White v. Register of Wills of Anne Arundel Cnty.

Decision Date01 May 2014
Docket NumberNo. 677,Sept. Term, 2013.,677
Citation217 Md.App. 187,90 A.3d 1213
PartiesDarlene WHITE v. REGISTER OF WILLS OF ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Puja Gupta (Cary J. Hansel, III, Joseph, Greenwald, & Laake, PA, on the brief), Greenbelt, MD, for Appellant.

Beatrice Nunez–Bellamy (Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: GRAEFF, BERGER, ARTHUR, JJ.

ARTHUR, J.

This case concerns whether appellant Darlene White, the former Chief Deputy Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County, was an employee of the executive branch or of the judicial branch. If Ms. White was an executive branch employee, she can bring a whistleblower complaint under the Maryland Whistleblower Law, Md.Code (1993, 2009 Repl.Vol.) § 5–305 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article; if she was a judicial branch employee, she cannot.

The Department of Budget and Management, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County concluded that Ms. White was a judicial branch employee and, thus, was not permitted to bring a whistleblower complaint. We agree and, therefore, affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

This appeal stems from Ms. White's termination as Chief Deputy Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County on January 31, 2012. Ms. White contends that she was terminated in retaliation for a complaint that she filed against her former boss, the Register of Wills for Anne Arundel County, with the Department of Budget and Management (“DBM”) on December 19, 2011. She seeks protection under the Maryland Whistleblower Law, Md.Code (1993, 2009 Repl. Vol.) § 5–305 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article.

Before her termination, Ms. White called the DBM to inquire about whether the Maryland Whistleblower Law, Md.Code (1993, 2009 Repl.Vol.) § 5–305 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article, would protect her from reprisals if she filed a complaint. According to Ms. White, an employee of DBM told her that she would be protected because her position as Chief Deputy Register of Wills made her an executive branch employee. She claims that, in reliance on that advice, she filed a whistleblower complaint under Md.Code (1993, 2009 Repl.Vol.) § 5–305 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article with DBM.

After Ms. White was terminated, DBM dismissed her complaint for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that Ms. White was a judicial branch employee, but that the whistleblower statute applied only to executive branch employees. 1 Ms. White appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”), which affirmed that DBM did not have jurisdiction over the complaint because Ms. White was a judicial branch employee.

As stated above, Ms. White filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The circuit court affirmed OAH's dismissal, and Ms. White noted a timely appeal.

Question Presented

Ms. White presents a single question for our review:

Is the Office of Administrative Hearings' finding that Ms. White was not an executive branch employee capable of filing a whistleblower complaint under Maryland Whistleblower Law, and was instead a judicial branch employee, supported by substantial evidence and legally correct?

For the reasons that follow, we answer yes and affirm.

Discussion

Ms. White argues that OAH erred when it concluded that she was an employee of the judicial branch, not the executive branch, and thus, not permitted to file a whistleblower action under Md.Code (1993, 2009 Repl.Vol.) § 5–305 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article. We disagree.

In reviewing an administrative agency's decision, we pass over the circuit court decision, and we examine the administrative decision using the same standard as the circuit court. Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 15, 997 A.2d 768 (2010). The Court's role “is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” United Parcel Service, Inc. v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650 A.2d 226 (1994).

At the outset, we note that the Office of the Register of Wills itself is indisputably part of the judicial branch. The Office of the Register of Wills was created by Article IV of Maryland's Constitution (Md.Const. art. IV, § 41), the article that creates and empowers the judicial branch. Moreover, the Register of Wills functions as the clerk of the orphans' court (Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution 251 (G. Tarr ed.2011)), by, for example, receiving, filing, and storing papers and records, keeping the docket, making out and issuing summonses and orders, issuing and certifying copies of the proceedings in the court, making entries of court proceedings, auditing accounts, etc. See generally Md.Code (1974, 2011 Repl.Vol.) § 2–208(c)(k) of the Estates and Trusts Article. Thus, the only question is whether Ms. White, in her role as the Chief Deputy of the Register of Wills, is considered part of the judicial branch as well.

At first glance, it would appear that if the Register of Wills is part of the judiciary, then the Chief Deputy of the Register of Wills must also be part of the judiciary. Ms. White, however, points to several statutes that give the Comptroller some control over the staff of the Register of Wills. Because the Comptroller is part of the executive branch (Md.Const. art. II, § 18), Ms. White argues that the staff of the Register of Wills must also be part of the executive branch.

In support of her contention, Ms. White specifically cites Md.Code (1997, Repl.Vol.2009), § 4–108(a) and (c) of the State Government Article, which allow the Comptroller to set “the number and compensation of assistant clerks or deputies employed by each register of wills” and to increase the salary of the staff in the offices of the registers of wills “commensurate with the increases granted to State employees generally.” She also cites Md.Code (1974, 2011 Repl.Vol.) § 2–208(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article, which gives the Comptroller the power to approve the appointments and compensation of deputies and clerks (after they have been appointed by the Register of Wills). On the basis of these enactments, Ms. White argues that the Comptroller's powers over the staff of the Register of Wills are sufficient to convert what would otherwise be a judicial branch position into an executive branch position. In our view, Ms. White overstates the importance of these statutes.

When we interpret statutes, we begin by examining the “normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute.” Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 712, 962 A.2d 342 (2008). We think that the plain language here shows that the Comptroller's authority is limited in its reach.

The statutes give the Comptroller no explicit control over the core actions and operations of the deputies and clerks in the Office of the Register of Wills. In particular, the statutes do not empower the Comptroller to supervise the deputies and clerks or to decide whether to hire or fire them. To the contrary, the Register of Wills has the statutory power to appoint deputies and clerks. Md.Code (1974, 2011 Repl.Vol.) § 2–208(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article. The Comptroller simply serves as a fiscal watchdog, determining the number of deputies and clerks and approving their appointments and compensation.

It makes perfect sense for the Comptroller to serve in that role. The salaries and expenses of the Office of the Register of Wills are paid from the fees and receipts of the office (Md.Code (1974, 2011 Repl.Vol.) § 2–205(d) of the Estates and Trusts Article), after which the excess goes to the State's General Fund. Md. Const. art. XV, § 1. Moreover, if the Office of the Register of Wills does not have sufficient funds to pay its salaries and expenses, the deficiency is funded from the taxes that the Register remits to the Comptroller during that fiscal year. Md.Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.) § 2–205(e). In these circumstances, the State has an obvious economic interest in ensuring that the Register of Wills does not appoint unnecessary deputies or clerks and does not overpay the deputies and clerks whom she has appointed. In setting the number and compensation of the deputies and clerks and approving their appointments and compensation, the Comptroller protects the State's economic interest.2

Not only do basic canons of statutory interpretation favor the conclusion that Ms. White is a judicial employee, but administrative deference favors it as well. We recognize that “an administrative agency's interpretation and application of the statute that the agency administers should be given “considerable weight” by reviewing courts. Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 612, 937 A.2d 242 (2007). Here, DBM, the agency responsible for overseeing the Whistleblower Act, did not think the Act applied to Ms. White. Thus, we should accord DBM's view substantial weight. Moreover, DBM has acted consistently with this view because it never classified Ms. White as an employee of the executive branch.

Even if we credited the argument that the Comptroller's statutory powers could transform the staff of the Register of Wills into executive branch employees, that would not help Ms. White, because the Chief Deputy of the Register of Wills is not a mere clerk or deputy. By statute, the Chief Deputy can act in place of the Register of Wills, and all actions taken by the Chief Deputy while substituting for the Register of Wills have “the force and effect as if performed by the register.” Md.Code (1974, 2011 Repl.Vol.) § 2–208 of the Estates and Trusts Article. For that reason, the Chief Deputy acts as the Register of Wills's alter ego, and she should be classified in the same way as the Register of Wills herself. See Rucker v....

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  • Donlon v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 68
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 12, 2018
    ...1023.5 The court concluded also thatin light of the "substantial weight" we accord DBM's view, see White [v. Register of Wills of Anne Arundel County], 217 Md. App. [187], 193, 90 A.3d 1213, [1216 (2014)] and the fact that nothing in the statutory text of SPP § 5-301 supports Donlon's argum......
  • Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch. v. Donlon, 571, Sept. Term, 2016.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • August 30, 2017
    ...(citing Halici v. City of Gaithersburg , 180 Md.App. 238, 248, 949 A.2d 85 (2008) ); see also White v. Register of Wills of Anne Arundel Cnty. , 217 Md.App. 187, 190, 90 A.3d 1213 (2014) (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea , 415 Md. 1, 15, 997 A.2d 768 (2010) ). In general, we are limited ......
  • Donlon v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 68, Sept. Term 2017
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 12, 2018
    ...1023.5 The court concluded also thatin light of the "substantial weight" we accord DBM's view, see White [v. Register of Wills of Anne Arundel County ], 217 Md. App. [187], 193, 90 A.3d 1213, [1216 (2014) ] and the fact that nothing in the statutory text of SPP § 5–301 supports Donlon's arg......
  • Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch. v. Donlon, 571
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • August 30, 2017
    ...(2015) (citing Halici v. City of Gaithersburg, 180 Md. App. 238, 248 (2008)); see also White v. Register of Wills of Anne Arundel Cnty., 217 Md. App. 187, 190 (2014) (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1, 15 (2010)). In general, we are limited to determining whether substantial re......
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