White v. Jeffrey Galion, Inc.
Decision Date | 05 May 1971 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 70-26. |
Citation | 326 F. Supp. 751 |
Parties | Holly J. WHITE, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY GALION, INC., an Ohio corporation, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Illinois |
Leon G. Scroggins, Madison, Ill., for plaintiff.
Ray Freeark, Belleville, Ill., for defendant.
This diversity action seeks recovery for injuries allegedly received due to a defective steering valve on a hydraulically operated ram car manufactured by defendant.
In his amended Count I plaintiff alleges that on February 22, 1968, he was an employee of Peabody Coal Company (Peabody), working in Eagle Mine No. 1 in Shawneetown, Illinois; that defendant sold to Peabody hydraulically operated ram cars, which were in use on and prior to the date of the injury; that on February 22, 1968, plaintiff was engaged in his employment when one of the ram cars went out of control due to a defective steering valve and collided with and broke a high pressure air hose, which struck him, causing serious and permanent injuries; that at the time the defendant sold the hydraulically operated ram cars to Peabody, the same were unreasonably dangerous in that there was a defective steering valve on the ram car in question.
Defendant moves for summary judgment as to Amended Count I, charging that plaintiff was an employee of Peabody; that the injury to plaintiff resulted from a collision of the alleged defective ram car with a high pressure line which then struck the plaintiff, causing the injury for which this suit is brought; that plaintiff has admitted in his deposition that he had gone to work for Peabody as a repairman and electrician at Eagle Mine No. 1 on September 11, 1967, about six months prior to the accident; that on the day in question he had been assigned on the particular ram car which he alleges caused his injury; that when he was injured he was not on the ram car but was standing in an open passageway, waiting for the ram car in question to arrive from another passageway; that as the ram car approached, it struck an air line which broke and flipped into plaintiff, causing his injuries; that the air line is not part of the ram car but is a one inch metal tube which comes into the mine from outside and is anchored at the roof of the mine; that it has been conclusively established through pleadings and depositions that plaintiff's status relative to the allegedly defective product at the time of the occurrence was not as a "user or consumer," but that of a "bystander"; and that in an action based on a defective product in the State of Illinois, a bystander has no standing to sue the manufacturer of a defective product, and plaintiff will, therefore, not qualify as a party eligible to recover under the theory of strict liability in products.
In Suvada v. White Motor Company, 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182, the Supreme Court of Illinois laid to rest the privity defense in actions against manufacturers, sellers, contractors, etc., and held these parties to strict privity-free liability for any injury or damage caused by any unreasonably dangerous products which one or all of them might place in the stream of commerce insofar as users and consumers are concerned. Prior to Suvada, privity was an essential ingredient to liability in a negligence action against a manufacturer.
The Fifth District Appellate Court in Wright v. Massey-Harris, Incorporated, 68 Ill.App.2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465, a products liability case dealing with an allegedly defective cornpicker, discussed post-Suvada law in Illinois and compared the new products liability provisions with the provisions which existed prior to Suvada, stating:
Although the Fifth District Appellate Court in Wright did not have before it the factual situation presented in the Murphy case, it nevertheless indicates it would, if presented a similar factual situation in a post-Suvada case, apply the doctrine of Suvada and extend liability to cover the innocent child although the child would under such circumstances be, as the plaintiff might be considered to be in the present action, a mere...
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