White v. Idaho Transp. Dep't

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BRODY, Justice.
• Citation: 549 P.3d 1077
• Docket Number: Docket No. 50746
• Decision Date: 03 June 2024
• Parties: Aaron Michael WHITE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, Respondent.
• topic: Administrative Law,Transportation

549 P.3d 1077

Aaron Michael WHITE, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, Respondent.

Docket No. 50746

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Opinion Filed: June 3, 2024

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Shoshone County. Barbara A. Duggan, District Judge.

The decision of the district court is affirmed.

Sullivan Law Office, PLLC, Coeur d’Alene, for Appellant. Joseph Sullivan argued.

Mark Alan Jackson, Coeur d’Alene, for Respondent. Mark Alan Jackson argued.

BRODY, Justice.

This appeal concerns a petition for judicial review of the administrative suspension of Aaron White’s driving privileges and whether the common law defense of necessity may be raised during an administrative license suspension ("ALS") hearing. White received a DUI citation and a notice of suspension of his driving privileges after he drove his wife to the hospital for emergency medical treatment following an ATV accident. During an Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") ALS hearing, the ALS Hearing Officer rejected White’s argument that his conduct was legally excusable under the necessity defense. The district court affirmed the ALS Hearing Officer’s decision to sustain White’s suspension. White timely appealed to this Court, arguing that the district court erred when it held White could not avail himself of the necessity defense in the ALS hearing. We affirm the district court’s decision.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Factual Background

On August 26, 2022, Aaron White and his wife Kristy White ("Kristy") were camping at a campsite in Shoshone County, Idaho. Kristy was injured after crashing her ATV. During the ALS hearing, Kristy testified that her injuries were severe, including a head injury, broken ribs, and a collapsed lung. She believed her injuries to be life threatening. White testified that he attempted to call 9-1-1 for an ambulance at their campsite; however, cell phone service was "spotty" and he was unable to successfully complete the call. White further testified he drove about "halfway down" "Two Mile Road" and, once they regained cell phone service, Kristy called 9-1-1 to request an ambulance. White gave the dispatcher their exact location and she informed him an officer was en route.

At approximately 1:00 A.M., Deputy Minier was dispatched to the scene and encountered the Whites near the bottom of the hill on Two Mile Road. White testified to the following exchange between himself and Deputy Minier:

[W]hen we got down to the bottom of the hill, there was an officer down there. And he said, "Would you like me to call an ambulance?" And I said, "I don’t know if we have the time." And he said, "1’ll follow you there." And we drove to the hospital.

White testified that he understood Deputy Minier’s offer to call an ambulance to mean an ambulance had not yet been requested when he and Kristy initially made the request to the 9-1-1 dispatcher. White testified that at the time he and Kristy encountered Deputy Minier, about an hour to an hour-and-a-half had passed since the time Kristy was injured. White believed an ambulance would take another fifteen to twenty minutes to arrive at their location. White testified that Kristy "was not herself by any means," had significant amounts of blood in her hair and on her face, and was not "conscious and alert and responsive to normal conversation." White was scared and worried about his wife’s injuries and blood loss and wanted to protect her well-being by getting her to the hospital as quickly as possible.

As the Whites were about to leave the bottom of the hill on Two Mile Road with Deputy Minier following behind, a second law enforcement officer, Deputy Bowman, arrived at the scene. Deputy Minier informed Deputy Bowman he would follow behind the Whites’ vehicle as White drove to the Shoshone Medical Center ("SMC"). All three vehicles arrived at SMC around the same time.

In his probable cause affidavit, Deputy Bowman of the Shoshone County Sheriff’s Office ("SCSO") stated that he arrived at SMC at approximately 1:19 A.M. When he arrived, he observed White exiting the driver’s seat of his truck, helping Kristy into the hospital, and then parking his truck in the parking lot. Deputy Bowman approached White and spoke to him next to White’s truck. According to the affidavit, White was slurring his speech and speaking in a slow tone and Deputy Bowman asked him whether he had been drinking. White admitted to drinking six beers, the last at 9:00 P.M. (four hours prior), and, when prompted, White stated that he thought he was over the legal limit. Deputy Bowman then informed White he had reason to believe White operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and asked White if he would be willing to perform field sobriety tests. White agreed. Deputy Bowman reported that White failed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN), walk and turn, and one leg stand tests. Thereafter, White agreed to a breathalyzer test and, at approximately 2:04 A.M., provided two breath samples. Deputy Bowman recorded White’s breathalyzer results as .159 and .156 BrAC (breath alcohol content).

Deputy Bowman issued White a misdemeanor citation for driving under the influence, Idaho Code section 18-8004(1)(a), and a notice of suspension of his driving privileges pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-8002A, which mandates administrative license suspension when a driver fails evidentiary tests for alcohol concentration. After giving White the citation and notice of administrative license suspension, Deputy Bowman allowed White to re-enter SMC.

B. Procedural Background

Three days after White was cited, he requested an ALS hearing before an ALS Hearing Officer to contest his license suspension. During the hearing, White did not dispute that he drove his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in excess of the legal limit. Rather, White argued that his conduct was legally excusable under the common law necessity defense.

The ALS Hearing Officer rejected White’s argument and concluded that "the common law ‘necessity’ defense is not grounds for challenging [an] administrative license suspension and is not sufficient cause for vacating the suspension." In support of this conclusion, the Hearing Officer noted that the necessity defense is not one of the five enumerated grounds for vacating a license suspension under Idaho Code section 18-8002A(7)(a)-(e). The ALS Hearing Officer also cited an unpublished district court decision, Hemry v. Idaho Transportation Department, Adams County Case CV2014-3228 (2014), which rejected a similar argument:

Additionally, Hemry v. ITD, Adams County Case CV2014-3228, entered September 18, 2014, provides in part that the necessity defense is not available to a petitioner as a defense in an administrative license suspension case as plain language of the statute and interpreting case law limit the grounds available to the petitioner.

White timely petitioned the district court for judicial review of the ALS Hearing Officer’s decision sustaining White’s suspension. After hearing oral arguments, the district court affirmed the ALS Hearing Officer’s decision to sustain White’s suspension.

White timely filed a notice of appeal.

II. Standards of Review

[1] "An [ALS] hearing under Idaho Code section 18-8002A results in an ‘agency action’ and is, therefore, governed by the [Idaho Administrative Procedure Act]." Wood v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 172 Idaho 300, 306, 532 P.3d 404, 410 (2023) (quoting Reagan v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 169 Idaho 689, 693, 502 P.3d 1027, 1031 (2021)). The hearing officer’s order is subject to challenge through a petition for judicial review. I.C. § 18-8002A(8). The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act ("APA," Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code) limits the grounds upon which an agency action may be set aside:

On judicial review, the APA directs that the hearing officer’s decision must be affirmed unless the court determines that the officer’s "findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions" are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or

(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Wood, 172 Idaho at 306-07, 532 P.3d at 409-10 (quoting I.C. § 67-5279(3)).

[2, 3] "On appeal, this Court reviews agency decisions directly, independent of the district court’s determination." Wood, 172 Idaho at 306, 532 P.3d at 409 (quoting Reagan, 169 Idaho at 693, 502 P.3d at 1031). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Williams v. Idaho State Bd. of Real Estate Appraisers, 157 Idaho 496, 502, 337 P.3d 655, 661 (2014) (quoting Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 420, 247 P.3d 644, 647 (2011)). This Court may set aside the agency’s decision if it determines the agency erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3)(a)-(e) and that "a substantial right of the a challenging party has been prejudiced." Wood, 172 Idaho at 306, 532 P.3d at 410 (quoting I.C. § 67-5279(4)). "If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." Id. (quoting I.C. § 67-5279(3)).

III. Analysis

A. The necessity defense is unavailable to petitioners in ALS proceedings under the plain language of the ALS statute.

[4] White challenges the ALS Hearing Officer’s conclusion that the common law defense of necessity is unavailable to petitioners in ALS proceedings. Citing to this Court’s decision in Reagan v. Idaho Transportation Department, 169 Idaho 689, 502 P.3d 1027 (2021), White contends that the failure to provide for such a defense in an ALS proceeding violates constitutional standards, specifically his right to raise a defense under the Sixth Amendment and his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In...