White v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County

• Decision Date: 11 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 8:06-CV-1626-T-27MAP.,8:06-CV-1626-T-27MAP.
• Citation: 636 F.Supp.2d 1272
• Parties: Mary WHITE, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

636 F.Supp.2d 1272

Mary WHITE, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 8:06-CV-1626-T-27MAP.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

July 11, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mary White, pro se.

ORDER

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and, Alternatively, Motion for Consolidation (Dkt. 19), to which Plaintiff has responded in opposition (Dkt. 20). Upon consideration, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Background

In this case, pro se Plaintiff Mary White, an African-American, brings various federal and state law claims arising from Defendant Hillsborough County School Board's termination of the charter for Wilbesan Charter School ("Wilbesan") in August 2005. Wilbesan opened as a charter school in July 2003, pursuant to a contract between Wilbesan and Defendant. (Dkt. 18, ¶ 6). Plaintiff was the director of Wilbesan. Id. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's employee, Charlene Staley, was angered by White's efforts to have a "black military man" certified as a vocational teacher. (Dkt. 18, ¶ 6-7). Plaintiff alleges that Staley told her that she was going to close Wilbesan and "began a malicious negative campaign of placing White in a false light to destroy the contract between White and Wilbesan." (Dkt. 18, ¶ 7).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Staley and two employees of Hillsborough County Fire Rescue engaged in a conspiracy to close Wilbesan. (Dkt. 18, ¶¶ 109-29). Plaintiff alleges that Staley refused to honor Wilbesan's existing fire safety inspection report and required another fire safety inspection, which Plaintiff contends violated statutory requirements. (Dkt. 18, ¶¶ 115-18). Plaintiff alleges that the fire safety inspection rules were enforced against Wilbesan, but not against "white owned and operated" charter schools with similar violations. (Dkt. 18, ¶¶ 17-22). Plaintiff also alleges that she reported an unidentified falsified safety report to Defendant's "Chief Officer" on June 20, 2005. (Dkt. 18, ¶ 141). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated Wilbesan's charter on August 4, 2005, in retaliation for her reporting the allegedly falsified fire safety report and for attempting to have the vocational teacher certified. (Dkt. 18, ¶ 15, 53-54).

Plaintiff filed the instant case alleging eleven claims: Disparate Treatment in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Count I); Tortious Interference of White's Contract with Wilbesan which Resulted in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Property and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II); Retaliation in Violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III); Defamation by Libel (Count IV); Hostile Work Environment (Count V); Deprivation of White's Property without Due Process of Law in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI); Selective Enforcement of Laws in Violation of Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VII); Unequal Protection of Laws in Violation of the U.S. Constitution Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VIII); Civil Conspiracy to Deprive White of her Civil Rights that Resulted in Selective Enforcement of the Laws and Denial of Equal Protection of Laws (Count IX); Action for Neglect to Prevent Civil Rights Violation (Count X); and Florida Whistleblower's Act pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3187 (Count XI).

Pending before this Court is a separate suit by Wilbesan against Defendant (Case No. 8:05-cv-2341-T-27TBM) ("related case"). Plaintiff originally brought several Fourteenth Amendment claims in the related case, which this Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the claims. (Dkts. 32, 52). In the instant motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims in this case should be dismissed based on the preclusive effect of the Court's prior decision regarding Plaintiff's standing. In addition, Defendant argues that several of Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, consolidated with the related case. As set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted as to Counts I, II, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI and denied as to Counts III and IV.

Standard

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Although a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual allegations, which, when taken as true, "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1964-65. A conclusory statement of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice to state a claim under Rule 8. Id. A well-pleaded complaint, however, may survive a motion to dismiss even if it appears "that recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 1965 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)). In addition, the complaint of a pro se plaintiff is to be construed more liberally than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.1990).

Discussion

A. Issue Preclusion

Defendant first argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or "issue preclusion," bars each of Plaintiff's claims. Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of an issue of fact or law that has been litigated and decided in a prior suit if: (1) the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior suit; (3) the determination of the issue was a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that action; and (4) the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir.1986). Federal principles of issue preclusion govern the preclusive effect of prior federal decisions. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 327 F.3d 1309, 1316-17 (11th Cir.2003).

In Counts I, VI, VII, and VIII of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for disparate treatment, deprivation of due process, selective enforcement, and unequal protection of laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the related case, Plaintiff previously made almost identical claims for "selective enforcement of laws, unequal protection of laws and disparate treatment" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Case No. 05-cv-2341, Dkt. 12, Count I, ¶ ¶ 40-55). The Plaintiffs in the related case also argued that they maintained a claim for denial of due process, which the Magistrate accepted in ruling on the motion to dismiss. (Case No. 05-cv-2341 Dkt. 32 at 2 n.3; 3; Dkt. 12, ¶¶ 9-10).

In the related case, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant arbitrarily singled out Wilbesan for closure based on fire safety violations, which resulted in the deprivation of her income as director. Based on these allegations, the Court determined:

White has not alleged or otherwise demonstrated an injury in fact for standing purposes. Here, even assuming that the School Board had a racially discriminatory policy or custom as alleged, the enforcement of that policy or custom in this instance was directed at the school and infringed no rights of White guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment or by contract. Rather, it was Wilbesan's charter and its right to operate a charter school that were infringed by the allegedly wrongful termination of the charter contract . . . Although White lost her position and income as a result of School Board's actions, this was not the consequence of an infringement on her own legally protected interests. Here, White was and is free to pursue her vocation, even that of operating another charter school if she wishes to do so. (Case No. 05-cv-2341, Dkt. 32 at 7).

Plaintiff has alleged materially identical facts and claims in this case, which, as Defendants argue, necessitates the same conclusion that Plaintiff lacks standing under issue preclusion principles. Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon Co., 884 F.Supp. 1544, 1556 (N.D.Fla.1995) (applying collateral estoppel to standing issue); Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.2006); see also Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 318 (7th Cir. 2000) (addition of new facts does not prevent preclusive effect of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction due to standing). In Counts I, VI, VII, and VIII, Plaintiff once again attempts to improperly recover personally for actions allegedly taken by Defendant against Wilbesan, and she fails to allege any illegal conduct directed at her, individually, by Defendant. Because Plaintiff's standing to bring these claims was previously determined, after Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, Counts I, VI, VII, and VIII must be dismissed.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for Disparate Treatment in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Count I); Deprivation of White's Property without Due Process of Law in Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI); Selective Enforcement of Laws in Violation of Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VII); and Unequal Protection of Laws in Violation of the U.S. Constitution Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VIII) are dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff's remaining...