White v. Com.

Decision Date03 November 2006
Docket NumberRecord No. 051737.
Citation636 S.E.2d 353
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
PartiesWilliam WHITE, Jr. v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

W. William Robinson, III (Hudson, Robinson & Newsome, on brief), for appellant.

Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), Emporia, for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

OPINION BY Justice DONALD W. LEMONS.

In this appeal, we consider whether the defendant was improperly denied the opportunity to present evidence to a jury supporting his insanity defense.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

William White, Jr. ("White") intended to present evidence of his insanity at his jury trial on charges of first degree murder, a violation of Code § 18.2-32, and assault and battery of a police officer, a violation of Code § 18.2-57. However, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion in limine to preclude White from presenting such evidence. Consequently, White entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere reserving the right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine.

On March 29, 2002, White was traveling in North Carolina when his car broke down on an interstate highway, and he made arrangements for a person he did not know, Elton Giliken ("Giliken"), to drive him to New York. At approximately 10:00 p.m. while traveling through Greensville County, Virginia, White directed Giliken to take him to a residence. White went to the front door at the house and inquired about someone named "Q." White returned to the car and then requested that Giliken take him to a specific motel near Route 301. At the motel, White went to a room and asked the occupants for "Q." He came back to Giliken's car, and then returned to the same motel room where he conducted a conversation through the door with the occupant. At this point, Giliken was concerned about White's actions and attempted to dial 911 on his cell phone, but was unable to get service. White returned to the car and asked Giliken to drive to the back of the motel where there were other rooms. White ingested what appeared to be cocaine, pulled out a knife, tied a bandana around his head, and asked Giliken to wait for him. Then he said, "I'm going to go kill me two mother f* *kers" and exited the car. Giliken sped away and notified the police about White's behavior and provided a description of him.

Minutes later, motel guests staying next door to the victim's room heard banging sounds and saw a man run by outside their window. Upon entering the room, the motel guests discovered the victim's body, which was later found to have had 27 stab wounds. Police investigating the murder determined that White was a primary suspect and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

The following day, State Police Trooper K.W. Spencer noticed a man walking on Interstate Highway 95 who was dressed in a "white fur coat, no shirt, red tights, and yellow shorts." The trooper stopped to speak with the man, who was subsequently identified as White, and informed him that he "could not walk on [I-]95." White was reluctant to leave the interstate and argued that his family was looking for him and "wouldn't be able to see him" if he left the interstate highway. The trooper left but returned a few minutes later. On this occasion, he spotted White walking backwards on an exit ramp headed toward the interstate. White approached the trooper's car and expressed frustration at Trooper Spencer for checking on him again. Trooper Spencer called for backup. After a physical altercation, Trooper Spencer and another officer subdued White. At that time, they discovered that a warrant for murder had been issued for White.

Prior to his trial, White followed the procedural steps required by statute to raise an insanity defense. He requested a psychiatric evaluation to determine his mental state at the time of the alleged offense and his competency to stand trial. He gave timely notice to the Commonwealth of his intent to present evidence of insanity pursuant to Code § 19.2-168. The trial court appointed Dr. William D. Brock, a licensed clinical psychologist, to conduct the psychiatric examination and provide a report.

The Commonwealth sought to preclude White from presenting any evidence regarding his state of mind at the time of the offense. In its motion in limine, the Commonwealth asserted that Dr. Brock's report did not support an insanity defense, that expert testimony is a "necessary predicate to asserting an insanity defense," and that the defendant cannot "rise above his own evidence" citing to Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922).1 Opposing the Commonwealth's motion, defense counsel argued that Dr. Brock's report could be "helpful" in establishing the existence of a mental disease or defect, and proffered additional testimony from lay witnesses to support White's defense on this issue.

The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion stating that "the introduction of the proffered testimony would not rise to the level of that which would warrant admissibility on the issue of insanity." As a result, the trial court barred the admission of any evidence to support White's insanity defense. After this ruling, White changed his plea to nolo contendere reserving his right to appeal the trial court's ruling. White was then convicted and sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder charge, and five years for the assault and battery of a police officer.

A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed White's conviction, White v. Commonwealth, 44 Va.App. 429, 605 S.E.2d 337 (2004), but upon rehearing en banc, White's conviction was affirmed, White v. Commonwealth, 46 Va.App. 123, 616 S.E.2d 49 (2005). White appealed to this Court upon one assignment of error: that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling which precluded the introduction of any evidence of the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense.

II. Analysis

A. Proffered evidence

The defendant proffered evidence in support of his intended plea of insanity that included the original report submitted by Dr. Brock as well as lay witness testimony. Dr. Brock's report noted that White's medical history reflected two hospitalizations for psychiatric treatment, the first occurring in Louisiana several months before the alleged offense, and the second shortly after his arrest. Each time White was treated with Haldol, an anti-psychotic medication. Prior to this report, Dr. Brock did not review hospital records from the Louisiana inpatient treatment because they were unavailable, but he opined that during that hospitalization White was likely treated for a "drug-induced psychosis" caused by "rather heavy abuse" of narcotics. White reported to Dr. Brock that he used cocaine "multiple times daily" for at least three months preceding his arrest on these charges.

White reported to Brock that he was traveling to New York because "`God' had something for him to do there;" he believed that God's purpose would be revealed during the trip; he heard the voices of "both God and the Devil" during much of his journey; he was drawn to a particular motel room because of the number "15" on the door because "he believed the number 14 to be a holy number and the number 15 to then mean '14 and me;'" the number "15" on the door caused him to believe that "he was to go to that room and, apparently, do battle with the individuals in it."

With regard to White's mental state at the time of the offenses, Dr. Brock opined that "[b]y all indications, Mr. White was, indeed experiencing symptoms of a psychosis at the time of the offenses for which he currently stands charged." The report cites numerous factors supporting Dr. Brock's opinion, including (1) White's history of psychiatric treatment for psychosis, (2) White's decision to return to drug abuse and quit taking his anti-psychotic medication after the Louisiana hospitalization, (3) White's account of the events surrounding the offense, and (4) his "bizarre behavior" in walking backwards down the interstate after being warned by police to stay away from that area.

Dr. Brock opined that while White "seems to meet the threshold criteria for an insanity defense," his defense may not be "viable" for two reasons. First, White's psychotic symptoms "appear to have either been the result of, or have been exacerbated by (most likely the former), his voluntary and excessive use of cocaine." Second, White "made significant efforts to not be identified or get caught" which would indicate that he knew right from wrong.

Dr. Brock submitted a second letter to the court after he had an opportunity to review the records from White's first hospitalization. In this letter, he stated that the medical records "confirm[ed]" his prior hypothesis that White "was suffering from a drug-induced psychosis" at the time of his hospitalization in Louisiana, resulting from "his abuse of cocaine, antihistamines and marijuana." Dr. Brock concluded that White's psychotic symptoms were "almost surely the result of his substance abuse and not some other mental condition."

Additionally, White proffered the testimony of Joseph W. Skinner ("Skinner"), a licensed clinical social worker, who had treated White weekly for a period of about six months during his pre-trial incarceration. Skinner was not qualified as an expert pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.5; however, he was offered as a lay witness. Skinner would have testified that White told him on "many occasions" that he heard the voice of God "both before and after the incident and at times when he was not taking drugs."

White next proffered the testimony of his roommate, Troy Whidbee, who would have testified that "at some time ... prior to coming to Virginia, that [White] had advised him that someone was out to kill him" and "God needed soldiers." Next, White's mother would have testified that her son was hearing voices prior to coming to Virginia,...

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