White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 1:99 CV 1134.
| Decision Date | 14 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:99 CV 1134. |
| Citation | 97 F.Supp.2d 816 |
| Parties | Mayor Michael R. WHITE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SMITH & WESSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Cornell P. Carter, City of Cleveland, Dept. of Law, Cleveland, OH, John R. Climaco, Jack D. Maistros, Keith T. Vernon, Climaco, Lefkowitz, Peca, Wilcox & Garofoli, Cleveland, OH, Wendell H. Gauthier, Gauthier, Downing & LaBarre, Metairie, LA, for Micael R. White, City of Cleveland.
Timothy J. Coughlin, Thompson, Hine & Flory, Cleveland, OH, Thomas R. Schuck, Ross A. Wright, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Cincinnati, OH, Gary R. Long, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Kansas City, MO, James P. Dorr, Anne G. Kimball, Sarah L. Olson, Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, IL, Jessica Elaine Price, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, Cleveland, OH, Barbara J. Arison, Frantz Ward, Cleveland, OH, for Smith & Wesson Corp.
Timothy J. Coughlin, Thompson, Hine & Flory, Cleveland, OH, James P. Dorr, Anne G. Kimball, Sarah L. Olson, Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, Chicago, IL, Barbara J. Arison, Cleveland, OH, for Sturm Ruger & Co.
Thomas Ignatius Michals, Steven R. Malynn, Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Cleveland, OH, Robert C. Gebhardt, Craig A. Livingston, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, San Francisco, CA, Mark L. Belleville, Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Columbus, OH, Lawrence S. Greenwald, Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander, Baltimore, MD, for Beretta U.S.A.
Robert C. Weber, David F. Adler, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Cleveland, OH, for Colt's Mfg. Co.
William F. Gibson, III, Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman, Cleveland, OH, John F. Renzulli, Renzulli & Rutherford, New York, NY, Nancy Tunis, Leonard Rosenbaum, Renzulli & Rutherford, New York, NY, for Glock, Inc., H & R 1871, Inc.
Daniel F. Gourash, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Cleveland, OH, Timothy A. Bumann, Budd, Larner, Gross, Rosenbaum, Greenberg & Sade, Atlanta, GA, Melissa Anne Maye, Yorkville, IL, for Taurus Intern. Marketing, Inc. William F. Gibson, III, Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman, Cleveland, OH, Robert Joyce, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, New York, NY, John F. Renzulli, Renzulli & Rutherford, New York, NY, for Sigarms, Inc.
Mark E. Elsener, Michael E. McCarty, Porter Wright, Morris & Arthur, Cincinnati, OH, James Clifford Sabalos, Newport Beach, CA, for Lorcin Engineering Co., Inc.
Mark E. Elsener, Michael E. McCarty, Porter Wright, Morris & Arthur, Cincinnati, OH, Daniel F. Gourash, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Cleveland, OH, James Clifford Sabalos, Newport Beach, CA, Melissa Anne Maye, Yorkville, IL, for Bryco Arms.
Daniel F. Gourash, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Cleveland, OH, Timothy A. Bumann, Budd, Larner, Gross, Rosenbaum, Greenberg & Sade, Atlanta, GA, Michael J. Zomick, Tarics & Carrington, Houston, TX, for Phoenix Arms.
Ronald B. Lee, Laura M.A. Faust, Roetzel & Andress, Akron, OH, for Navegar Inc.
William F. Gibson, III, Gallagher, Sharp, Fulton & Norman, Cleveland, OH, John F. Renzulli, Renzulli & Rutherford, New York, NY, William M. Griffin, III, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, Little Rock, AR, for Arms Technology, Inc.
This matter comes before the Court upon Certain Defendants'1 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. # 23) and Defendant B.L. Jennings's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 21) (collectively referred to below as Defendants). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are DENIED.
On April 15, 1999, Mayor Michael White and the City of Cleveland filed a lawsuit against Defendants in the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County. Plaintiffs plead the following seven causes of action: (1) a claim under the Ohio Products Liability Act, OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.75, for Unreasonably Dangerous Design (against Manufacturing/Seller Defendants only); (2) a state common law claim of Negligent Design (against Manufacturing/Seller Defendants only); (3) a claim under the Ohio Products Liability Act, OHIO REV. CODE § 2307.76, for Unreasonably Dangerous Because of Inadequate Warning (against Manufacturing/Seller Defendants only); (4) a state common law claim of unjust enrichment; (5) a claim for Nuisance Abatement under Cleveland City Code § 203.01; (6) a state common law claim of Public Nuisance; and, (7) a state common law claim of Negligence (against Trade Association Defendants only).
Defendants Glock, Inc., H & R 1871, Inc., and Hi-Point Firearms2 removed the action to this Court on May 12, 1999. Although the other Defendants were not signatories to the Petition for Removal, they signed consent forms.3
Certain Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on July 26, 1999. Defendant B.L Jennings filed a Motion to join Certain Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the same date. Plaintiffs filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion on August 26, 1999, to which Defendants filed a Reply on September 20, 1999. Subsequently, Defendants and Plaintiffs filed supplemental authority in support of their respective positions.
The Trade Association Defendants4 filed their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction on July 26, 1999. Plaintiffs filed a Brief in Opposition on September 8, 1999, to which the Trade Association Defendants replied on September 21, 1999.
The Court scheduled oral argument for October 29, 1999, in order to hear argument on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and the Trade Association Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. On that date, oral argument turned to whether or not removal was proper and whether the Court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over this case. After briefing by the parties, and dismissal of the only non-diverse party, the Court determined that diversity jurisdiction existed and it had jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Doc. # 67. Oral argument on the Trade Association Defendants' Motion was rescheduled and held on December 9, 1999. The Court denied the Trade Association Defendants' Motion on January 27, 2000. See Doc. # 81.
The Court now turns to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state any cause of action cognizable under Ohio law.
The Court will dismiss a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir.1998) (quotes and citation omitted). The Court "must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief." Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158, 116 S.Ct. 1041, 134 L.Ed.2d 189 (1996). On a motion to dismiss the Court presumes that a plaintiff's "general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
Defendants argue that there are "three over-arching reasons" why this case should be dismissed: (1) the case should be dismissed as a matter of public policy; (2) Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim under Ohio law; and, (3) Plaintiffs' claims encroach upon the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs respond that their claims cannot be dismissed as a matter of public policy; do not violate the Constitution; state proper causes of action under Ohio law; and, that they are entitled to the relief they seek.
Defendants argue that the Court should not "legislate on issues of public policy," but, ironically, should dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint "as against public policy." (Defs.' Mot. at 4, 8.) The Court does not dismiss cases based on public policy; rather, a case will be dismissed if it fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiffs' lawsuit sets forth product liability claims, among others. Defendants argue that because firearms are "heavily regulated,"5 the Court would violate the "separation of powers" if this case is not dismissed because the Court would exercise a "`legislative function by engaging in policy decisions and making or revising rules or regulations.'" (Defs.' Mot. at 6 (citation omitted).)6 Defendants attempt to make their product, firearms, above the law and exempt from product liability lawsuits.
However, just as products liability lawsuits may be brought against other allegedly defective products, ranging from abrasive discs to yarn,7 they may be brought against firearms. Indeed, products as heavily regulated as firearms, if not much more so, are subject to product liability lawsuits, from automobiles, see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), to medical devices, see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996), as well as other consumer products such as asbestos, birth control devices, tobacco products, and silicone breast implants. Courts are not "legislating" or "making or revising rules and regulations" when they enforce existing state product liability laws. They are enforcing the state's power "to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons." Id. at 475, 116 S.Ct. 2240. Defendants' argument that this lawsuit against their products must be dismissed because such a complaint is against public policy widely misses the mark.
Defendants argue that the City of Cleveland may not legislate beyond its borders. (Defs.' Mot. at 8.) As Plaintiffs properly point out,...
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