White v. Chester Cnty. Election Comm'n
| Decision Date | 25 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-01216-JDB-atc |
| Parties | BERNIS MICHELE WHITT WHITE, Plaintiff, v. CHESTER COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
On September 20, 2019, the Plaintiff, Bernis Michele Whitt White, brought this action against the Defendants, Chester County, Tennessee (the "County"); the County Election Commission (the "Commission"); and the State of Tennessee (the "State"), alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (the "ADA"), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. (the "RA"). Specifically, White, former Administrator of Elections ("AOE") for the Commission, complained that she suffered discrimination and retaliation at the hands of her employer related to her disability. Before the Court are the separate motions of the County and the Commission (D.E. 16), as amended (D.E. 18)1 and of the State (D.E. 17) to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the issues have been fully briefed, the motions are ripe for disposition.
According to the pleading, White began working for the Commission as the AOE in June 2009. Her salary was paid "primarily" by the County and she received her benefits through the same entity. (D.E. 1 ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff suffers from depression and worked for some time without incident, receiving pay increases, reappointment to her position, and no negative reviews. For years before her disability was known, she was not required to complete timesheets reflecting the hours she worked; no records were kept or required regarding her vacation and sick leave, accumulated or taken; and she was not required to submit doctors' notes. Moreover, the Commission's policy manual did not set forth particular hours for a normal work week.
On February 28, 2017, White traveled to Arizona for in-patient treatment for her depression. As far as she knew, the Commission's members were unaware of the nature of the trip, except for Stephen Morris, the Commission's chairman. Upon her return to work on May 30, 2017, members of the Commission were advised of the reason for her absence. At a meeting some two months later, Commissioner Bill Moore berated and insulted her regarding her absences and requested that she begin keeping a file of her time away from work and notify him when she would be out. He also asked for a prognosis concerning her disability. She complied, and continued treatment.
At an October 26, 2017, meeting, the Commission voted to terminate her employment. According to the minutes, her attendance was not the reason for her firing. The following day, the Commission issued a separation notice. In the section of the notice intended to reflect an explanation for the employment action, no reason was given other than that she had been fired. The notice stated that White's employer was Chester County Local Government.
On or about November 1, 2017, she filed a workers' compensation claim arising from an injury that occurred on July 27 of that year. The County and its workers' compensation insurer handled the claim before the Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims, during which it identified the County as her employer.
In the instant action, Plaintiff alleges alternatively that the Commission is an instrumentality of the County and she, therefore, was an employee of the County and that the Commission was an instrumentality of the State and that she was thus a State employee. (See id. ¶¶ 9-10.) She seeks a declaratory judgment that the actions complained of were unlawful under the ADA and/or RA, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.
Rule 12(b)(1) permits dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction, as has been invoked here, "questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading." Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cty., 847 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir.) (quoting Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 380 (2017). In analyzing a facial attack, "a district court must take the allegations in the complaint as true." Qandah v. Johor Corp., 799 F. App'x 353, 356 (6th Cir. 2020). The plaintiff bears the "burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion." Wayside Church, 847 F.3d at 817 (quoting Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986)). "To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Jackson v. Ford Motor Co., 842 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2016)) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The RA "prohibits discrimination against the disabled by recipients of federal funding and requires reasonable accommodations to permit access to such recipient facilities and programs by disabled persons." L.G. by and through G.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cty., Ky., 775 F. App'x 227, 230 (6th Cir. 2019). The statute provides in pertinent part that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]" 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Defendants seek dismissal of the RA claims on the grounds that they are time-barred.
"Dismissal of a complaint because it is barred by the statute of limitations is proper when the statement of the claim affirmatively shows that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle [her] to relief." Dimond Rigging Co., LLC v. BDP Int'l, Inc., 914 F.3d 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gibson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The RA does not contain a statute of limitations and, therefore, courts must borrow the limitations period from the most analogous state cause of action. Endres v. Ne. Ohio Med. Univ., 938 F.3d 281, 292 (6th Cir. 2019). In Tennessee, the statute of limitations to be applied to RA claims is the one-year period set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A). I.L. through Taylor v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 257 F. Supp. 3d 946, 964 (E.D. Tenn. 2017), aff'd on other grounds by I.L. by and through Taylor v. Tenn. Dep't of Educ., 739 F. App'x 319 (6th Cir. 2018). The accrual date of an RA claim, which is determined by federal law, is the date "the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [her] action." Endres, 938 F.3d at 292 (quoting Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984)).
It is the position of the Defendants that, whether the claim accrued on October 26, 2017, the date of the Commission's vote, or October 27, 2017, the date of the separation notice, Plaintiff's RA claim, filed almost two years later, is untimely. White does not appear to disagree with either the appropriate statute of limitations or the accrual dates identified by the Defendants. Instead, the Court understands her argument to be that, since she timely filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge on or about August 21, 2018, within 300 days of the employment action, and brought this suit on or about June 25, 2019, within ninety days of her receipt of a right to sue letter, the suit is timely. However, courts in this circuit have held that the filing of an EEOC charge is not a prerequisite to an RA suit against a nonfederal employer, Tuck v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 7 F.3d 465, 470-71 (6th Cir. 1993); Caldwell v. Bartlett City Schs., Case No. 2:16-cv-2608-JPM-tmp, 2017 WL 8819282, at *10-11 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 2017), and, thus, does not toll the statute of limitations, Gong v. The Cleveland Clinic Found., Inc., Case No. 1:16CV2624, 2017 WL 433212, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2017); Knapp v. City of Columbus, No. C2-01-255, 2002 WL 193849, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 2002). As the RA claims are time-barred, they are hereby DISMISSED.
The ADA was passed "to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities." Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 848 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (pre-2008 amendments)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To that end, the law broadly prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual on the basis of disability as it applies to aspects of employment including hiring, advancement, and firing." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff stated in her complaint that she was bringing this action under Titles I and II of the ADA.2 Title I prohibits discrimination by "covered entities" against qualified individuals "on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020). A "covered entity" is defined under the statute as "an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). Title II proscribes discrimination on the basis of disability with respect to "the benefits of the services, programs, or...
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