White v. Hines

• Citation: 109 S.E. 31,182 N.C. 275
• Decision Date: 26 October 1921
• Docket Number: 289.
• Parties: WHITE v. HINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS, ET AL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

109 S.E. 31

182 N.C. 275

WHITE v. HINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF RAILROADS, ET AL.

No. 289.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 26, 1921

Appeal from Superior Court, Cumberland County; Daniels, Judge.

Action by Samuel A. White, by his guardian, against Walker D. Hines Director General of Railroads, and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. No error.

The charge must be considered as a whole in the connected way in which it was given, and on presumption that the jury did not overlook any portion of it, and if when so construed it presents the law fairly and correctly, it will afford no ground for reversal, though expressions standing alone might be regarded as erroneous.

Where the competency of an injured person executing a release was in question, and defendant's witness testified that he paid the injured person a sum of money, and that his mental condition at that time was good, denied on cross-examination having told plaintiff that the injured person was in mighty bad shape when witness gave him the check, evidence of such statement was admissible for purpose of contradiction.

This was a civil action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for injury to Samuel A. White, the ward of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants. The case was tried before his honor, Frank Daniels, Judge, and a jury at the March term, 1920, of the superior court of Cumberland county, the trial resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.

The plaintiff moved to substitute John Barton Payne as the successor of Walker D. Hines as Director General of Railroads.

Upon the trial, there was evidence for the plaintiff tending to show that her ward, Samuel A. White, while a passenger on a train of the defendants, was injured by the derailment of the train; that he was "thrown about within the coach," which was overturned; that he was injured on the back of the head about the base of the brain, and that his body and limbs were bruised; that his mind was seriously affected; that he was treated, after the injury, in the Tranquil Park Sanitarium in Charlotte, at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, and at the Highsmith Hospital in the city of Fayetteville; and that he is now confined in the State Hospital for the Insane. The plaintiff alleged that the injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendants in the operation of the train in the negligent care of the rolling stock and roadbed, and in the negligent failure properly to inspect and to care for them. The plaintiff further alleged that her ward, by reason of said injuries, had suffered great pain, had incurred expense for medical and hospital service, had been ruined in physical health, and made permanently insane; that his earning capacity had been destroyed, and his family deprived of his support; that prior to the alleged injuries, to wit July 20, 1917, her ward had been strong and vigorous, both mentally and physically; and that he had been industrious, skillful, and proficient in his occupation of "beamer and stationary engineer."

The defendants denied that they were negligent in any of the respects complained of, and that the plaintiff's injury, if any, was due to an accident which could not reasonably have been foreseen or prevented.

The defendants further alleged that the plaintiff's ward had executed to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, one of the defendants, a release and receipt in full for his claim for damages resulting from the alleged injuries. This alleged release was introduced in evidence.

There was evidence tending to show that the derailment had been caused by a washout in the roadbed; that the section master had examined the track about three hours before the derailment occurred, and had found it apparently in safe condition; that the train had been inspected before it left Rocky Mount, and was found to be in good condition in all respects; and that it was skillfully operated by a competent crew. There was evidence tending to show that there had been heavy rains for one or two days, and that a hole under the track, five or six feet deep, had been caused by water running underneath.

There was evidence for the plaintiff tending to show that her ward's mind had been seriously impaired by the injuries which he had sustained in the derailment, and that he did not have sufficient mental capacity to execute the release introduced in evidence by the defendants, and that the release had been procured by fraud and undue influence. Plaintiff contended that said release, for this reason, was voidable. There was evidence for the defendant tending to show that the plaintiff's ward had sufficient mental capacity to execute said release. Evidence was introduced tending to show his mental condition prior to the alleged derailment, at that time and thereafter, and especially with reference to his mental condition at the time the release was alleged to have been signed. There was further evidence for the plaintiff tending to show that her ward had judicially been declared a lunatic in July, 1918, by a proceeding duly prosecuted before the clerk of the superior court of Cumberland county, and that the plaintiff had duly been appointed as his guardian.

At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendants moved for judgment as in case of nonsuit, and at the close of all the evidence, this motion was renewed.

The defendant's motion was allowed as to the Railroad Administration and denied as to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. To the court's refusal to dismiss as to the railroad company, the company duly excepted.

The issues were answered by the jury, as follows:

(1) Was the plaintiff injured by the negligence of the defendant as alleged in the complaint? A. Yes.

(2) Did plaintiff execute the release set out in the answer? A. Yes.

(3) Was the execution of said release procured by fraud, or undue influence, as alleged in the reply? A. Yes.

(4) Was plaintiff incapable, by reason of mental affliction, to execute the said release, as alleged in the reply? A. Yes.

(5) What damages, if any, is plaintiff entitled to recover of the defendant? A. $12,500, less $554 paid.

Judgment was entered for $11,946, together with the costs of this action. The defendants appealed.

Rose & Rose, of Fayetteville, for appellants.

Evans & Eason, of Raleigh, for appellee.

ADAMS J.

There are 52 exceptions in the record, several of which have been formally abandoned.

The plaintiff alleged that the train in which her ward was traveling "was wrecked by derailment." In their answer the defendants admitted that the train was "wrecked by derailment without fault or negligence on the part of the defendants, or any of their agents or employees." The plaintiff offered in evidence the following portion of the answer:

"Answering the allegations contained in article 5 of the complaint, the defendants admit that on July 20, 1917, S. A. White was a passenger on train No. 89 of defendants, en route to Hope Mills, N. C., and that while said White was a passenger on said train, about 1 1/2 miles from Hope Mills, said train was wrecked by derailment."

The defendants objected on the ground that the remainder of their allegations was omitted, and that the court below should have excluded the evidence or required the plaintiff to offer the additional phrase denying "fault or negligence on the part of the defendants." The evidence offered by the plaintiff was admitted, and the defendants excepted. This is the first exception in the record.

Evidence of the derailment and of the ward's injury as the proximate result was sufficient on the question of negligence to carry the case to the jury. The plaintiff's allegation that the train had been wrecked by derailment was the distinct statement of a circumstance relevant to the first issue. Proof of the plaintiff's qualification as guardian, of the derailment of the train, and of the ward's personal injury as the proximate result, nothing else appearing, made a prima facie case for the plaintiff, and upon the defendants devolved the duty of explaining the alleged wreck. In a number of decisions this principle has been applied, and it has frequently been held, in accordance with his honor's ruling, that the admission of a separate fact relevant to the inquiry, though only a part of an entire paragraph, is competent without qualifying or explanatory matter inserted by way of defense. Sawyer v. R. R., 145 N.C. 30, 58 S.E. 598, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 200; Stewart v. R. R., 136 N.C. 387, 48 S.E. 793; Wade v. Contracting Co., 149 N.C. 177, 62 S.E. 919. The first exception cannot be sustained.

Exceptions 9, 10, 11, 21, 23, 24, 29, 30, 32, 35, 36, 38, and 39 are addressed, directly or inferentially, to the mental condition of the plaintiff's ward, and may be grouped and considered together. All these exceptions are without real merit. The defendants offered in evidence a paper writing purporting to be the ward's receipt for $554, and a release of the railroad company from all liability resulting from the derailment. The plaintiff replied that Samuel A White was mentally incapacitated to such an extent that at the time of its execution he could not comprehend the nature and effect of the instrument to which he had affixed his signature. Evidence as to White's mental condition, then, was both material and essential. The defendants contended that testimony to the effect that he "was crazy" or "not normal" was the statement of a positive conclusion, or fact, and, for this reason incompetent. But in this jurisdiction it is established that a nonexpert witness, who has had conversations and dealings with another, and a reasonable opportunity,...