White v. Fletcher
| Decision Date | 24 October 1956 |
| Citation | 90 So.2d 129 |
| Parties | W. A. WHITE, Appellant, v. Leonard L. FLETCHER, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Harris L. Kimball, of the office of J. Russell Hornsby, Orlando, for appellant.
M. W. Wells of Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, Orlando, for appellee.
The appellant, W. A. White, plaintiff below, was a police officer for the City of Orlando. In July, 1953, much public attention was focused on White, who was a witness in the prosecution of a prostitute in whose activities he was allegedly involved. The Orange County Ministerial Association wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Board and the Mayor demanded publicly that an investigation be made. Newspaper articles concerning the matter appeared.
On August 4, 1953, in a newspaper article entitled 'City Police Chief Lax, Official Says,' there appeared this statement: 'The Board Chairman said his personal investigation convinced him the man 'is not fit to be a police officer.'' Leonard L. Fletcher, the defendant below and appellee here, who was the chairman of Civil Service Board, made this statement to a newspaper reporter, Paul Thompson, about the plaintiff, W. A. White.
On August 6, 1953, White filed his complaint, charging Fletcher with libel. The defendant answered that the statement was true, was published for good motive, and that defendant's statement was privileged by virtue of the fact that he was a member of the Civil Service Board and felt duty bound to express the sentiments of his office to the public. The answer was filed on January 2, 1954. No other pleading directed to the issue was filed but the plaintiff maintains that a Motion for Summary Judgment (filed by him on November 23, 1954) was itself a pleading directed to the issue. On November 23, 1954, plaintiff filed demand for trial by jury; such demand was denied. Defendant made an oral motion for summary judgment.
On January 6, 1955, the court entered its Final Summary Judgment for defendant, expressing the opinion, upon the pleadings and a deposition, that the publication was privileged and that no evidence of express malice existed. We agree.
It appears from the record that in the first instance Fletcher's comment might well constitute merely an 'opinion or inference from facts assumed to be true' and be, therefore, immune from liability for defamation. 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 131(3). Plaintiff's case fails to prove any lack of good motive.
As expressed by Mr. Justice Terrell in Kennett v. Barber, 159 Fla. 81, 31 So.2d 44, 46, this Court held:
'We think the rule is now generally accepted that any one who seeks public employment or public office or who makes his living by dealing with the public or otherwise seeks public patronage, submits his private character to the scrutiny of those whose patronage he implores, and that they may determine whether it squares with such a standard of integrity and correct morals as warrants their approval.' (Emphasis added.)
The uniformed policeman, therefore, was certainly subject to fair comment and criticism from any member of the public of the City of Orlando. The generally accepted rule is that 'public officials' or 'public men' are subject to such fair comment. Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So.2d 635. This Court has said a person whose duty it is to perform agency for the State is a 'public officer', and that a person in the service of the government who derives his position from duly authorized election or appointment is a public officer. State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477, 22 So. 721. There could be little doubt that a policeman, then, is a 'public officer'.
The plaintiff could well contend that words which impute conduct incompatible with proper exercise of one's lawful business or office are actionable per se, Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, Fla., 66 So.2d 495, Adams v. News-Journal Corporation, Fla., 84 So.2d 549, or that 'when a matter which otherwise would be qualifiedly privileged communication is published falsely, fraudulently and with express malice * * *...
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Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Brautigam, 58-409
...Fla. 431; and Montgomery v. Knox, 23 Fla. 595, 3 So. 211; with State ex rel. Arnold v. Chase, 94 Fla. 1071, 114 So. 856 and White v. Fletcher, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 129. 3 Restatement, Torts, § 606, p. 275, defines privileged criticism (fair comment) ' § 606. General Principle. '(1) Criticism ......
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Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ane, 79-1463
...recognition that early common law did not take into account the complexities of the modern daily newspapers). See also, White v. Fletcher, 90 So.2d 129 (Fla.1956); Abram v. Odham, 89 So.2d 334 (Fla.1956); Leonard v. Wilson, 150 Fla. 503, 8 So.2d 12 (1942). Florida's recognition and media pr......
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Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gellert
...Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974); White v. Fletcher, 90 So.2d 129 (Fla.1956); Lampkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 408 So.2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Coleman v. Collins, 384 So.2d 229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980);......
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Edward L. Nezelek, Inc. v. Sunbeam Television Corp.
...no showing or averment of compliance was made in a pleading. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.120(c). Motions are not pleadings. See, e.g., White v. Fletcher, 90 So.2d 129 (Fla.1956); Raulerson v. Hamm, 394 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110. See also H. Trawick, supra, § 6-1. The complaint w......
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Chapter 12-1 Introduction
...that the legal issues are fully settled by the pleadings, and there exists no genuine dispute as to a material fact." White v. Fletcher, 90 So. 2d 129, 131-32 (Fla. 1956). See Deluxe Motel, Inc. v. Patel, 727 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).[46] See B.B.S. v. R.C.B., 252 So. 2d 837, 839......