White v. Louisiana Western Ry. Co

• Decision Date: 29 February 1932
• Docket Number: 31549
• Citation: 140 So. 486,174 La. 308
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: WHITE v. LOUISIANA WESTERN RY. CO

140 So. 486

174 La. 308

WHITE v. LOUISIANA WESTERN RY. CO

No. 31549

Supreme Court of Louisiana

February 29, 1932

Judgment affirmed.

Pujo Bell & Hardin, of Lake Charles (Denegre, Leovy & Chaffe, of New Orleans, General Counsel), for applicant.

Cline Plauche & Thompson and Hawkins & Pickrel, all of Lake Charles, for respondent.

O'NIELL C. J. ST. PAUL, J., dissents.

OPINION

O'NIELL, C. J.

On the 25th of August, 1921, George W. White, while working as a brakeman for the defendant railway company, suffered an injury to his head, which incapacitated him for a month. He returned to work then and continued in the employment of the railway company, without any apparent ailment, until the 21st of September, 1929, when he was stricken with an epileptic fit, and a scientific examination revealed that the epilepsy was caused by the injury which had occurred on the 25th of August, 1921. White sued for compensation under the Employers' Liability Act. The railway company pleaded that the action was barred by the prescription of one year, under the provisions of section 31 of Act No. 20 of 1914, as amended by Act No. 85 of 1926, p. 124. The plea of prescription was overruled, and, the case being heard on its merits, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for compensation at the rate of $ 18 per week for 400 weeks. The railway company appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed the judgment. 135 So. 255. The case is before us on a writ of review.

According to section 31 of Act No. 20 of 1914, before it was amended, a claim for compensation was barred unless within one year after the injury or death the parties agreed upon the payments to be made, or unless within one year after the injury proceedings were begun as provided in the act. In the case of Guderian v. Sterling Sugar & Railway Co., 151 La. 59, 91 So. 546, in 1922, it was decided that the word injury meant the injurious result of the accident, and that the action was not barred if brought within a year after the injury manifested itself, even though brought more than a year after the accident. By the Act of 1926, section 31 of the statute was amended by substituting the word accident for the word injury, in the only two places where the word injury had been used in that section. That is the only change that was made in that section of the statute by the amendment of 1926. We have no doubt, therefore, that the purpose of the amendment was to bar all claims for compensation under the statute unless adjusted by agreement of the parties within a year after the happening of the accident, or unless sued on within the year after the happening of the accident. It is to be observed that, under section 8, subsec. 1(e) of the act of 1914 (which is subsection 2 of that section of the act of 1926), providing "For injury causing death within one year after the accident," the word accident, instead of the word injury, is used to mark the beginning of the year. And so, by the amendment of section 31, by the act of 1926, the year in which a claim must be adjusted or an action thereon must be brought, if brought at all, commences from the date of the accident, and not from the date on which the injury results or manifests itself. The consequence of the amendment is that, if no personal injury results or manifests itself within a year after an accident, and if, therefore, no compensation is agreed upon and no suit is filed within the year after the accident, there is no right of action for compensation under the statute. According to the statute, the word accident does not mean the resulting personal injury, but means the occurrence itself, the happening of which causes the injury. The statute, as amended, may seem harsh in that respect, but it is too plain now to admit of the construction which was given to it in Guderian v. Sterling Sugar & Railway Co.

The district judge in this case held that the action would be barred if governed by the act of 1926, but that, inasmuch as the contract of employment was governed by the act of 1914 it would impair the obligation of the contract to apply to this case the act of 1926. The court of appeal did not subscribe to that view, or find it necessary to go that far, but, on the authority of West v. Industrial Lumber Co., 14 La.App. 224, 128 So. 678, held that, even under the act of 1926, the prescription of one year should be reckoned from the time the employee became aware of his injury. Strange to say, West v. Industrial Lumber Co. was decided originally by the same district judge who decided the present case, and the opinion...