White v. Franklin

• Decision Date: 27 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. DC85-34-NB-O.,DC85-34-NB-O.
• Citation: 637 F. Supp. 601
• Parties: Benjamin O. WHITE, Plaintiff, v. Donald E. FRANKLIN, John R. Kitchens, Walter M. Valesky and the United States of America, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

637 F. Supp. 601

Benjamin O. WHITE, Plaintiff, v. Donald E. FRANKLIN, John R. Kitchens, Walter M. Valesky and the United States of America, Defendants.

No. DC85-34-NB-O.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Delta Division.

May 27, 1986.

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Julie E. Chaffin, Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff.

Patricia D. Rogers, Oxford, Miss., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BIGGERS, District Judge.

This cause came before the court on the motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment filed by defendants Donald E. Franklin, John R. Kitchens, and Walter M. Valesky (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the individual defendants"), who are sued in both their individual and their official capacities, and on the motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment filed by the United States of America ("the USA"). Being fully advised in the premises, the court is now in a position to rule on these motions.

I. FACTS

This action, involving termination of plaintiff Benjamin A. White's flight examiner status, arose from the following uncontested facts. The plaintiff served as a designated flight examiner for the Federal Aviation Administration (the FAA), which is both a component of the Department of Transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 1652(e)(1) (1977, repealed Jan. 12, 1983) and an agency of the defendant USA, from 1968 to 1984. Under "certificates of authority" granted by the Federal Aviation Administrator (the "Administrator") pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1355(a) (1976 & Supp.1986) (empowerment of Administrator to certify private persons as examiners), flight examiners conduct flight tests both for certification of commercial pilots and for aircraft and instrument ratings. Although flight examiners serve as representatives of the FAA, they receive their compensation by charging the examinee a reasonable fee for conducting tests and completing the required reports. See 49 U.S.C. § 1355(a). Flight examiners are appointed for renewable periods of one year, 14 C.F.R. § 183.15(a); however, 14 C.F.R. § 183.15(d) enumerates six circumstances under which a designation may be terminated during its one-year duration.

During 1983, White underwent routine evaluation inspections by defendant Walter W. Valesky, Operations Aviation Safety Inspector for the Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) in Jackson, Mississippi. Valesky allegedly witnessed several instances of improper performance by White and by letter dated February 15, 1984 notified White that his designation as flight examiner was terminated "immediately." Termination was purportedly in accordance with 14 C.F.R. § 183.15(d), which provides that:

A designation as flight examiner made under this subpart terminates ... (4) upon a finding by the Administrator that the representative has not properly performed his duties under the designation; ... or (6) for any reason the Administration the FAA considers appropriate.

Id. The plaintiff allegedly had no notice that his certification was in jeopardy, nor was he specifically informed of the alleged violations until two weeks after termination. White subsequently demanded reconsideration of the decision, and requested information from defendant Kitchens, the Manager of the FSDO in Jackson, Mississippi, as to appeal procedures. Kitchens allegedly denied the existence of any appeal rights; however, after the plaintiff's continued requests, Kitchens reviewed the file and informed the plaintiff by letter that Valesky's action would not be altered.

At the plaintiff's request, a meeting was held on June 12, 1984 in Jackson, Mississippi, between White, Kitchens, Valesky, and defendant Franklin, another safety inspector with the Jackson FSDO. At this conference, the plaintiff was informed in detail of his alleged violations and given an opportunity to explain his actions. The plaintiff allegedly was unable to adequately explain his improper performance; subsequently, Kitchens notified the plaintiff by letter that the termination would not be altered.

The plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the FAA on January 8, 1985, in which he alleged entitlement under both the fifth amendment and 5 U.S.C. § 558 to notice and a hearing prior to termination of his certificate. During the pendency of this administrative claim, the plaintiff filed the instant cause of action on February 7, 1985 against the individual defendants in both their individual and their official capacities. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged entitlement to a due process hearing prior to termination of his certification, and sought both reinstatement and damages. The administrative claim was denied on May 28, 1985; thereafter, the plaintiff filed his first amended complaint, adding the USA as a defendant and deleting the claim for reinstatement. In a second amended complaint, which controls this case, the plaintiff alleges the following causes of action:

(1) Deprivation of life, liberty or property without a due process hearing;

(2) Conspiracy by the individual defendants to deprive the plaintiff of liberty and property without due process of law, including falsification and withholding of information;

(3) Violation of 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (1977), which provides the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity for a due process hearing prior to termination of his certificate of authority; and

(4) Negligent deprivation by the defendants of the plaintiff's due process rights.

Furthermore, the plaintiff specifically detailed his basis for long-arm jurisdiction over the individual defendants.

The defendants' motions to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment allege that the instant action fails on jurisdictional grounds due to filing prior to final disposition of the administrative claim. Furthermore, the individual defendants contest long-arm service of process in their individual capacities. In addition, the defendants contend as a matter of law that the plaintiff was not entitled to a due process hearing. Finally, the defendants assert either absolute, qualified, or sovereign immunity from suit.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION

The original and both amended complaints contain tort claims against the individual defendants both individually and in their official capacities. The defendants contend that suit against the individual defendants in their official capacities is effectively against the United States. See Trammel v. Callaway, 415 F.Supp. 212, 214 (N.D.Miss.1976) (suit against United States officer is against United States if decree operates against sovereign). Accordingly, the defendants assert that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (Supp.1986) prior to filing suit for money damages against the United States. See Rise v. United States, 630 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir.1981) (exhaustion of administrative remedies a jurisdictional prerequisite to tort suit for money damages against United States). Thus, the defendants argue that this portion of the suit should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The defendants' argument is well taken in part. In his original complaint, the plaintiff asserted claims for reinstatement and money damages against the individual defendants, both individually and in their official capacities. The plaintiff's original complaint undoubtedly stated cognizable claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities and, at least as to the non-monetary claim for reinstatement, against the individual defendants in their official capacities; thus, the plaintiff's original complaint presented a live controversy notwithstanding the administrative exhaustion requirements. After denial of the administrative claim, the plaintiff amended his complaint to include the United States as a defendant, to reallege his claim for damages against the individual defendants both individually and in their official capacities, to seek money damages from the United States, and to delete his claim for reinstatement. Clearly, the claim against the United States was properly filed after denial of the administrative claim. Furthermore, the amended complaint, realleging a claim for money damages from the individual defendants in their official capacities, was filed after denial of the administrative claim. No prejudice resulted to the defendants from the filing of the amended complaint; in addition, no objection could have been raised had the plaintiff filed the identical complaint as an entirely new cause of action rather than as an amended complaint in this cause. Under such circumstances, the court will not require the empty formalism of initiation of a new cause of action, nor will the relation-back doctrine of Fed.R. Civ.P. 15(c) apply to bar this suit. United States v. Reiten, 313 F.2d 673, 675 (9th Cir.1963) (non-application of relation-back doctrine when defeative of remedial purpose); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 15.15(5) (2d Ed.1985) (refusal of courts to apply relation-back doctrine to cause prematurity of claim in amended complaint.)

However, the plaintiff did not present his conspiracy claim to an administrative agency. This claim, which seeks only money damages, is improper against both the United States and the individual defendants in their official capacities¹ under the administrative exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).

Accordingly, the defendants' motions to dismiss are well taken and shall be GRANTED as to the plaintiff's claim of conspiracy asserted against the United States and the individual defendants in their official capacities; however, the motions are not well taken and shall be DENIED as to other claims.

III. LONG-ARM JURISDICTION

The individual defendants concede proper long-arm service of process on them in their official capacities, but contest long-arm jurisdiction in their individual capacities. All individual defendants are...