White v. Klitzkie

• Decision Date: 20 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-16347.,00-16347.
• Parties: Jackery B. WHITE, Petitioner, v. Robert KLITZKIE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

281 F.3d 920

Jackery B. WHITE, Petitioner, v. Robert KLITZKIE, Respondent.

No. 00-16347.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted November 6, 2001.

Filed February 20, 2002.

Elizabeth A. Fisher, Honolulu, HI, for the petitioner.

Tricia R.S. Ada, Deputy Attorney General, Hagatna, GU, for the respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Guam; John S. Unpingco, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-00-00011-JSU.

Before THOMPSON, O'SCANNLAIN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge THOMPSON; Dissent by Judge BERZON

DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

Jackery B. White, a prisoner serving a sentence imposed by the Territory of Guam, appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court determined that White's petition was procedurally barred and unexhausted, and denied his request for a certificate of appealability. We granted a certificate of appealability, limited to the issues of "whether the district court properly dismissed the petition based on failure to exhaust and procedural default."

In advance of oral argument, it became apparent that there was a threshold issue of whether White's habeas petition was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a ground asserted by the respondent in the district court and in this court. We asked for and received from the parties supplemental briefing on that issue. The issue was also fully explored at oral argument.

Although the statute of limitations issue was not included in the certificate of appealability, we can affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record. See Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1100 n. 2 (9th Cir.2000). We conclude that White's federal habeas petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), that statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) did not render the petition timely filed, and White is not entitled to equitable tolling. Cf. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of White's petition without reaching the grounds upon which the district court dismissed it.

I

On August 13, 1993, White pleaded guilty in the Superior Court of Guam to one count of robbery with a special allegation that the robbery was committed while he was on release pending prosecution of earlier burglary charges. On October 1, 1993, White was sentenced to a total term of 30 years — 10 years on the robbery conviction, and another 20 years resulting from the special allegation. White's motion to reduce his sentence was denied by the Guam Superior Court.

White directly appealed his sentence to the Appellate Division of the United States District Court for the District of Guam, which at that time had jurisdiction over all appeals from the local courts of Guam pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3.¹ Upon the request of his appointed counsel, however, White's direct appeal was dismissed with prejudice on December 19, 1995.

On August 26, 1994, White filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Guam. He alleged that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, because his counsel had a conflict of interest. He also alleged that his counsel was incompetent, and as a result of his counsel's incompetence and conflict, White was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Guam Superior Court appointed counsel for White and held an evidentiary hearing. On May 12, 1997, the Guam Superior Court denied White's habeas petition, finding that his counsel was conflict-free and competent, and that his plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily.

With the assistance of counsel, White appealed the denial of his habeas petition to the Supreme Court of Guam. He again alleged that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because his counsel had a conflict of interest. He also alleged that the Guam Superior Court should have granted his petition for the writ because the government's return was not filed on time. The Supreme Court of Guam treated White's appeal as an original petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On December 16, 1998, following a de novo review of White's claims, the Supreme Court of Guam filed an opinion denying his petition on the merits.

White contends that shortly thereafter, on December 28, 1998, he attempted to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with this court. The record contains a "Notice of Appeal," signed by White and dated December 28, 1998. Although this document is captioned for filing in the Supreme Court of Guam, the text indicates that it is an "appeal[] to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. ..." (emphasis in original). White contends that he intended this document to be a petition to this court for a writ of certiorari, and that on December 28, 1998 he sent the document "to the Ninth Circuit for filing through the Guam Department of Corrections Officials." The document was never filed with this court. White sent a follow-up letter in October 1999,² and received in response a letter from a deputy clerk dated November 2, 1999, stating that White had no matter pending in this court.

On March 13, 2000, White, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the District of Guam.³

The district court dismissed White's petition, and this appeal followed.

II

Prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), there was effectively no limit on the time during which a state prisoner could file a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Under the AEDPA, however, a state prisoner must file his federal habeas corpus petition within one year of the date his state conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). White's conviction became final on December 19, 1995, when he dismissed his direct appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (statute of limitations runs from "the conclusion of direct review or the time for seeking such review").

Because White's conviction became final prior to the AEDPA's enactment, the earliest date the one-year statute of limitations for filing his federal habeas petition would have begun to run was the date the AEDPA went into effect, April 24, 1996. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.1999). On that date, however, White had a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pending before the Superior Court of Guam. Thus, the statute of limitations was further tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), which provides tolling for "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending."

The statute of limitations remained tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) while White sought a writ of habeas corpus through Guam's territorial procedures. See Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006. Consistent with those procedures, White presented his habeas petition to the Superior Court of Guam and then to the Supreme Court of Guam. The latter court denied White's petition on December 16, 1998. That denial ended statutory tolling of the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2), and the one-year statute of limitations began to run.⁴ White did not file his federal habeas petition in the United States District Court until March 13, 2000. White's federal petition, therefore, is barred by the one-year statute of limitations unless he is entitled to some additional period of tolling.

White argues he is entitled to an additional 90 days of tolling from December 16, 1998, the date the Supreme Court of Guam denied his territorial habeas petition, because during that 90-day period he could have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Alternatively, White argues that the period of statutory tolling was extended for the time between December 28, 1998, when he attempted to file a petition for a writ of certiorari with this court, and November 2, 1999, when he learned that his petition had never been filed. We address each argument in turn.

White relies on Wixom for the proposition that he is entitled to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) for the time during which he could have sought review by a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. That reliance is misplaced. In Wixom, we held that a state prisoner's conviction becomes final, so as to commence the running of the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(1)(A), upon "the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." Wixom, 264 F.3d at 897 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)).

As our sister circuits have recognized, the question of when a conviction becomes final, so as to start the running of the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(1)(A), is fundamentally different from the question of how long the statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2). See Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 318-19 (3d Cir.2001) (holding that the statute of limitations is not tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the time during which a state prisoner could have filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court); Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035-36 (8th Cir.2001) (same); Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691, 695 (6th Cir.2000) (same); Gutierrez v. Schomig, 233 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir.2000) (same); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir.1999) (same). We agree with these decisions.

The statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) only for "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review... is pending." A petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is simply not an application for state review. Crawley v. Catoe, 257 F.3d 395, 399 (4th Cir.2001) (citing Duncan v. Walker, ...