready-Mix, Inc., Appellants, v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF POLK COUNTY, Iowa, et al., Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Robert E. Dreher and John R. Hearn, Des Moines, for appellants.

J. R. McManus, Des Moines, for appellees.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, HARRIS, and Mc,CORMICK, JJ.

MASON, Justice.

Plaintiff, Marjorie F. White, owned a 5.9 acre tract of land and buildings located on the south edge of Ankeny with a 600-foot frontage on the south side of Ordnance Road. This property was leased to plaintiff Ankeny Ready-Mix Inc. for its concrete mixing plant operations. Mrs. White, her husband John C., and Leo T. Schuler were the officers of Ready-Mix at all times material.

Early in 1967 the Polk County assessor's office inspected the property with the intention of establishing its value as of January 1, 1968, for tax purposes. The 27 percent value of the land and buildings was determined to be $31,360.00, based upon a 100 percent value of $116,150.00 consisting of $30,900.00 for land and $85,230.00 for buildings and equipment.

The taxpayers had protested the assessment as being in error and in excess of the actual value of the property involved. The Polk Board of Review denied the protest and affirmed the assessment. June 28 the taxpayers filed a petition in the Polk district court appealing the decision of the Board. However, the case was not reached for trial in the district court for several years due to a number of continuances.

The tax assessment for 1971 was the same as the 1968 assessment. Again plaintiffs protested to the Board asserting that the property was assessed for more than the value authorized by law and that there was an error in the assessment. The Board rejected the claim the assessment was excessive. Another petition was filed in the district court appealing the Board's affirmance of the 1971 assessment. The cases were subsequently consolidated for trial in the district court.

The taxpayers had attacked the assessments on two theories: (1) the assessor included in both assessments the value of machinery and equipment and a building which were not in existence on the premises either in the year 1968 or the year 1971; and (2) the assessment was excessive and erroneous on a straight valuation basis.

Plaintiff-taxpayers appeal from the decree of the Polk district court dismissing their petitions in equity seeking relief from assessments made by the Polk county assessor for the years commencing January 1, 1968, and January 1, 1971, both regular real property assessment years.

Plaintiffs frame the issues presented by their appeal in this fashion: (1) whether the taxpayers proved and the trial court should have ruled the assessor made an error in his assessments of taxpayers' property which entitled them to a reduction in assessment for 1968 and 1971; and (2) whether the taxpayers proved by the testimony of two disinterested witnesses that their property was assessed at a higher value than authorized by law for the years 1968 and 1971.

I. The assessor's error referred to in plaintiffs' first contention related to a separate plant building and machinery and equipment installed therein which were retired from service.

In both petitions plaintiffs alleged: '5. The assessment against Appellants' land is excessive and confiscatory in that the assessed value is based on a valuation higher than its actual value and discriminatory against these Appellants contrary to law.' It was requested the $31,360.00 figure be reduced to $19,710.00.

During the course of the district court proceedings, four 'data cards' from the county assessor's office were admitted into evidence. These cards each described a building on plaintiffs' premises and listed its value.

Card 1 (card numbers correspond to exhibit numbers) represents a cement block and frame building used for garage, storage area and repair shop purposes. The evidence indicated the building is in poor condition and probably was not well built in the beginning.

Card 3 represents a 'pole building,' i.e., poles were driven into the ground, upon which were fastened sheets of corrugated steel. This structure is used mainly for truck storage, although there is a small finished office in one corner of the building.

Card 4 lists the actual plant and equipment for the mixing of concrete. This facility commenced operation in September 1966. The components of the mixing plant include storage bins, conveyor belt, a 'batcher' and control panels. The building itself also contains an office, restroom and dock area.

The three buildings were in existence on January 1 of both 1968 and 1971. Except for its foundation the structure represented by Card 2 had been completely removed from the premises by december 1967. Deputy Assessor Frank L. Frost inspected the property early in 1967 when this old plant, known as the Greco plant, and new plant stood side by side. It is undisputed the assessor's total value of buildings as of January 1, 1968, included a $29,310.00 valuation for the Greco plant. The 1968 and 1971 total assessment figures were exactly the same.

Defendants argue the nonexistence of the Greco plant was not brought to the attention of the Board. This contention is bolstered by the fact Leo T. Schuler, manager of Ankeny Ready-Mix, informed neither the county assessor's office nor the Board the old plant and equipment had been sold and removed. The other two officers of the corporation, Mrs. White and her husband, John C. White, did not appear before the Board in either 1968 or 1971. Furthermore, Mr. White never notified the assessor's office of the Greco plant's removal. Defendants declare this ground was not mentioned in either of plaintiffs' protests to the Board.

In any event, it was adduced the old plant was sold to Ankeny Concrete Block (corporation) and was moved from plaintiffs' land December 9, 12 and 13, 1967. The old foundation, which no one contends had any value, was destroyed and removed in the spring of 1968. The trial court itself 'accepted' the fact the Greco plant had been sold and paid for by December 1, 1967.

Defendants, in response, rely upon asserted procedural deficiencies on the part of plaintiffs. In this regard it is claimed plaintiffs' contention is not properly before this court because it was not presented before the Board. The relevant portions of the 1968 protest filed with the Board are set out in plaintiffs' reply brief.

"2. That said property is assessed for more than the value authorized by law; that the amount of said over-assessment is $11,650.00; that $73,000.00 is its actual value

                Land................. $13,000.00
                Building.............. 60,000.00
                

and that 27% Thereof or $19,710.00 is a fair assessment. (See Sec. 441.21, as amended by Sec. 1 of Chapter 354, Laws of the 62nd G.A. (1967)). This land, except a small portion thereof, was purchased in 1965 for $12,600, leased for $960 per year for a 5 years from July 15, 1965, based on 8% Of the approximate cost and agreed value; all other items assessed are carried at cost of $98,300 less depreciation $18,000, net $80,300 approximately on books of Lessee, Ankeny Ready-Mix, Inc. Assessment in excess of the amount stated in paragraph 2 violates Section 1, Chapter 354, Laws of 62nd General Assembly, and is excessive, inequitable and capricious.

"3. (Omitted)

"4. That there is an error in the assessment as follows: See statement under paragraph 2 hereof."

The following portion of the 1971 protest is also set forth:

"4. That there is an error in the assessment as follows: Any assessment in excess of the amount stated in paragraph 2 violates Section 441.21, Code of Iowa, 1971, and is excessive, inequitable and capricious."

Defendants' argument is supported somewhat by the fact neither manager Schuler nor Mr. and Mrs. White informed the Board the Greco plant had been eliminated. It could not logically be claimed the Board was specifically apprised of this fact by plaintiffs' protests.

In their initial brief and argument plaintiffs specifically rely upon section 441.37(4), The Code, 1971. This provision states in relevant part:

'Protest of assessment--grounds. Any property owner or aggrieved taxpayer who is dissatisfied with his assessment may file a protest against such assessment with the board of review * * *. Said protest shall be in writing and signed by the one protesting or by his duly authorized agent. Taxpayer may have an oral hearing thereon if request therefor in writing is made at the time of filing the protest. Said protest must be confined to one or more of the following grounds:

'1. * * *

'2. * * *

'3. * * *

'4. That there is an error in the assessment and State the specific alleged error.

5. * * *.' (Emphasis supplied).

Plaintiffs did not state 'the specific alleged error' before the Board which they presently assert as a ground for reducing the assessment. This court has held a ground not presented to a board of review may not be considered by the district court or, for that matter, the supreme court. See City of Atlantic v. County Bd. of Review, 234 N.W.2d 880, 882 (Iowa 1975); Milroy v. Board of Review of County of Benton, 226 N.W.2d 814, 817 (Iowa 1975); Commercial Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Board, 229 Iowa 1081, 1084, 296 N.W. 203, 204.

In reply brief, however, plaintiffs argue their protest was sufficient. 'The particular reason why the property was over-assessed is demonstrated in this case by the fact that in both 1968 and 1971 the assessor was including a building and a plant which no longer existed on the premises. Such inclusion partakes of the nature of an error, but the end result is the overvaluation of the property that admittedly existed by reason of the fact that the assessor valued the latter as if the removed plant and building were still a part of the premises.'

It is also argued proceedings before a board of review are informal and no...

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  • Doe v. Ray
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 16, 1977
    ...we give weight to the fact findings of the trial court, but are not bound by them. Rule 344(f)(7), R.C.P; White v. Board of Review of Polk County, Iowa, 244 N.W.2d 765, 772; Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Company, Iowa, 214 N.W.2d 126, II. The first of plaintiffs' three propositions raised for......
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