White v. Brommer
| Decision Date | 17 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-cv-04353 |
| Parties | BRIAN WHITE, Plaintiff v. JACK BROMMER, BOROUGH OF COLUMBIA and MATTHEW LEDDY, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
This matter is before the court on Motion of Defendants for Summary Judgment filed April 7, 2011, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed April 14, 2011.
For the following reasons, I grant defendants' motion and deny plaintiff's. I conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude granting summary judgment in defendants' favor on plaintiff's claims for unconstitutional seizure, malicious prosecution, violation of right to contract, violation of equal protection, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, defamation, or the Monell1 claim against the Borough of Columbia.
Jurisdiction is based upon federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. This court also properly has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over plaintiff's state law claims, which are part of the same case or controversy.
Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to these claims occurred in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, which is located in this judicial district.
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a six-count Complaint on September 24, 2009. Defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss on November 19, 2009. By Order and Opinion filed September 30, 2010, I denied the motion in part and granted it in part, without prejudice for the plaintiff to re-plead with an amended complaint.
On October 22, 2010, plaintiff filed a six-count Amended Complaint. Count One alleges unconstitutional seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Count Two alleges malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count Threealleges violations of equal protection and right to contract pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Counts Four, Five and Six are Pennsylvania state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with a contractual relationship and defamation, respectively.
On April 7, 2011, the Motion of Defendants for Summary Judgment was filed, together with Defendants' Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. Plaintiff's Brief in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed April 28, 2011.
On April 14, 2011, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, together with Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Material Facts for Summary Judgment were filed on May 4, 2011.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505,2509-2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, 316 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2003). Only facts that may affect the outcome of a case are "material". Moreover, all reasonable inferences from the record are drawn in favor of the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d at 216.
Although the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the non-movant must then establish the existence of each element on which it bears the burden of proof. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Company, 235 F.3d 851, 857-858 (3d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs cannot avert summary judgment with speculation or by resting on the allegations in their pleadings, but rather they must present competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in their favor. Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999); Woods v. Bentsen, 889 F.Supp. 179, 184 (E.D.Pa. 1995).
Based upon the pleadings, record papers, exhibits, and defendants' uncontested concise statement of facts, the pertinent facts are as follows.2
Beginning in March 2009, plaintiff Brian White was employed as a doorman and security guard each Thursday, Friday and Saturday night at the Riverview Bar & Grill, in Columbia Borough, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.3 On Sunday, May 24, 2009 at approximately 2:00 p.m., plaintiff, along with his friend, Barry Funk, arrived at the Riverview Bar.4 Plaintiff was not working that day. He and his friend were there as patrons, and sat at the bar.5 The two men evenly split three pitchers of beer.6
Two other patrons sitting at the bar that evening were Darryl Leese and Charles Messersmith.7 Among the other bar patrons that night was a woman, Nicole Shireman, who was celebrating her 21st birthday with her boyfriend.8
Plaintiff believed that Mr. Leese or Mr. Messersmith was harassing or upsetting Ms. Shireman.9 The bartender that evening, Tammy Caplinger, told plaintiff that he was mistaken and that neither man was harassing the girl.10 Plaintiff did not listen to Ms. Caplinger.
At approximately 7:30 p.m. plaintiff approached the area of the bar where both men were seated to stop the harassment which he believed was taking place. He pushed Mr. Leese to the ground.11 When Mr. Leese stood up, plaintiff pushed him to the ground again.12 Mr. Leese never hit or touched Mr. White.13
The bartender, Ms. Caplinger, then told plaintiff to leave the bar.14 She called the "911" emergency line and told the operator that "Brian White flipped out and knocked a guy off the bar stool."15 Mr. Messersmith also called 911.16 Plaintiff left the bar on foot, heading home.17
As a result of the 911 calls, Borough of Columbia police officers were dispatched to the Riverview Bar & Grill.18Three officers, Sergeant Jack Brommer, Officer Matthew Leddy and Officer Brent Keyser, were on duty that evening.19 All three were dealing with a separate matter at the time the 911 call center dispatched them to the Riverview Bar & Grill.20
The radio transmissions from the 911 Center were:
When Sergeant Brommer arrived at the bar, he talked to the bartender. She told him that plaintiff had pushed Mr. Leese off the bar stool, and that plaintiff had left the bar.22Sergeant Brommer also spoke to Mr. Leese and Mr. Messersmith, both of whom also described plaintiff pushing Mr. Leese.23
All three witnesses reported to Sergeant Brommer that plaintiff believed Mr. Leese or Mr. Messersmith had made a comment to the woman and tried to follow her into the bathroom.24All three also told Sergeant Brommer that plaintiff was mistaken and that no one had harassed Ms. Shireman.25
Sergeant Brommer also spoke to Ms. Shireman, who was upset, but he obtained no written statement from her or her boyfriend.26
Sergeant Brommer then transmitted to units over the County-wide radio channel, including Officer Leddy, that the suspect is Brian White, who resides on Cherry Street.27
At this point, the facts become much less clear. Officer Leddy stated in his deposition that Sergeant Brommer directed him to arrest plaintiff for suspicion of assault, and that the arrest was Sergeant Brommer's decision.28 Officer Leddy said that Sergeant Brommer told him that the man assaulted wished to press charges, and that Sergeant Brommer told Officer Leddy that if he ran across plaintiff he should be placed in custody.29
Sergeant Brommer, on the other hand, stated in his deposition that he never told anyone to arrest plaintiff and that the decision was entirely that of Officer Leddy.30 Sergeant Brommer also testified at his deposition that Officer Leddy arrested plaintiff for public drunkenness, and that the arrest was not at that time related to the incident at the bar.31
The difference between the deposition testimony of Sergeant Brommer and Officer Leddy on whether or not Sergeant Brommer told Officer Leddy to arrest plaintiff is not material to the decision here.
The degree of intoxication exhibited by plaintiff is also in dispute. Officer Leddy approached plaintiff as he was walking on Fifth Street.32 Officer Leddy said that plaintiff appeared angry and agitated, and used profanity.33 According to Officer Leddy, plaintiff was "clearly intoxicated; displaying glassy bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and a strong odor of intoxicated [sic] beverage emanating from his breath."34
Officer Leddy wrote in his police report:
I advised White that I was attempting to determine what happened at the bar, but he again insisted that I arrest him. Due to his obvious level of intoxication and distinct possibility that he would be a danger to himself or others or annoyance of others, I placed White under arrest and...
To continue reading
Request your trial