White v. Muniz
| Decision Date | 17 April 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98SC760.,98SC760. |
| Citation | 999 P.2d 814 |
| Parties | Barbara WHITE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Helen Everly, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Sherry Lynn MUNIZ, f/k/a Sherry Lynn Hutchenson, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Patterson, Nuss & Seymour, P.C., Franklin D. Patterson, Gregg E. Kay, Englewood, Colorado Attorneys for Petitioner.
Nick Wimmershoff Longmont, Colorado, Attorney for Respondent.
Wilcox & Ogden, P.C., Ralph Ogden, Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Amicus Curiae The Colorado Trial Lawyers Association.
Knapp & Sachs, P.C., Benjamin Sachs, Debra Knapp, Denver, Colorado; Law Office of Kathleen Mullen, P.C., Kathleen Mullen, Denver, Colorado; The Legal Center For People With Disabilities And Older People, Chester R. Chapman, Claire Williamson, Denver, Colorado; Law Offices of John Robert Holland, P.C., John Robert Holland, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amici Curiae AARP, The Alzheimer's Association (National), The Alzheimer's Association — Rocky Mountain Chapter, The ARC of Colorado, Guardianship Alliance of Colorado, The Legal Center for People with Disabilities and Older People, and National Citizens' Coalition for Nursing Home Reform.
Petitioner, Barbara White, as personal representative of the estate of Helen Everly, appeals the decision of the court of appeals in Muniz v. White, 979 P.2d 23, 25 (Colo.App.1998), which determined that a mentally incapacitated adult should be held liable for her intentional tort even if she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions.1 We disagree with the court of appeals. Rather, we conclude that under the facts present in this case, in order to recover on a theory of intentional tort, the plaintiff, Sherry Lynn Muniz, was required to prove that Everly intended to commit an act and that Everly intended the act to result in a harmful or offensive contact. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals, and remand for reinstatement of the jury verdict in favor of the defendant.
In October of 1993, Barbara White placed her eighty-three year-old grandmother, Helen Everly, in an assisted living facility, the Beatrice Hover Personal Care Center.2 Within a few days of admission, Everly started exhibiting erratic behavior. She became agitated easily, and occasionally acted aggressively toward others.
On November 21, 1993, the caregiver in charge of Everly's wing asked Sherry Lynn Muniz, a shift supervisor at Hover, to change Everly's adult diaper. The caregiver informed Muniz that Everly was not cooperating in that effort. This did not surprise Muniz because she knew that Everly sometimes acted obstinately. Indeed, initially Everly refused to allow Muniz to change her diaper, but eventually Muniz thought that Everly relented. However, as Muniz reached toward the diaper, Everly struck Muniz on the jaw and ordered her out of the room.
The next day, Dr. Haven Howell, M.D. examined Everly at Longmont United Hospital. Dr. Howell deduced that "she [had] a progressive dementia with characteristic gradual loss of function, loss of higher cortical function including immediate and short term memory, impulse control and judgement." She diagnosed Everly with "[p]rimary degenerative dementia of the Alzheimer type, senile onset, with depression."
In November of 1994, Muniz filed suit alleging assault and battery3 against Everly, and negligence against Barbara and Timothy White.4 The case proceeded to a jury trial on March 17, 1997.5 While arguing outside the presence of the jury for specific jury instructions, the parties took differing positions on the mental state required to commit the alleged intentional torts. Muniz requested the following instruction: "A person who has been found incompetent may intend to do an act even if he or she lacked control of reason and acted unreasonably." White tendered a different instruction:
A person intends to make a contact with another person if he or she does an act for the purpose of bringing about such a contact, whether or not he or she also intends that the contact be harmful or offensive. The intent must include some awareness of the natural consequences of intentional acts, and the person must appreciate the consequences of intentional acts, and the person must appreciate the offensiveness or wrongfulness of her acts.
The trial court settled on a slightly modified version of White's instruction. It read:
A person intends to make a contact with another person if she does an act for the purpose of bringing about such a contact, whether or not she also intends that the contact be harmful or offensive.
The fact that a person may suffer from Dementia, Alzheimer type, does not prevent a finding that she acted intentionally. You may find that she acted intentionally if she intended to do what she did, even though her reasons and motives were entirely irrational. However, she must have appreciated the offensiveness of her conduct.
(Emphasis added.) In selecting the instruction on intent, the trial court determined that Everly's condition rendered her mental state comparable to that of a child.
Muniz's counsel objected to the last sentence of the instruction, claiming that it misstated the law. He argued that the instruction improperly broadened the holding in Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974), where the supreme court held that an infant must appreciate the offensiveness or wrongfulness of her conduct to be liable for an intentional tort. The jury rendered verdicts in favor of Everly and White.
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. The court of appeals reasoned that most states continue to hold mentally deficient plaintiffs liable for their intentional acts regardless of their ability to understand the offensiveness of their actions. "[W]here one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be borne by the one who occasioned it." Muniz v. White, 979 P.2d 23, 25 (Colo.App.1998). The court of appeals reasoned that insanity may not be asserted as a defense to an intentional tort, and thus, concluded that the trial court erred in "instructing the jury that Everly must have appreciated the offensiveness of her conduct." Id. at 26.
The question we here address is whether an intentional tort requires some proof that the tortfeasor not only intended to contact another person, but also intended that the contact be harmful or offensive to the other person.
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1, a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a mere offensive contact with the other's person although the act involves an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and, therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 (1965)(emphasis added); see also Hall v. McBryde, 919 P.2d 910, 913-14 (Colo.App. 1996)
Historically, the intentional tort of battery required a subjective desire on the part of the tortfeasor to inflict a harmful or offensive contact on another. See Restatement, supra, § 8A; Keeton, supra, § 8; 6 Am.Jur.2d Assault and Battery § 8 (1999). Thus, it was not enough that a person intentionally contacted another resulting in a harmful or offensive contact. See Restatement, supra, § 18 cmt. e;6 Keeton § 8. Instead, the actor had to understand that his contact would be harmful or offensive. See Keeton, supra, § 8; Dobbs, supra, § 29. The actor need not have intended, however, the harm that actually resulted from his action. See Restatement, supra, § 16(1). Thus, if a slight punch to the victim resulted in traumatic injuries, the actor would be liable for all the damages resulting from the battery even if he only intended to knock the wind out of the victim. See id.
Juries may find it difficult to determine the mental state of an actor, but they may rely on circumstantial evidence in reaching their conclusion. No person can pinpoint the thoughts in the mind of another, but a jury can examine the facts to conclude what another must have been thinking. See Keeton, supra, § 8. For example, a person of reasonable intelligence knows with substantial certainty that a stone thrown into a crowd will strike someone and result in an offensive or harmful contact to that person. See id. Hence, if an actor of average intelligence performs such an act, the jury can determine that the actor had the requisite intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, even though the actor denies having such thoughts. See id.
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Perez v. Qwest Corp.
...an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and, therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 816 (Colo.2000) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). The elements for an assault cause of action under Colorado law are as follows: T......
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Hughes v. the Metro. Gov't of Nashville
...have similarly held that an intent to harm is not an essential element of the intentional tort of assault. See, e.g., White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 819 (Colo.2000) (“With regard to the intent element of the intentional torts of assault and battery, ... a plaintiff must prove that the actor ......
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Perez v. Qwest Corp.
...an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and, therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 816 (Colo. 2000)(alteration in original)(emphasis omitted). The elements for an assault cause of action under Colorado law are as follows:To ......
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Hughes v. the Metro. Gov't of Nashville
...have similarly held that an intent to harm is not an essential element of the intentional tort of assault. See, e.g., White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 819 (Colo. 2000) ("With regard to the intent element of the intentional torts of assault and battery, . . . a plaintiff must prove that the act......