White v. National Football League

Citation585 F.3d 1129
Decision Date10 November 2009
Docket NumberNo. 08-2001.,08-2001.
PartiesReggie WHITE; Michael Buck, Hardy Hardy Nickerson; Vann McElroy; Dave Duerson, Appellees, v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE; The Five Smiths, Inc.; Buffalo Bills, Inc.; Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc.; Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.; Cleveland Browns, Inc.; The Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd.; PDB Sports, Ltd.; The Detroit Lions, Inc.; The Green Bay Packers, Inc.; Houston Oilers, Inc.; Indianapolis Colts, Inc.; Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc.; The Los Angeles Raiders, Ltd.; Los Angeles Rams Football Company, Inc.; Miami Dolphins, Ltd.; Minnesota Vikings Football Club, Inc.; KMS Patriots Limited Partnership; The New Orleans Saints Limited Partnership; New York Football Giants, Inc.; New York Jets Football Club, Inc.; The Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, Inc.; B & B Holdings, Inc.; Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc.; The Chargers Football Company; The San Francisco Forty-Niners, Ltd.; The Seattle Seahawks Inc.; Tampa Bay Area NFL Football Club, Inc.; Pro-Football, Inc., Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

on the brief, Washington, DC, Daniel J. Connolly, Bruce Jones, on the brief, Minneapolis, MN), for Appellant.

Jeffrey L. Kessler, argued, New York, N.Y. (Edward M. Glennon, Mark Alan Jacobson, on the brief, Minneapolis, MN, James W. Quinn, Bruce S. Meyer, David G. Feher, Eva W. Cole, on the brief, New York, NY), for Appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Since the entry of a 1993 consent decree, the district court1 has overseen the enforcement of a settlement in an antitrust class action brought by the above-named class members against the National Football League and its member clubs (NFL or League). Throughout that time, the district court has resolved numerous disputes over the terms of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (settlement agreement) and parallel Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) that govern player employment in the NFL.

In August 2007, Michael Vick, then quarterback for the Atlanta Falcons, pled guilty to federal dog fighting charges. The NFL Commissioner thereafter suspended Vick indefinitely without pay, and the League initiated a grievance procedure seeking a declaration that the Falcons could recover certain bonus money that had been paid to Vick with the expectation that he would play football through 2014. Class counsel and the National Football League Players Association (Association) challenged the recovery as violative of anti-forfeiture provisions contained in the settlement agreement and CBA. Special Master Stephen Burbank issued an opinion that the Falcons were entitled to recover the amounts sought. The decision was appealed to the district court, which entered an order (Vick Order) stating that the bonus payments were already earned and thus not subject to forfeiture. The League then filed a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the district court's judgment, arguing that (1) the district court's oversight of the consent decree should be terminated because of intervening changes in the law and factual circumstances and (2) the district judge should remove himself from the case because of the reasonable perception that he was biased. The district court denied the motion. The League now appeals from the Vick Order and the denial of its Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the judgment. We affirm.

I. Factual Background
A. The White Settlement Agreement

The 1993 settlement represented the resolution to a decades-old dispute between football players and team owners. Although professional football generates significant revenue, players and owners often have differing ideas about how the money should be spent. Owners desire cost-cutting mechanisms such as salary caps and player drafts; players want free agency and competition among clubs for the best talent. For many years, team owners worked together to minimize labor costs, instituting, for example, the Rozelle Rule—a measure that virtually eliminated free agency by requiring any team acquiring a free agent to compensate the player's original team. This court's decision in Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.1976), ended that practice, holding that the Rozelle Rule violated antitrust law as an impermissible restraint on competition for player services. The fact that the Rozelle Rule was unilaterally implemented by team owners was critical to our holding, because we recognized that a similar collectively bargained provision would have been shielded from antitrust liability by the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws. See id. at 615-16.

The players' initial antitrust victory was short lived, for following the ruling in Mackey the owners used their leverage in collective bargaining to reestablish the status quo, exchanging the Rozelle Rule for similar collectively bargained provisions that were impervious to antitrust attack. See Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1304 (8th Cir.1989) (holding that the collectively bargained "Right of First Refusal/Compensation" system was not subject to antitrust liability). The Association organized strikes in 1982 and 1987, but those efforts failed to win free agency or other desired changes in League rules. Consequently, in 1989 the Association chose to decertify as a union and abandon collective bargaining in favor of renewed antitrust litigation.

After several successful antitrust lawsuits brought by individual players, Reggie White and four other named plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on behalf of

(i) all players who have been, are now, or will be under contract to play professional football for an NFL club at any time from August 31, 1987, to the date of final judgment . . . and (ii) all college and other football players who, as of August 31, 1987, to the date of final judgment . . . have been, are now, or will be eligible to play football as a rookie for an NFL team.

The complaint sought antitrust injunctive relief and damages stemming from various League rules, including the mandatory right of first refusal system, the standard NFL contract, and the college draft. On April 30, 1993, the district court approved a consent decree that provided the players with monetary relief and made a variety of significant changes to League rules. The agreement also allowed for the recertification of the Association and the resumption of the collective bargaining relationship between the players and the owners. Additionally, the settlement stated that the district court would retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of the agreement through appointment of a Special Master, who would hear disputes subject to review by the district court.

Since the original approval of the settlement agreement, it has been amended five times, most recently in 2006. Each time, the enforcement jurisdiction of the district court has been retained as part of the agreement. A new CBA was also formed in 1993, with terms mirroring those in the settlement agreement. Thereafter, whenever the parties have agreed to change a provision in the CBA, a conforming change has also been made to the settlement agreement. In the event of a conflict, the provisions in the settlement agreement trump the CBA.

B. Michael Vick's Contract

One of the changes to the settlement agreement in 2006 was the addition of an anti-forfeiture provision, the effect of which was to limit the instances in which players would have to return money to their teams. Guaranteed income is coveted by football players, due to the high risk of injury and the fact that the standard NFL contract allows a team to cut a player who does not meet expectations. As a result, players commonly negotiate bonus payments in addition to their yearly salary. The bonuses may be guaranteed for skill or injury—thus allowing a player to keep the money in certain instances in which the remainder of his contract (i.e yearly salary) is terminated.2 Although some of the terms of individual player contracts may vary, a contract cannot provide for forfeiture that is prohibited under the terms of the settlement agreement and CBA.

In 2004, Vick negotiated a contract with the Atlanta Falcons to play football for the team through 2014. In addition to a yearly salary, the contract included two roster bonuses—one for 2005 ($22.5 million) and one for 2006 ($7 million).3 The contract stated that the bonus amounts would be additional consideration for the execution of the long-term player contract, provided that (1) Vick adhered to all contract provisions and (2) Vick was on the Falcons' eighty-man roster on the fifth day of the 2005 and 2006 league years. The contract also gave the Falcons the discretion to guarantee the bonuses for skill and stated that, if so guaranteed, Vick had an obligation to execute a new contract setting forth the terms of the skill guarantee. The Falcons subsequently exercised their right to guarantee the bonuses for skill. Vick met the roster provisions in the contract and was accordingly paid $29.5 million.

As set forth above, after playing just two seasons under his contract, Vick pled guilty to federal dog fighting charges and was suspended by the League Commissioner. The Falcons sought to recover $16.22 million from Vick, a prorated portion of the bonuses based on the remaining years in his contract that he was unable to perform. On behalf of the Falcons, the League filed a grievance with the Special Master seeking a declaration that recovering the bonus money would not violate the anti-forfeiture provisions in the CBA and settlement agreement. The Special Master determined that the Falcons could recover bonus payments properly allocable to years Vick had not performed. On appeal, the district court disagreed, concluding instead that...

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    ...football players, much of which is described in prior opinions of this court and the district court. See, e.g., White v. NFL, 585 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir.2009); White v. NFL, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir.1994); Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.1989); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.1976). For ......
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    ...district court has continued to oversee the settlement by resolving numerous disputes over the terms of the SSA and CBA. White v. NFL, 585 F.3d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir.2009). Whenever the NFL and the NFLPA have agreed to change a provision in the CBA, a conforming change has also been made to t......
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