White v. Chafin
Decision Date | 10 July 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 16-1319,16-1319 |
Citation | 862 F.3d 1065 |
Parties | Philip WHITE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Kyllion CHAFIN, in his individual and official capacity, Defendant–Appellee, and Robert Wycoff, in his individual and official capacity, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Andrew McNulty, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP, Denver, Colorado (Darold W. Killmer and Mari Newman, Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Geoffrey Klingsporn, Denver City Attorney's Office, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before KELLY, MURPHY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
Mr. Philip White obtained a judgment for $100,000 in compensatory damages and moved for an award of prejudgment interest. The district court denied the motion, viewing the bulk of the award as compensation for noneconomic damages.
For the second argument, Mr. White suggests that we could award prejudgment interest on the entire compensatory award ($100,000) or at least on the amount of his economic damages.
Mr. White urges a "bright-line rule" requiring the addition of prejudgment interest whenever a claimant prevails under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellant's Opening Br. at 7. But this bright-line rule would conflict with our published opinions. Under those opinions, prejudgment interest "is not recoverable as a matter of right." Zuchel v. City & Cty. of Denver , 997 F.2d 730, 746 (10th Cir. 1993). Those opinions cannot be overruled by a panel. Thompson v. Weyerhaeuser Co. , 582 F.3d 1125, 1130 (10th Cir. 2009). Thus, our panel must apply those opinions and reject Mr. White's argument for a bright-line rule requiring prejudgment interest in all § 1983 cases.
In his reply brief, Mr. White contends that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the federal law on prejudgment interest should incorporate Colorado law, which mandates prejudgment interest. Mr. White waived this contention by waiting to present it for the first time in his reply brief. See Wheeler v. Comm'r , 521 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 2008) ().1
The contention is not only waived but also invalid. Notwithstanding § 1988, our court has held that awards of prejudgment interest are not recoverable as a matter of right, as discussed above. See p. 3, above. In addition, § 1988 would require use of state law only if federal law were considered "deficient" in cases involving § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 ; see Robertson v. Wegmann , 436 U.S. 584, 588, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978). In our view, federal law is not rendered "deficient" by the absence of a mandatory right to prejudgment interest in § 1983 cases. See Furtado v. Bishop , 604 F.2d 80, 97 (1st Cir. 1979) ( ).
Because reliance on § 1988 is waived and invalid, we see no reason to question our precedents even if we could. Under those precedents, an award of prejudgment interest is not recoverable as a matter of right.
Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc. , 111 F.3d 758, 763 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, Mr. White acknowledges that "[u]nder the current standard in this Circuit, district courts have been given great leeway in their determinations as to whether prejudgment interest should be awarded when a jury returns a verdict of compensatory damages in Section 1983 cases." Appellant's Opening Br. at 7.2
According to Mr. White, the denial of prejudgment interest constituted an abuse of discretion for four reasons:
We reject these arguments.
We have prescribed a two-step test to determine whether to award prejudgment interest. The first step is to determine whether such an award would compensate the injured party. Zuchel v. City & Cty. of Denver , 997 F.2d 730, 746 (10th Cir. 1993). If prejudgment interest would be compensatory, the court must determine whether the equities would preclude an award. Id .
Mr. White argues that the district court erroneously skipped the first step, balancing the equities without deciding whether prejudgment interest would have been compensatory. We disagree.
The district court began by determining that prejudgment interest for noneconomic damages would not be compensatory. For this determination, the court reasoned that Mr. White had primarily obtained noneconomic damages. This determination led the district court to decide that prejudgment interest was unnecessary to compensate Mr. White. In reaching this decision, the court acted within its discretion.3
Mr. White argues that the district court neglected to consider the importance of "just compensation" for a delay in paying noneconomic damages. Appellant's Opening Br. at 43. For this argument, Mr. White relies on Barnard v. Theobald , 721 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2013), which held that a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for a delay in paying noneconomic damages. See Barnard , 721 F.3d at 1078. We reject this argument.
In our view, the district court had the discretion to decline awarding prejudgment interest for noneconomic damages. Mr. White implicitly assumes that noneconomic damages are incurred instantly at a discrete point in time and that any delay in payment is compensable. But the district court could reasonably reject these assumptions, viewing noneconomic damages as continuing over an undefined period. Under this view, the jury could ascertain the amount from a sense of how much the damages are worth at the time of trial. Wilson v. Burlington N.R.R. Co. , 803 F.2d 563, 567 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., concurring). This approach represents a reasonable exercise of discretion.
Mr. White argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider Mr. White's age, the public interest in fully compensating Mr. White, and the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct. We have no reason to doubt the district court's consideration of the defendant's culpability and the need for full compensation. Mr. White obtained $300,000 in punitive damages, and the district court could reasonably conclude that the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct had not required an award of prejudgment interest. And the court stated why it regarded prejudgment interest as unnecessary for full compensation.
The district court did not mention Mr. White's age. But the district court had little reason to consider Mr. White's age, for his opening brief made no mention of his age. In Mr. White's reply brief, his age is referenced twice. The first reference appeared in the discussion of noneconomic damages, a subject that was thoroughly discussed in the district court's order. See Appellant's App., vol. I at 228 (). The second reference to age involved the risk that Mr. White might not live long enough to collect. See id . at 232 (). Even if the district court had agreed,4 it could reasonably have questioned why Mr. White's potential death would have tipped the balance on prejudgment interest.
In our view, the district court acted within its discretion in balancing the equities.
Finally, Mr. White contends that the district court should have awarded prejudgment interest based on the award of economic damages. For this contention, Mr. White insists that his evidence showed economic damages of $3,974.25. But we do not know how the jury weighed that evidence. Thus, the district court refused to attribute $3,974.25 to economic damages. This reasoning fell within the district court's discretion.
In district court, Mr. White argued that the district court should refuse...
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