White v. Ford

• Decision Date: 03 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-490,82-490
• Citation: White v. Ford, 471 A.2d 1176, 124 N.H. 452 (N.H. 1984)
• Parties: Robert R. WHITE, Executor et al. v. Fred H. FORD, Jr.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1176

471 A.2d 1176

124 N.H. 452

Robert R. WHITE, Executor et al. v. Fred H. FORD, Jr.

No. 82-490.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Feb. 3, 1984.

Edward W. Richards, Nashua, by brief, for plaintiffs.

Arthur O. Gormley, Jr., Nashua, by brief, for defendant.

PER CURIAM.

This action to quiet title presents two questions: first, whether a quitclaim deed of specifically described property is effective, by virtue of the doctrine of estoppel by deed, to convey after-acquired title; and second, whether the quitclaim deed was security for a debt. The Master (James D. O'Neill, Esq.) answered both questions in the affirmative, and the Superior Court (Flynn, J.) approved his report. We affirm and remand for further findings consistent with this opinion.

The plaintiff, Robert R. White, is executor under the will of John E. Ford, who died February 6, 1978. Fred H. Ford, Jr., the defendant, is a nephew of the deceased. By deed dated March 30, 1962, the deceased purported to convey to the defendant by specific description, with quitclaim covenants, approximately ten acres of land in the town of Hudson. At that time, title to the land was held by the town under a tax collector's deed.

At the time of the quitclaim conveyance to the defendant, there was an outstanding mortgage on the property running to a third party, which was assigned to the defendant as part of the same transaction. There is evidence which indicates that, shortly before the deed was executed, the defendant had lent the deceased $1,000 to pay back taxes. There is further evidence indicating that the defendant had lent the decedent money over a period of years. There is a notation on the mortgage instrument that the mortgage note was paid in full by the deceased on January 9, 1963.

On May 3, 1963, the deceased purchased the property from the town. Until his death, the deceased lived there and personally paid whatever taxes were paid on the property, with an undetermined amount of the money being furnished by the defendant.

The deed complies in its form with the statutory requirements for a quitclaim deed, RSA 477:28, and accordingly has the "force and effect of a deed in fee simple" containing covenants:

"that at the time of the delivery of such deed the premises were free from all incumbrances made by the grantor, except as stated, and that he [the grantor] will, and his heirs, executors and administrators shall, warrant and defend the same to the grantee and his heirs, successors and assigns forever against the lawful claims and demands of all persons claiming by, through or under the grantor, but against none other."

Id. The statute's effective date (July 31, 1951) predates the execution and delivery of this deed, and, therefore, governs its provisions.

In the presence of such covenants, the court agrees that the decedent's after-acquired title passed to the defendant pursuant to the doctrine of estoppel by deed. Fletcher v. Chamberlin, 61 N.H. 438, 446 (1881); Kimball v. Blaisdell, 5 N.H. 533 (1837).

Having ruled that title passed to the defendant, the master ruled further that the decedent's quitclaim deed was given to the defendant as security for a debt. A deed absolute on its face may be proven by parol evidence to have been intended by the parties to operate as security for a debt. Page v. Foster, 7 N.H. 392, 394 (1835); see generally 9 Thompson on Real Property § 4733. The intentions of the parties at the time of the conveyance is determinative, see Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Brown Co., 120 N.H. 620, 623, 419 A.2d 1111, 1113 (1980), but those intentions may be inferred from the situation of the parties and their actions after the contract was executed. Auclair v. Bancroft, 121 N.H. 393, 395, 430 A.2d 169, 171 (1981); Summit Elec., Inc. v. Pepin Bros. Const. Inc., 121 N.H. 203, 206, 427 A.2d 505, 507 (1981). Where, as here, the trial court must look to extrinsic evidence to deduce the intentions of the parties, we will adopt the trial court's interpretation of the contract if supported by sufficient evidence. See Baker v. McCarthy, 122 N.H. 171, 175, 443 A.2d 138, 140 (1982); Austin v. Ellis, 119 N.H. 741, 742, 408 A.2d 784 (1979).

Our review of the record compels us to conclude that the evidence does support the finding that the deed was given to the defendant as...