White v. Gregory

• Decision Date: 23 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-7641,91-7641
• Parties: Jess WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald O. GREGORY; Michael House, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

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1 F.3d 267

Jess WHITE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald O. GREGORY; Michael House, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-7641.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 2, 1992.

Decided Aug. 23, 1993.

Larry Michael Bonham, Larry L. Rowe, Charleston, WV, argued, for plaintiff-appellant.

Rita A. Stuart, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, WV, argued, for defendants-appellees.

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

Jess White, a prisoner at Pruntytown Correctional Center, West Virginia, brought this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988) alleging that prison officials were denying him three meals a day in violation of his civil rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He sought both injunctive relief and damages. The district court dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) (1988), and White appealed. We affirm.

I

White states in his complaint that the defendants, Ronald O. Gregory and Michael House, allowed him only two meals a day on weekends and holidays, thereby forcing him to forego food for periods of up to eighteen hours. House is the Superintendent at the Pruntytown Correctional Center, and Gregory is the Commissioner of the West Virginia Department of Corrections. White explicitly stated that he was suing both defendants "as individuals."

White's complaint was referred to a magistrate judge, who concluded that White's allegations were sufficient to state a claim under Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461, 465 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837, 99 S.Ct. 121, 58 L.Ed.2d 133 (1978) (holding that an allegation that prisoners were "not provided with three wholesome and nutritious meals a day" stated a claim). Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended that White be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court adopted the recommendation and ordered that White's complaint be filed and that Defendants be served.

Defendants did not file an answer within twenty days of service of the complaint as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). White moved for a default judgment, which the district court denied. Instead, finding excusable neglect, the court granted Defendants' motion for additional time in which to file a responsive pleading. Defendants then moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

In support of the motion to dismiss, ¹ House submitted an affidavit in which he stated that White lived in a basement apartment in the Superintendent's (i.e., House's) residence. House stated that White had full access both to House's refrigerator and to a separate refrigerator that White was allowed to keep fully stocked with food. Defendants also submitted the affidavit of Geraldine Lambert, who worked with food services at Pruntytown. Lambert stated that White was allowed to select three to four days worth of food from the prison food supplies for his own refrigerator.

White responded by submitting an affidavit in which he claimed that he only had access "to the kitchen at the Superintendent's house ... when [he] cleaned it or while cooking House's meals." (J.A. 68A.) In addition, White filed a "Motion Not to Dismiss" in which he stated that "while House was Superintendent, he was not allowed food at the Superintendent's house. And [he] was not allowed to cook at the Superintendent's house for himself." (J.A. at 63A.) White "agree[d] that House had food sent to the Superintendent['s] house[,] but it was state food that House ate[,] not Plaintiff." (J.A. at 63A.) White reiterated this point in his affidavit, claiming that he was unable to get food from the Pruntytown Correctional Center's kitchen because he was restricted to the Superintendent's residence. Finally, in his verified complaint, White claimed that he told House that he was entitled to three meals a day, and that House responded by laughing and saying that "he didn't care what the courts said on feeding three meals a day to inmates." (J.A. at 16A.)

The matter was referred to a magistrate judge who recommended dismissal under Sec. 1915(d) on two grounds. First, the magistrate judge determined that Defendants were acting in their official capacities, and held that they were therefore immune from suit under Sec. 1983. Second, the magistrate judge determined that White's allegation that "he was denied three meals a day is refuted by affidavits attached to defendants' motion to dismiss." (J.A. at 58A.) The magistrate judge also determined that White's claim for injunctive relief was moot because he was no longer incarcerated at Pruntytown. See Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir.1987). The district court accepted the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissed the complaint.

II

A

Section 1915(d) grants district courts the power to dismiss in forma pauperis complaints that are either frivolous or malicious. The Supreme Court has determined that a complaint is frivolous under Sec. 1915(d) "where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law where it is based on an "indisputably meritless legal theory." Id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact where "the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible." Denton v. Hernandez, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992).

Dismissals under Sec. 1915(d) are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1734. District courts typically will grant a plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis only after making a preliminary finding that the complaint is not frivolous. Since leave to proceed in forma pauperis is necessary for service under Sec. 1915(b), most dismissals under Sec. 1915(d) occur before any of the defendants are served. However, even if a complaint has been filed and served, district courts have discretion under Sec. 1915(d) to dismiss the complaint where in the course of litigation it becomes evident that the plaintiff's allegations are clearly baseless in law or fact. See id. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1731-34 (holding that dismissal under Sec. 1915(d) is appropriate where affidavits supporting amended complaint indicated that the initial complaint was factually frivolous). Section 1915(d) does not, however, empower district courts to resolve genuine issues of material fact. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1734.

Although the district court dismissed the complaint here because White's claims appeared factually frivolous in light of the affidavits submitted by Defendants, we do not address whether dismissal on this ground was justified. Instead, we affirm the dismissal under Sec. 1915(d) because White's theory of an Eighth Amendment violation is indisputably meritless under Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375 (4th Cir.1993).

In Strickler, we held that a prisoner must suffer "serious or significant physical or mental injury" in order to be "subjected to cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the" Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1381. Here, White admits that he received three meals a day except for weekends and holidays, when he received two meals. He makes no suggestion of any deleterious physical or mental effects from this meal schedule. Dieticians may quibble over whether two meals a day provide a nutritionally balanced diet, but the deprivation alleged here simply does not rise to the level of a "serious or significant physical or mental injury."

We conclude that the facts stated in White's complaint plainly indicate that his claims are indisputably meritless, and hence that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d).

B

White raises two other matters that we need address only briefly. First, he challenges the district court's holding that Defendants were acting in their official capacities and were therefore immune from suit under Sec. 1983. The district court relied upon language in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2311-12, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), which suggested that state officials are immune from suit under Sec. 1983 if they act in their official capacities. The Supreme Court recently rejected that interpretation of Will, holding that "state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are 'persons' within the meaning of Sec. 1983" and are not "absolutely immune from personal liability under Sec. 1983 solely by virtue of the 'official' nature of their acts." Hafer v. Melo, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 358, 365, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); see also Goodmon v....