White v. Carolina Realty Co.

• Decision Date: 30 November 1921
• Docket Number: 445.
• Citation: White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182 N.C. 536, 109 S.E. 564 (N.C. 1921)
• Parties: WHITE v. CAROLINA REALTY CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

109 S.E. 564

182 N.C. 536

WHITE v. CAROLINA REALTY CO.

No. 445.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

November 30, 1921

Appeal from Superior Court, Mecklenburg County; Harding, Judge.

Action by W. L. White against the Carolina Realty Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. No error.

In action for injuries to occupant of automobile sustained in collision with defendant's truck, instruction making defendant liable if it was negligent, without requiring such negligence to have proximately caused injury, held not erroneous, where other instructions, including that immediately following, required the negligence to have proximately contributed to injury.

Civil action to recover damages for an alleged negligent injury to plaintiff in a collision between a Ford automobile, in which the plaintiff was a passenger, and a truck belonging to the defendant.

Upon denial of liability and issues joined, the jury returned the following verdict:

"(1) Was the plaintiff's injury caused by the negligence of the defendant as alleged in the complaint? A. Yes.

(2) What damages, if anything, is the plaintiff entitled to recover? A. $2,500."

Clarkson Taliaferro & Clarkson, of Charlotte, for appellant.

F. M Redd and D. E. Henderson, both of Charlotte, for appellee.

STACY J.

This is an action brought by W. L. White to recover damages for an alleged negligent injury caused by a collision between a Ford automobile, in which the plaintiff was riding as a passenger and the defendant's truck, said collision occurring on West Trade street in the city of Charlotte at an early morning hour on September 23, 1920.

There was evidence tending to show that the defendant's truck was standing at the intersection of Linden avenue and West Trade street in a manner violative of a traffic ordinance of the city, when the Ford automobile owned and driven by one E. H. McQuay, and in which the plaintiff was riding as a passenger, ran into and collided with the defendant's truck, causing serious and permanent injuries to the plaintiff. The accident occurred about 7:30 a. m. during a heavy equinoctial storm, when the fog, rain, and wind made it difficult for the occupants of the car to see very far ahead.

The evidence was conflicting as to the exact position of the truck at the time of the injury and as to whether the defendant's driver had violated any of the traffic ordinances of the city of Charlotte; but, under his honor's charge, the jury have found these matters in accordance with the plaintiff's contention.

From all the evidence it clearly appeared that the plaintiff was a passenger in McQuay's car and exercised no authority or control over its management and had nothing to do with the manner in which it was driven.

Upon these, the facts chiefly relevant, we think the defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit was properly overruled.

Conceding that McQuay, the owner and driver of the Ford machine, was negligent, as it is quite apparent from the evidence he was, yet this would not shield the defendant from suit if its negligence was also one of the proximate causes of the plaintiff's injury. Crampton v. Ivie, 126 N.C. 894, 36 S.E. 351. There may be two or more proximate causes of an injury; and where this condition exists, and the party injured is free from fault, those responsible for the causes must answer in damages, each being liable for the whole damage, instead of permitting the negligence of the one to exonerate the others. This would be so though the negligence of all concurred and contributed to the injury, because with us there is no contribution among joint tort-feasors. Wood v. Public Service Corp., 174 N.C. 697, 94 S.E. 459, 1 A. L. R. 942.

In Harton v. Tel. Co., 141 N.C. 455, 54 S.E. 299, the following statement of the law is quoted with approval:

"To show that other causes concurred in producing or contributing to the result complained of is no defense to an action of negligence.

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