White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.
| Docket Number | CV-22-08113-PCT-JAT |
| Decision Date | 31 July 2023 |
| Parties | Matthew White, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Matthew White's appeal from the Social Security Commissioner's denial of disability insurance (“DI”) and supplemental security income disability insurance (“SSIDI”) benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C § 401 et seq. (Doc. 1). The appeal is fully briefed. (Docs. 10; 13; 14).
Plaintiff filed an application for DI and SSI benefits in April of 2020, alleging neck, shoulder, back, and leg pain. (Docs. 9-3 at 28; 9-5 at 2). Plaintiff's application was denied at the initial stage, upon reconsideration, and by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) after a hearing. (Docs. 9-3 at 36, 46, 63, 76; 9-2 at 39). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. (Doc. 9-2 at 3). Plaintiff then timely filed this action seeking review of the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
A claimant qualifies for SSI and DI benefits if, among other things, he is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 1382(a). A claimant is disabled if he is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The SSA has created a five-step process for an ALJ to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(1), § 416.920(a)(1). Each step is potentially dispositive. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4).
At step one the claimant is not disabled if he is doing substantial gainful activity. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). At step two the claimant is not disabled if he does not have a “severe impairment,” i.e., “any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. §§ 404.1420(a)(4)(ii), (c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). At step three the claimant is disabled (and entitled to benefits) if his impairment or combination of impairments “meets the duration requirement” and “meets or equals” an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
If not, the ALJ will determine the claimant's “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) by considering “all the relevant evidence” including impairments, “any related symptoms,” and resulting “physical and mental limitations” to determine “the most [the claimant] can do despite [his] limitations.” Compare id. § 404.1520(a)(4), with id. § 404.1545(a)(1); and compare id. § 416.920(a)(4), with id. § 416.945(a)(1). At step four the claimant is not disabled if, considering the RFC and the physical and mental demands of the claimant's past relevant work, he can still perform such work. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (f). If the claimant cannot perform (or does not have) past work, at step five the claimant is not disabled if, considering his RFC, “age, education, and work experience,” he can adjust to other work that exists “in significant numbers in the national economy.” Compare id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g)(1), with id. § 404.1560(c); and compare id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g)(1), with id. § 416.960(c). But if the ALJ finds the claimant cannot adjust to other work, he is disabled. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged disability onset date.[1] At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's degenerative disc disease with spondylosis was severe. (id.). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment. (id. at 31-32).
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the RFC to do light work with postural and environmental limitations. (id. at 32-37). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could lift and carry up to 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; stand and walk for four hours and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour day; not climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps or stairs; occasionally stoop, crouch, and kneel; frequently balance; and occasionally work with exposure to dangerous moving machinery and unprotected heights. (id. at 32).
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to do any past relevant work. (id. at 37). At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could adjust to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, based on a vocational expert's (“VE”) testimony that a person of Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC could perform the work of a parking lot cashier, information clerk, and bench assembler. (id. at 38). As a result, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (id. at 38-39).
Plaintiff argues that the promulgation of the 2017 SSA regulations governing consideration of medical opinion evidence exceeded Defendant's authority under the Social Security Act (“the Act”).[2] Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in discrediting Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony and in finding unpersuasive the opinion of Plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Singh. (id. at 12-23). The Court considers each issue in turn.
The Act grants Defendant “full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of [the subchapters dealing with DI and SSIDI], which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions” and directs her to “adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to” benefits under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a); see id. § 1383(d)(1). This “exceptionally broad authority” affords Defendant “wide latitude” to make rules and regulations regarding the evaluation of medical evidence. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 790 (9th Cir. 2022).
Because Congress left a gap which it explicitly directed Defendant to fill with regulations, Defendant's evidentiary rules “may be set aside only if they exceed the agency's statutory authority or are arbitrary and capricious.”[3] A regulation exceeds the authority granted by an express statutory delegation if it is “manifestly contrary to the statute.” Harner v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 38 F.4th 892, 897 (11th Cir. 2022); see Mead, 533 U.S. at 227. The Act itself “provides no guidance as to how the agency should evaluate medical evidence.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 790. It does require Defendant “to make findings of fact” and discuss “the evidence . . . and the reason or reasons upon which any unfavorable decision is based,” and to consider “objective medical evidence of pain or other symptoms established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory techniques.” id. (cleaned up) (first quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(1), 1383(c)(1)(A), then quoting id. § 423(d)(5)(A)). But “[b]eyond that, how to evaluate the evidence is up to the agency.” id.
The relevant SSA regulations in effect between 1991 and 2017 directed ALJs to weigh medical opinion evidence depending on the medical source's relationship to the claimant, with treating sources generally receiving the most evidentiary weight, followed by examining sources and then non-examining sources. id. at 790-91 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(2)). The 2017 regulations “eliminate[d] any semblance” of this “hierarchy of medical opinions,” although “the extent of the claimant's relationship with the medical provider . . . remains relevant.” id. at 788, 790. Under the 2017 regulations, while ALJs must always consider a source's area of specialty and relationship with the claimant in weighing a medical opinion, ALJs are not required to articulate this consideration in explaining their decision-although they are free to do so, “as appropriate.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), (c)(3)-(4), 416.920c(b)(2), (c)(3)-(4). Rather, consistency and supportability are now the most important factors in evaluating medical opinions. id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
Plaintiff, in arguing that promulgating the 2017 regulations exceeded Defendant's statutory authority, identifies several supposed conflicts between the Act's requirements and certain provisions of the 2017 regulations. (Doc. 10 at 8-12). The Court considers each supposed conflict in turn.
Plaintiff first argues that Defendant's regulations are inconsistent with the Act because they create different standards for determining disability at different stages of review. (Doc. 10 at 8). Plaintiff notes that the Act requires Defendant to “establish by regulation uniform standards which shall be applied at all levels of determination review, and adjudication in determining whether individuals are under disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 421(k)(1). Plaintiff also notes that 20 C.F.R. § 404.1593(b) requires recipients of disability benefits who have already been judged disabled to provide reports from their “physician, psychologist, or others who have treated or evaluated” such individuals, “as well as any other evidence that will help” Defendant to determine if such individuals “are still disabled.” 20 C.F.R....
To continue reading
Request your trial