White v. Doney
Decision Date | 12 April 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 8773,8773 |
Citation | 82 Idaho 217,351 P.2d 380 |
Parties | L. V. WHITE and Myrtle White, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Vern M. DONEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Jones & Jones, Alfred C. Hagen, Boise, for appellant.
J. F. Martin and C. Ben Martin, Boise, for respondents.
During May, 1956, respondents were possessed of and occupied a 21 foot Kozy Coach trailer house at the C & M Trailer Court located about halfway between John Day, Oregon and Canyon City, Oregon. On about June 2, 1956, a Mr. Easter, whom respondents regarded as an agent of appellant, called upon respondents and discussed with them the purchase of a 40 foot Terra Cruiser trailer house which at that time was located at Long Creek. The record is not clear as to the date upon which respondents signed a contract of conditional sale relative to the purchase of the Terra Cruiser; however said instrument bears date of June 21, 1956, and the name 'Doney Trailer Sales' as dealer-seller is typewritten as is also the name Easter, as authorized agent. On about June 21, 1956, the Terra Cruiser was delivered to respondents by Mr. Easter and an employee of appellant, at which time respondents' personal belongings were transferred from the Kozy Coach, in which respondents had been living, to the Terra Cruiser. Respondents at that time delivered to Easter a bill of sale to the Kozy Coach following which Mr. Easter and appellant's employee took the Coach and bill of sale with them.
On about July 18, 1956, respondents moved the Terra Cruiser from the C & M Trailer Court to Redmond, Oregon, where respondent, Mrs. White, lived for approximately two weeks, following which she joined her husband in Spokane, Washington, leaving the trailer house at Redmond. She returned to the trailer house on August 6, 1956, for a brief stay, following which she went back to Spokane where respondents remained until September 12, 1956, on which date they returned to Redmond and discovered that their trailer house was gone and their personal belongings either missing or damaged.
Between the dates of June 28 and August 9, 1956, appellant addressed four letters to respondents, General Delivery, Canyon City, Oregon, None of such letters was ever received by respondents. Under dates of August 10 and September 7, 1957, respondents mailed United States Postal money orders, each in the sum of $69.24, payable to the Pacific Finance Co., Boise, Idaho, as previously directed by Easter, to be applied in payment of the installments payable under the contract which they had signed. Said money orders were later returned to respondents.
On August 16, 1956, appellant, in company with Easter, went to Redmond and removed respondents' personal belongings from the Terra Cruiser and moved it to appellant's premises in Boise. Respondents commenced this action seeking damages for the wrongful conversion of the Terra Cruiser, for the loss of personal belongings and for punitive damages. The jury returned a unanimous verdict awarding respondents $1,802 compensatory damages and $1,400 punitive damages. From a judgment in favor of respondents in the total amount of $3,202, plus costs, this appeal is taken.
Appellant's first assignment of error claims that the verdict is contrary to the law and evidence for the reason that Easter did not have actual or apparent authority to bind appellant to the contract and also that the evidence shows a total failure of consideration on the part of respondent. Respondent Mrs. White testified that during May, 1956, she, in company with an acquaintance, went to appellant's place of business just outside of Boise where she first met appellant; that on said occasion appellant told her that he had an agent by the name of Easter whom he relied on and that they could deal with him; that she had known Mr. Easter since 1949; that later Easter called upon respondents and discussed with them the purchase and sale of a Terra Cruiser and the trade in of the Kozy Coach; that Easter later returned and reported that appellant approved the sale; that Easter delivered the Terra Cruiser and took the Kozy Coach as a down payment about two weeks after their first discussion. Between June 28, 1956 and August 9, 1956, appellant addressed four letters to respondents in which appellant repeatedly refers to the 'Terra Cruiser that you purchased from us' and 'the balance due us'. One of said letters refers to the Kozy Coach that 'you used as a down payment on the 1955 Terra Cruiser trailer house that you purchased from us'. The following is an excerpt from a letter addressed to respondents under date of July 6, 1956, to wit:
The letters above referred to are convincing that appellant regarded the contract of conditional sale as binding upon respondents as purchasers of the Terra Cruiser and the following excerpt from appellant's testimony is explanatory as to how it happens that he did not actually sign said contract:
The rule has been repeatedly stated by this Court that where an agent has acted within the apparent scope of his authority and the third party dealing with the agent has relied upon the appearance of authority to such party's detriment, in theory the principal becomes estopped to deny agent's apparent authority to do the particular act or acts in controversy. Manley v. MacFarland, 80 Idaho 312, 327 P.2d 758; Texas Company v. Peacock, 77 Idaho 408, 293 P.2d 949; Stout v. McNary, 75 Idaho 99, 267 P.2d 625; Madill v. Spokane Cattle Loan Co., 39 Idaho 754, 230 P. 45. The authority of the agent to act for and on behalf of his principal does not have to be established by direct or positive proof, but may be inferred from dealings, circumstances, acts and conduct. Stout v. McNary, supra; Carron v. Guido, 54 Idaho 494, 33 P.2d 345; Lightner v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 52 Idaho 616, 17 P.2d 349. The evidence in the instant case is entirely sufficient to justify the jury in concluding that Easter had authority to bind appellant to the contract involved.
Appellant's second contention that there was a failure of consideration which justified appellant to repossess the Terra Cruiser is also untenable. Respondents testified that they thoroughly discussed with Easter the fact that they did not have a certificate of title to the Kozy Coach and that all they could give was a bill of sale. Although there is conflicting evidence concerning the bill of sale which was given Easter at the time of delivery of the Terra Cruiser to respondents it was the province of the jury to decide the question as to whether appellant, through his agent, agreed to accept such title in lieu of a certificate of title. It is proper to note that notwithstanding the contention of appellant that no contract existed between the parties it is nevertheless argued in appellant's brief that:
Appellant's contention that the trial court erred...
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