White v. Parker
| Decision Date | 24 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2171,2171 |
| Parties | DARLENE WHITE v. LAUREN M. PARKER, ET AL. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
UNREPORTED
Woodward, Reed, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Woodward, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Appellant, Darlene White, the former Chief Deputy Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County, filed an action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against, among others, appellees, the State of Maryland and Lauren M. Parker, the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County, claiming discriminatory retaliation. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
On appeal, appellant presents two questions for our review, which we have condensed into one:1
Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees?
We answer this question in the negative and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
In November 2006, Parker was elected Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County for the first time. On September 26, 2007, Parker promoted appellant from an auditor to Assistant Chief Deputy of the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County. On November13, 2007, Parker promoted appellant from Assistant Chief Deputy to Chief Deputy.
In late June 2011, Parker discovered that appellant had approved a pay raise for an employee without Parker's permission. On July 5, 2011, Parker learned that, over the previous weekend, appellant had transferred her supervisor folder from the office's server to her desktop without Parker's knowledge or permission.
On July 6, 2011, Parker met with appellant, told her "that it's not working with [appellant] because of [appellant's] dominating personality and [that appellant] was not capable of changing [her] ways of managing and leading th[e] office[,]" and suggested that appellant retire. After appellant declined to retire, Parker decided that they would "start over" - appellant would keep her salary and public title, but internally, she would be demoted to Chief Administrative Officer and her personnel responsibilities would be transferred to other employees.
On July 18, 2011, Parker wrote appellant two memos regarding appellant's approval of an employee's pay raise and appellant's transfer of the supervisor folder from the server to her desktop, respectively. In these memos, Parker stated that appellant's actions "created severe problems in this office" and "a loss of trust by the Register[.]"
In November 2011, appellant went on full-time leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Appellant returned to work on a part-time basis in December 2011.
On December 12, 2011, appellant filed a Whistleblower Complaint against Parker with the Department of Budget and Management. The complaint contained various grievances about alleged "unethical and illegal activities in the Register's [O]ffice,including a hostile work environment, mismanagement of budget and public records, abuse of political influence[,] and unlawful hiring practices." The Department referred the matter to Steven Barzal, Director of the Office of Human Resources for the Office of the Comptroller of Maryland, for investigation. Barzal determined that there was "no cause regarding the issues raised by [appellant] in her complaint." Barzal's report concluded:
Moreover, there has been no protected adverse employment action that has occurred to this date. Not only does [appellant's] filing of this complaint appear to be pre-emptive to preclude retaliation (in the form of termination), but in effect, could likely become a self-fulfilling prophecy where she complains of a predicted outcome (termination), and then complains that an adverse action has occurred.
(Second bold emphasis added).
In late December 2011, appellant contacted the NAACP which, on December 28, 2011, sent a letter to the Governor and copied eight government officials, including Parker and appellant. The letter notified the recipients of appellant's Whistleblower Complaint and stated that "[w]e respectfully, request that your office take the necessary steps to insure that [appellant] is not retaliated against for bringing this matter to the attention of the appropriate authorities." On January 3, 2012, appellant filed a complaint with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights ("civil rights complaint"), which was also forwarded to the Office of the Comptroller.
On January 5 or 6, 2012, appellant conducted a training program for employees of the Register's Office. After the training, at least four employees complained to Parker about the content of the training and appellant's attitude toward employees.
On January 9, 2012, Parker placed appellant on paid administrative leave. On January 30, 2012, Parker terminated appellant's employment due to appellant's "management style and the relationship between [ ] Parker and [appellant.]"
On January 31, 2014, appellant filed the instant action against the Comptroller of Maryland, Parker, the State of Maryland, and Anne Arundel County in the circuit court, alleging counts of wrongful termination, violation of due process, discrimination based on race, gender, age, and retaliation, and requesting a declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, and a writ quo warranto. On July 25, 2014, the circuit court dismissed all defendants, except appellees, Parker and the State of Maryland, and all counts except for discriminatory retaliation.
On October 28, 2014, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. On November 11, 2014, appellant filed an opposition to appellees' motion. On November 13, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing on appellees' motion for summary judgment and other matters unrelated to this appeal. On December 3, 2014, both parties filed supplemental memoranda regarding the Supreme Court's decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
On December 5, 2014, the circuit court issued a memorandum opinion and order in which it granted appellees' motion for summary judgment. The opinion and order were entered on December 8, 2014. Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal on December 22, 2014.
Additional facts will be set forth as necessary to resolve the issue raised in the instant appeal.
The trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment if (1) no dispute as to a material fact exists, and (2) the party seeking summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tyler v. City of College Park, 415 Md. 475, 498 (2010). "The facts properly before the court, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them will be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." De la Puente v. Cty. Comm'rs of Frederick Cty., 386 Md. 505, 510 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). We perform an independent review of the record to determine whether there is a dispute of material fact. Tyler, 415 Md. at 498-99. "Even when there are factual disputes, when resolution of these disputes makes no difference in the determination of the legal question . . . [the disputed facts] do not prevent the grant of summary judgment." Honeycutt v. Honeycutt, 150 Md. App. 604, 620 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 376 Md. 544 (2003). Whether a trial court's grant of summary judgment was proper under Maryland Rule 2-501 is a question of law subject to de novo review. Walk v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 382 Md. 1, 14 (2004).
The Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), Md. Code , § 20-601 et seq., of the State Government (II) Article ("SG"), prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for filing a charge of discrimination: "An employer may not discriminate or retaliate against any of its employees . . . because theindividual has . . . made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subtitle." SG § 20-606(f).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains a similar retaliation provision: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
Maryland courts rely on federal court decisions interpreting Title VII's retaliation provision in their analysis of FEPA's retaliation provision. The Court of Appeals has stated:
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