White v. Fl. Hwy. Patrol, Div. of Fl. Dept. of Hwy.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-310-CIV-FTM-17D.,95-310-CIV-FTM-17D.
• Citation: 928 F. Supp. 1153
• Parties: Edward Keith WHITE, Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, A DIVISION OF FLORIDA DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, Bobby R. Burkett, David Kelly, Ronald D. Getman, Bruce A. Takach, James R. Motes, Dean Cassels and Willie Strickland, and Ten Unknown Officers of the Florida Highway Patrol, in their official and individual capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

928 F. Supp. 1153

Edward Keith WHITE, Plaintiff, v. FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, A DIVISION OF FLORIDA DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR VEHICLES, Bobby R. Burkett, David Kelly, Ronald D. Getman, Bruce A. Takach, James R. Motes, Dean Cassels and Willie Strickland, and Ten Unknown Officers of the Florida Highway Patrol, in their official and individual capacities, Defendants.

No. 95-310-CIV-FTM-17D.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division.

June 10, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Douglas L. Wilson, Wilson Law Firm, Naples, FL, for plaintiff.

Henry A. Gill, Jr., Thomas Edward Allison, Attorney General's Office, Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tampa, FL, for defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' VARIOUS MOTIONS TO DISMISS

KOVACHEVICH, Chief Judge.

This action is before this Court on the following motion and response:

1. Defendant, Florida Highway Patrol, and the individual Defendants' motion to dismiss all counts (Dkt. 11).

2. Plaintiff's response in opposition to Defendants' various motions to dismiss. (Dkt. 20).

STATEMENT OF CASE

This is an action for declaratory judgment, reinstatement and damages brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging conspiracy to deprive and deprivation of due process on the basis of race. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff further alleges violation of state law, alleging conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his livelihood and asserts that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiff also claims a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of association. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges all Defendants negligently investigated this matter and thus violated their duty of care.

FACTS

Plaintiff has alleged the following facts in support of his complaint:

1. In 1991 Plaintiff, Edward Keith White, was employed as a state trooper by the Florida Highway Patrol on a probationary status.

2. In August 1991, Plaintiff asked Spencer Gowdy, a person known by Plaintiff to be a convicted felon, to do some repair work on Plaintiff's car.

3. Plaintiff alleges that Gowdy took Plaintiff's car without his permission, picked up Norman Banks, and proceeded at night to a street in Clewiston, Florida. Gowdy then sold a small amount of crack cocaine to Defendant Willie Strickland, an undercover police officer.

4. Defendant Strickland conveyed information about the drug deal to Defendant Cassels, a deputy sheriff with the Hendry County Sheriff's Office, and described the car Gowdy was driving.

5. Defendant Cassels then discussed this information with other deputies of the Sheriff's Office and one of the deputies advised Cassels that the car probably belonged to Plaintiff.

6. Defendant Cassels conveyed the possible identification of the vehicle to the Florida Highway Patrol.

7. The Florida Highway Patrol gave this information to Defendant Motes who obtained Plaintiff's address, went to his residence and obtained Plaintiff's license plate number off his vehicle. Defendant Motes then verified through a computer check that the vehicle belonged to Plaintiff.

8. Defendant Strickland met with Defendant Motes and identified Plaintiff, in a photo line-up, as a passenger in the car Spencer Gowdy was driving.

9. Plaintiff alleges that prior to the meeting to look over the photos, "someone" had informed Defendant Strickland which photo was Plaintiff's.

10. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Motes knew the identification of Plaintiff was false, and that the false identification "was part of a tacit or express conspiracy to get rid of the Plaintiff."

11. Plaintiff alleges that a substantial motivation of the alleged conspiracy was racial discrimination.

12. Defendant Motes interviewed several witnesses, and prepared an investigation report which allegedly grossly distorted the contents of the interviews, concluded that Plaintiff had lied when he denied being present during the drug transaction, and recommended discipline.

13. Defendant Motes knew that the recommended discipline would likely mean termination because Plaintiff was still on probationary status.

14. Defendant Motes' report was sent to Defendant Takach, who forwarded the report to Defendant Burkett and Defendant Getman.

15. Allegedly none of the aforementioned Defendants in paragraph fourteen reviewed the interview transcripts attached to the report, and all of the aforementioned Defendants had a duty to do so.

16. Plaintiff alleges if Defendants had read the interview transcripts attached to the report they would have been put on notice that the investigation was improper, which would have led to facts suggesting that Plaintiff was the victim of racial discrimination, and was in any case innocent.

17. Defendant Getman presented the Motes report to a disciplinary board committee, comprised of the ten (10) unknown Defendant officers of the Florida Highway Patrol, who had the responsibility of recommending action to the Director of the Florida Highway Patrol.

18. Allegedly, the ten (10) unknown Defendant officers recommended dismissal without reviewing the interviews.

19. Defendant Burkett, acting on behalf of the Florida Highway Patrol, accepted the committee's recommendation and fired Plaintiff on October 11, 1991.

20. Allegedly, Defendants Takach and Burkett carelessly and recklessly did not read the report, which contained attachments contradicting the conclusions of Defendant Motes, and together with the remaining Defendants terminated Plaintiff in reliance on the conclusions, which were clearly erroneous.

21. Plaintiff alleges that the termination was based on racial discrimination and was consistent with a pattern of racial discrimination in the Florida Highway Patrol.

22. The same facts support common law counts of conspiracy and negligence.

23. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants also violated his right to freedom of association by terminating him for associating with a family he had known since childhood.

24. The investigation and termination allegedly caused Plaintiff emotional distress and economic injury, entitling him to damages and reinstatement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a motion to dismiss, a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that a Plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). A trial court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, is required to view the complaint in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 721 (11th Cir.1991). Although the Court must take the allegations in a complaint as true when reviewing motions to dismiss, it is not permitted to read into the complaint facts that are not there. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2944-45, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986); Beck v. Interstate Brands Corp., 953 F.2d 1275, 1276 (11th Cir.1992).

In a civil rights action, more than mere conclusory allegations are required; a complaint will be dismissed where allegations are vague and conclusory. Lucas v. Cannon, 848 F.Supp. 168 (M.D.Fla.1994). In 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions against individuals, factual details must be provided that demonstrate a violation of a clearly established right. Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir.1992).

DISCUSSION

I. DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Defendants argue that as a probationary employee, subject to discharge-at-will, Plaintiff did not have a property interest in his job with the Florida Highway Patrol. Defendants rely on an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' case which states "a state employee who may be discharged at will under state law does not have a property interest in his continued employment and is not entitled to the protection of due process." Blanton v. Griel Memorial Psychiatric Hospital, 758 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir.1985). Additionally, Defendants argue they provided Plaintiff with a process that ensured his termination was not arbitrary or capricious, in providing a review of Plaintiff's case by at least thirteen (13) people.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants Motes, Cassels and Strickland have violated his property interest without due process of law by conspiring to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining permanent status with the Florida Highway Patrol. Plaintiff argues that he was denied minimal due process, which is afforded to even probationers, because Defendants discriminated against him due to his race.

Plaintiff asserts that his probationary position was a property right because of the process Defendants undertook in evaluating his possible termination. Plaintiff concedes that if his superior at Florida Highway Patrol was able to fire him on the spot then he would not have a § 1983 claim. However, since Florida Highway Patrol provided an extensive process of investigation, Plaintiff claims he has a property interest in his employment.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Willie Strickland knowingly made a false identification of Plaintiff as being present at a drug deal. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Motes distorted his report on Plaintiff in furtherance of Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff argues that these acts were motivated by racial bias and were compounded by the recklessness of other Defendants in the chain of command at Florida Highway Patrol. Plaintiff claims that Defendants' acts directly and proximately denied Plaintiff his right to a fair process in the enforcement of his contract rights. Plaintiff asserts Defendants are liable under §§ 1981 and 1983 for said violation of his contract rights.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV, § 2.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating:

(1) that the Plaintiff is a

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