White v. Edmond

• Decision Date: 04 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-8903,91-8903
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,294 Willis A. WHITE, Linda White, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David EDMOND, Irene Edmond, Vnac, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 681

971 F.2d 681

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,294

Willis A. WHITE, Linda White, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David EDMOND, Irene Edmond, Vnac, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-8903.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Sept. 4, 1992.

Ronald Bruce Warren, Thomasville, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants.

F. Carlton King, Jr., Chad A. Schultz, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before BIRCH, Circuit Judge, JOHNSON ^*, and BOWNES ^**, Senior Circuit Judges.

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from summary judgment that raises the issue of the scope of the "Fireman's Rule" under Georgia law. Appellant Willis A. White ("White"), a fireman, brought this action against appellee Volvo North America Corporation ("Volvo NAC"), an automobile manufacturer. ¹ White alleged that he was injured while fighting a fire at a residential house as a result of the explosion of part of a Volvo automobile, which was parked in a burning garage adjoining the house. White sued Volvo NAC for negligence in the manufacture of the automobile part that exploded. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia determined that Volvo NAC was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law under the Fireman's Rule. It found that as a fireman, White knowingly and voluntarily assumed all risks normally associated with fighting fires, including the explosion of part of the Volvo automobile. White now appeals, ² and we affirm.

FACTS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The facts of this case are essentially undisputed. On March 25, 1990, White's volunteer firefighting unit was called to a fire at the home of David and Irene Edmond. When White arrived at the Edmond's property, the house was completely engulfed in flames. The blaze had already destroyed the entire house and its contents, including the 1988 Volvo automobile that was parked in a carport adjoining the house. The Volvo's gas tank had exploded prior to White's arrival.

While White was fighting the fire in the garage/carport area, the Volvo automobile again exploded. White's legs were injured as a result of being struck by metal fragments that were propelled from the Volvo when the shock absorbers used to attach the bumpers to the car exploded. Both White and Volvo NAC agree that the Volvo's bumper was blown off the car by the force of the explosion, although Volvo NAC disputes White's assertion that the bumper was blown "through the carport wall."

White alleged that his injuries were the result of a defect in the 1988 Volvo automobile. He also alleged that Volvo NAC was negligent in the manufacture, inspection and distribution of the automobile, because the bumper and bumper shock absorber exploded in the course of the fire. Volvo NAC argued, and the district court agreed, that summary judgment was required under the Fireman's Rule as a matter of law. There was, therefore, no determination of the negligence issue.

As this is an appeal of a district court's grant of summary judgment, our review of the legal determinations below is de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 752, 112 L.Ed.2d 772 (1991). We must, however, " 'resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.' " See Browning v. Peyton, 918 F.2d 1516, 1519-20 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Tackitt v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 758 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir.1985)).

DISCUSSION

I.

The parties have treated Georgia law as controlling in both the district court and on appeal. The district court assumed Georgia law applied when it determined in its summary judgment ruling that the Fireman's Rule was a valid defense to White's suit against Volvo NAC. We, therefore, apply Georgia law in our de novo review of the district court's grant of summary judgment. See, e.g., Jefferson Pilot Broadcasting Co. v. Hilary & Hogan, Inc., 617 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir.1980) (following parties' assumption as to controlling law); see also Black Warrior Elec. Membership Corp. v. Mississippi Power Co., 413 F.2d 1221, 1223 n. 5 (5th Cir.1969) (same principle).

Because Georgia law is controlling,

[W]e must interpret the law as would a Georgia court. Even "[i]n the absence of controlling precedent, we must nonetheless decide ... issue[s] as we believe a [Georgia] court would decide [them] ..." In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the Georgia court would adopt the prevailing rule if called upon to do so.

Wammock v. Celotex Corp., 835 F.2d 818, 820 (11th Cir.1988) (citations and footnotes omitted).

The Fireman's Rule has a relatively short pedigree in Georgia case law. The doctrine was first applied under Georgia law by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. See Brown v. General Elec. Corp., 648 F.Supp. 470 (M.D.Ga.1986). In Brown, an injured fireman brought a suit for negligence and products liability against the manufacturer of a coffee maker that was allegedly the initiating cause of the fire that caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 471. After review of Georgia law, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court of Georgia would adopt the Fireman's Rule because of the continued viability of the doctrine of assumption of risk in Georgia. Id. In finding that the Fireman's Rule barred the plaintiff's claims as a matter of law, the district court employed the formulation of the rule furnished by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals: " 'Other jurisdictions are almost unanimous in denying recovery by an injured fireman from one whose sole connection with the injury is that his negligence caused the fire.' " Id. (citing Flowers v. Sting Sec., Inc., 62 Md.App. 116, 488 A.2d 523, 532 (1985)).

In Ingram v. Peachtree South, Ltd., 182 Ga.App. 367, 355 S.E.2d 717 (1987), the Court of Appeals of Georgia confirmed the applicability of the Fireman's Rule under Georgia law. Ingram involved a negligence claim made by firemen for injuries suffered while fighting a fire on the defendant's premises. 355 S.E.2d at 717-18. The Court of Appeals of Georgia stated that the Fireman's Rule is "[b]asically [ ] the principle [ ] that while a fireman may recover for negligence independent of the fire, a landowner is not liable for negligence in causing the fire. As an oft-cited case holds, one 'cannot complain of negligence in the creation of the very occasion for his engagement.' " Id. at 718 (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 274, 157 A.2d 129, 131 (1960)).

In affirming the grant of summary judgment barring the plaintiffs' negligence claim, the Ingram court applied an assumption of risk rationale. It determined that despite the "ample" evidence of the property owner's negligence leading to the start of the fire, the firemen were barred from recovery for their injuries resulting from the sudden acceleration of the blaze. Id. at 719. The Ingram court reasoned that as firemen, the plaintiffs had knowledge of the general danger of acceleration of a fire, as well as specific knowledge of a prior source of flammables on the defendant's property. Id.

In its next decision addressing the scope of the Fireman's Rule, the Court of Appeals of Georgia noted with approval its prior decision in Ingram barring recovery by injured firemen as a result of the defendant landowner's negligence. See Bycom Corp. v. White, 187 Ga.App. 759, 371 S.E.2d 233, 233-34 (1988). Bycom, however, involved different facts than those that had occasioned the rule of Ingram. In Bycom, the plaintiff fireman was dispatched to investigate a natural gas leak and was seriously injured when the leak caught fire. 371 S.E.2d at 233. The fireman sued the corporation whose agents had allegedly negligently ruptured the gas pipeline and had failed to indicate the location of the leak. Id. The Bycom court determined that the rule of landowner non-liability of Ingram, while "perfectly adequate" when applied to questions of negligence on premises owned by the defendant, would not cover the situation in which "the alleged negligence and the injury occurred off the premises of the alleged tortfeasor." Id. 371 S.E.2d at 234. In order to avoid a " 'dichotomy ... which [would] deny recovery to a fireman injured on-premises but allow recovery to a fireman injured off-premises,' " the Bycom court reviewed the policy justifications for the Fireman's Rule adopted in other jurisdictions. Id. (quoting Koehn v. Devereaux, 495 N.E.2d 211, 215 (Ind.Ct.App.1986)). The Court of Appeals of Georgia placed particular emphasis on the decision of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, Flowers v. Sting Sec., 488 A.2d 523, previously cited by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia as authority for adoption of the Fireman's Rule under Georgia law. It quoted, inter alia, the following passage from that decision discussing the various rationales for the Rule:

Closely intertwined with the primary assumption of risk rationale, and strongly supporting it, but with an independent content of its own is the public policy rationale. That rationale, in a nutshell [has been] articulated [as follows]: "A public safety officer cannot base a tort claim upon damage caused by the very risk that he is paid to encounter and with which he is trained to cope.... Such officers, in accepting the salary and fringe benefits offered for the job, assume all normal risks inherent in the employment as a matter of law and thus may not recover from one who negligently creates such a risk."

Flowers v. Sting Sec., 488 A.2d at 534-35 (citing Steelman v. Lind, 97 Nev. 425, 634 P.2d 666, 667 (1981)).

After review of the leading cases, the Court of Appeals of Georgia furnished its interpretation of the Fireman's Rule:

[T]he public policy of the State of Georgia requires adoption of a Fireman's Rule in Georgia broader than that stated in Ingram.... [W]e now hold that it...