White v. Starbucks Corp.

Decision Date02 July 2007
Docket NumberNo. C 06-3861 VRW.,C 06-3861 VRW.
Citation497 F.Supp.2d 1080
PartiesSteve WHITE, Plaintiff, v. STARBUCKS CORP., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California

Clyde Hobbs Charlton, Matthew Roland Bainer, Scott Edward Cole, Scott Cole & Associates, APC, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff.

Gregory William Knopp, Damien DeLaney, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Joel M. Cohn, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

ORDER

WALKER, Chief Judge.

This action is brought by Steve White, a former store manager of defendant Starbucks Corp (Starbucks), who purports to represent a class consisting of individuals who work or worked as managers in Starbucks' California stores. No class has been certified. Starbucks moves for summary judgment on all claims. For reasons discussed below, Starbucks' motion is GRANTED.

I

The following facts are undisputed. On May 3, 2004, Starbucks hired White as a store manager, and White entered the Starbucks Retail Management Training (RMT) program. Doc # 43, Ex A at 16:1-14, Ex B at 95:24-96:11. The program lasted approximately eight weeks and included classroom instruction, which took place in Berkeley, California, as well as in-store training, which took place in a Starbucks store in Concord, California. Id, Ex A at 24:4-25:20. On June 28, 2004, after completing the RMT program, White became the store manager of the Countrywood store in Walnut Creek, California. Doc # 43, Ex A at 16:22-17:9. White ended his employment with Starbucks on July 8, 2004, only 11 days after starting work at the Countrywood store. Doc # 43, Ex A at 17:6-9; 63:24-64:6.

White filed this action on June 21, 2006. Doc # 1. White asserts four claims: (1) unlawful failure to pay overtime wages in violation of Cal Labor Code §§ 201-204 and Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) Wage Order No 7 ("off-the-clock claim")1; (2) failure to provide meal and rest periods in violation of Cal Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512; (3) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of Cal Labor Code § 226; and (4) violation of Cal Bus & Prof Code §§ 17200-17208 ("unfair competition law claim"). Doc # 1 at 9-13. This case is before the court under its diversity jurisdiction.

II

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving any doubt in favor of the nonmoving party. "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the pleadings, however, but must produce significant probative evidence, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56, supporting the claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists. TW Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). The evidence presented by the nonmoving party "is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The evidence presented by both parties must be admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publishing Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir.1979). Hearsay statements in affidavits are inadmissible. Japan Telecom, Inc. v. Japan Telecom America Inc., 287 F.3d 866, 875 a. 1 (9th Cir.2002).

A

Starbucks argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on White's off-the-clock claim for two independent reasons: (1) White cannot prove that Starbucks had knowledge that White worked off-the-clock; and (2) White cannot produce sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of uncompensated work as a matter of just and reasonable inference. Doc # 42 at 6-16. As discussed below, the court need only address Starbucks' first argument.

To prevail on his off-the-clock claim, White must prove that Starbucks had actual or constructive knowledge of his alleged off-the-clock work. Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 585, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000). Starbucks points out that White admitted in deposition that he never told anyone at Starbucks about working off-the-clock:

Q: Did you tell anybody at Starbucks Coffee that you had worked off the clock when you were employed by the company?

A: No.

Doc # 43, Ex A (White dep) at 102:11-14.

Q: All right. Mr White, you testified that you didn't inform anybody of your off-the-clock work?

A: I did not.

Q: And you testified that as far as you know nobody knew that you were working off the clock. Do you recall that testimony?

A: Yes.

Id. at 188:24-189:5.

White never told his district manager that he had worked off-the-clock (id. at 98:23-24, 102:15-17); never told the individual who conducted his exit interview that he had worked off-the-clock (id. at 100:7-10, 102:8-10, 102:15-17); and never used Starbucks' dedicated hotline to report his complaint anonymously because he "didn't feel a need to" and "there was no reason." Id. at 145:21-146:9.

Starbucks also points out that, during the 11 days he worked in the Countrywood store, White did record and was paid for nearly eight hours of overtime, one hour of which was paid at a double-time rate. Doc # 43, Ex A (White dep) at 68:11-15, 69:14-72:8, 17:6-12. White admits he was never criticized or disciplined for working overtime:

Q: And you said earlier that you were never criticized or disciplined for working overtime, as far as you can recall?

A: Me, personally?

Q: Yes.

A: Yes.

Q: That's true?

A: That's true.

Id. at 103:18-25. In addition, White knew that other employees were also reporting and being paid for overtime. Id. at 123:12-25.

White does not dispute that lie never told anyone at Starbucks about working off-the-clock. White does not dispute that he and others recorded and were paid for overtime work. Rather, White attempts to create a dispute of fact whether Starbucks knew about some unspecified time worked off-the-clock by showing that "[d]efendant knew how much time it took to perform much of the work required by the SMs [store managers]." Doc # 46 at 8. Specifically, White points to the deposition testimony of Starbucks vice president Cindy Chrispell:

Q: Have there, to your knowledge, ever been any time work studies done with regard to the work performed by store managers?

A: I know there were some done as part of the earlier work when we were making the adjustments, changing them from exempt to non-exempt.

Q: To your knowledge a time motion study was done around that point in time for the store managers. Is that your testimony?

A: Yes.

Doc # 47, Ex B (Chrispell dep) at 103:19-104:3. White also offers evidence that Starbucks formulated estimates of the amount of time required for baristas (though not store managers) to perform customer service tasks. Doc # 47, Ex D. And White points out that district managers performed monthly audits of individual stores. Doc # 47, Ex B at 78:3-14. White concludes that "[t]his level of intimate knowledge of the SMs activities, in and of itself, would support a reasonable conclusion that the Defendant should have known what its SMs were doing." Doc # 46 at 8.

Finally, White contends that "Starbucks admits it knew that Store Managers worked off-the-clock in violation of the written policies," doc # 46 at 9, based on the following testimony given by Ms Chrispell:

Q: Are store managers, to your knowledge, ever expected to perform work from home?

A: Not expected to, no.

Q: Do they, as far as you know, ever do that?

A: They sometimes do. They are not supposed to. I mean they are directed to perform their work at work. But it does happen sometimes, yes.

Doc # 47, Ex B at 113:6-12.

The court is troubled by plaintiffs evidence. While plaintiff may be able to show a material dispute whether Starbucks had actual or constructive knowledge that some store managers sometimes worked off-the-clock, plaintiff has not submitted evidence that Starbucks had actual or constructive knowledge that Steve White worked off-the-clock. Furthermore, Chrispell testified that store managers are paid for the time spent working at home. Doc # 49, Ex B at 136:13-15. In any event, the testimony is irrelevant as to White himself because White does not claim to have worked at home. Doc # 49, Ex A at 174:6-8.

Regarding White's other evidence, White does not provide the time motion study of the store manager position or present any evidence of its findings. White fails to explain how this study, which was conducted in 2002 or 2003 (doc # 49, ex B at 103:25-104:17), would give Starbucks constructive knowledge of his alleged off-the-clock work in 2004. White does not explain how time standards applied to baristas would make Starbucks aware that he was working off-the-clock. Finally, White does not explain how the district manager's store visits translate into actual or constructive...

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