White v. Daniel

• Decision Date: 31 October 1919
• Docket Number: 3438.
• Citation: 261 F. 70
• Parties: WHITE v. DANIEL.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

261 F. 70

WHITE v. DANIEL.

No. 3438.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

October 31, 1919

Francis M. Oliver, of Savannah, Ga. (Edgar J. Oliver, of Savannah Ga., and A. S. Way, of Reidsville, Ga., on the brief), for appellant.

Frederick T. Saussy, of Savannah, Ga. (Warnell & Newton, of Savannah Ga., on the brief), for appellee.

Before WALKER, Circuit Judge, and FOSTER and GRUBB, District Judges.

WALKER Circuit Judge.

The appellant, the wife of the bankrupt, claimed the sole beneficial ownership of a tract of land, a voluntary conveyance of which to the appellant and the bankrupt was made by the former's father in the year 1893. The grantor died shortly after he made the deed, leaving a will, made the same day the deed was made, and which did not charge the land conveyed, or the value of it, against the appellant as an advancement. The conveyance mentioned stated that it was made in consideration of $700 and for and in consideration of natural love and affection of the grantor for the grantees but nothing was paid to the grantor.

The claim asserted is based on the following contentions: (1) That the land, though deeded to the grantor's daughter and her husband, was an advancement to the former; (2) that the beneficial ownership of the half interest conveyed to the bankrupt was in his wife as a result of an implied trust arising in her favor; (3) that parol declarations of the bankrupt and his wife to the effect that the land belonged to the latter created a trust in her favor as to the legal interest vested in the bankrupt by the deed; (4) that the bankrupt was precluded from claiming the beneficial ownership of the half interest conveyed to him as a result of his acquiescence in a settlement of the residue of the grantor's estate made several years after his death between the appellant and the other devisees of that residue, in which settlement, with the consent of the appellant, she was charged with the sum of $700 as the value of the land deeded to herself and her husband, with the result that the amount she received as her share of the residue was less than it would have been if she had not consented to the $700 being charged against her share. The claim asserted is not sustainable on any of the grounds mentioned.

1. The grantor in the deed having died leaving a will which did not provide for the land or its value being charged against the share in his estate given to the...