White v. Golden Corral of Hampton, LLC
| Decision Date | 13 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:13cv27 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | GLORILFNE WHITE, Plaintiff, v. GOLDEN CORRAL OF HAMPTON, LLC, Defendant. |
Before the Court is Defendant Golden Corral of Hampton. LLC's ("Defendant" or "Golden Corral") Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 25, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Having carefully considered the parties' pleadings, this matter is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth herein. Defendant's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.
Plaintiff Glorilene White ("Plaintiff"), a former Assistant Manager of the Bakery for Golden Corral of Hampton, brought this claim against Defendant, her former employer, alleging she was terminated as a result of her visual disability and in retaliation for exercising her protected rights. Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. Defendant denies Plaintiff's claims and maintains thai Plaintiff was terminated for performance issues, including excessive tardiness. Answer ¶ 2-5, ECF No. 4.
In 2006, at the time of her hire, Plaintiff informed Golden Corral managers that she had a visual disability which prevents her from driving. Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 27. Plaintiff alleges that her Golden Corral manager allowed her to arrive late to work since she depended on taxis for transportation. Def.'s Am. Mot. Summ. J. Mem. ¶ 14, ECF No. 26. Plaintiff also alleges that her manager agreed to print her monthly work schedule because her visual disability rendered her unable to view images on a computer screen. Pl.'s Opp'n 1. Plaintiff considers both the late arrival time and the printed schedules to be accommodations to her position that enabled her perform her job with her visual disability.
In January 2010, Plaintiff spoke with her manager James Rex Hoover about a fellow employee's accusation that certain Golden Corral staff members were illegal aliens. Def.'s Am. Mot. at ¶ 2-3. Plaintiff asserts that after this conversation with Hoover, Golden Corral management rescinded her accommodations. Pl.'s Opp'n 1 -2. Defendant counters that around that time, Golden Corral management developed concerns about Plaintiff's performance because her late arrivals became frequent and excessive. Def.'s Am. Mot. 3. On February 20, 2010, Plaintiff met with Hoover to discuss disciplinary actions as a result of her excessive tardiness. Id. ¶ 13. The disciplinary document, described as a "final warning," advised Plaintiff that continuing to arrive late to work "may result in severe disciplinary action from demotion of position up to and including termination." Id. Because Plaintiff continued to arrive late to work, she was terminated on May 1, 2010. Id. at 20.
After receiving a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on November 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed her Complaint pro se against Defendant on February 25, 2013. On November 26, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion for Sanctions, alleging that Plaintiff did not respond to discovery requests or appear for her deposition. On January 15, 2014, this Court accepted the findings of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, which foundsanctions appropriate because Plaintiff failed to comply with discovery. The Court ordered Plaintiff, who had recently obtained counsel, to respond to interrogatories, grant a discovery deposition and pay certain fees to Defendant. This Court also granted Defendant leave to file an amended summary judgment motion. Defendant filed the instant Amended Motion for Summary Judgment on February 14, 2014.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also McKinney v. Bd. of Truststees of Md. Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992) () (citations omitted). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts, and inferences to be drawn from the facts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 411 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,587 (1986).
Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party "must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). "Genuineness means that the evidence must create fair doubt; wholly speculative assertions will not suffice." Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by.Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also Ash v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 800 F.2d 409, 411-12 (4th Cir. 1986) ().
The relevant portion of Title VII prohibits discrimination against any employee who "has opposed any ... unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a). The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") provides, "[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter..." 42 U.S.C § 12203(a)-(b). Retaliation claims pursuant to the ADA are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), "pretext" framework. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 432 (4th Cir. 2006). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff "must prove that (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer acted adversely against her, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the asserted adverse action." Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011). If the plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima facie case for retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action. Laber, 438 F.3d at 432. If the defendant provides evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was a pretext for retaliation. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-48 (2000). The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. Id.
Defendant claims that Plaintiff has not established that she engaged in a protected activity or that a causal connection between such a protected activity and her termination exists. Instead, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff was terminated for excessive tardiness, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination that bore no relation to a protected activity.
Plaintiff raises no opposition or response to Defendant's request for summary judgment on her retaliation claim. Defendant's argument that Plaintiff fails to state a viable retaliation claim has been uncontroverted and Plaintiff has not established that there is any genuine issue of material fact in dispute. In opposing the summary judgment motion, Plaintiff did not present evidence that her report of alleged discrimination or unlawful conduct was a protected activity that caused Defendant's adverse employment action against her. Plaintiff also failed to present evidence that excessive tardiness was a pretextual explanation for her termination. Therefore, Defendant's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment as to the retaliation claim is GRANTED.
In supporting a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact. Defendant emphasizes Plaintiff's noncompliance with Local Rule 56(B), which requires a specific listing of facts in dispute in response to an opposing party's statement of material undisputed facts. See EDVA Local Rules, Local Civil Rules, pg. 25 (Nov. 19, 2010). Local Rule 56(B) states that briefs in opposition to summary judgment must contain a specifically captioned section listing all material facts contended to be in dispute, with citations to the parts of the...
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