White v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

Decision Date14 January 1969
Citation443 S.W.2d 661,59 Tenn.App. 707
PartiesGlenn WHITE, Complainant; Wiley Watson, Intervenor, Complainants (Appellees), v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant (Appellant).
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Lloyd S. Adams, Humboldt, for appellant State Farm Mut. Auto. ins. co.

John W. Norris, Brownsville, for appellee Glenn White.

Lyle Reid, Brownsville, for intervenor appellee Wiley Watson.

MATHERNE, Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Chancery Court of Haywood County, Tennessee, wherein that Court held defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, liable under a personal and farm liability policy which it issued to complainant, Glenn White, for the satisfaction of a judgment previously obtained against Glenn White and others by one Wiley Watson in the Circuit Court of Haywood County, Tennessee.

The parties will be referred to as they appeared in the Trial Court, appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, as defendant; appellee, Glenn White, as complainant; and intervenor, Wiley Watson, as Watson.

The original bill alleged that the defendant by and through its duly authorized agent, Bill Thornton, issued its 'Personal and Farm Liability Policy No. 1468 168--D15--42' to complainant effective October 15, 1963, and thereafter renewed same to October 15, 1964, and that premiums were paid thereon. This policy was filed as exhibit to the bill and was later introduced in evidence. Complainant alleged that on or about June 25, 1964, one Wiley Watson sustained accidental injuries on premises operated and controlled by the complainant and which were covered by said policy. As result of these injuries, Wiley Watson sued complainant and obtained a jury verdict and judgment against complainant in the amount of $5,000.00. Complainant alleged that defendant was duly notified of this accident and that the accident and injuries sustained by Wiley Watson were of the type and nature covered and indemnified against by the defendant under said policy; that defendant had refused to satisfy this judgment obtained against complainant. The complainant prayed that the Court order the defendant to satisfy said judgment cost, expenses and interest accrued thereon.

By answer the defendant admitted the issuance of the policy alleged, admitted the suit by Wiley Watson, and the judgment thereon. Defendant alleged that the suit by Watson was styled 'Wiley Watson vs. Glenn White and Billy Joe Manus, individually, and partners, d/b/a M & W Dozer Work', and the case was tried on the theory that Watson was the employee of both defendants on a farm in Haywood County owned by one K. L. Page and rented by complainant, White. Defendant alleged it defended the suit for White under a reservation of rights. Defendant denied that the accident and injuries suffered by Watson were within the coverage of the policy and asserted: (1) The premises upon which Watson was injured were not a part of the premises defined and covered in the policy; (2) The liability fixed against complainant, White, in the Circuit Court action was not individual but was joint and several against him as a partner with Billy Joe Manus outside the coverage of the policy issued by defendant to complainant, White, as an individual policy; (3) The accidental injuries sustained by Watson did not occur in such a manner and under such circumstances as to afford complainant, White, protection under the terms of the policy.

Wiley Watson, the party in whose favor the Circuit Court judgment was rendered, was permitted to intervene in this suit, and he thereby joined the complainant and asserted that the defendant was liable for the judgment rendered in his favor against White.

The suit was heard on oral testimony before the Chancellor according to the forms of chancery. A written Opinion was filed by the Chancellor deciding the issues in favor of complainant. A decree was entered adjudging the complainant entitled to recover of the defendant the amount of the judgment in the Circuit Court cause of Wiley Watson vs. Glenn White et al together with interest thereon from the date of said judgment to wit, June 13, 1966. Said amount was ordered paid into the Chancery Court for benefit of the intervenor, Wiley Watson.

The defendant, insurance company, has appealed and assigned as error the same propositions as set out above, plus error in the admission of certain evidence. The Assignments of Error will not be individually considered herein, but will be disposed of after a review and holding by the Court on the issues involved.

This appeal is from an equity cause tried according to the forms of chancery, and the appellant under T.C.A. § 27--301 is entitled to a reexamination of the whole matter of law and fact appearing in the record; but under T.C.A. § 27--303 there is a prima facie presumption of the correctness of the decree of the Chancellor, and the decree will not be disturbed unless the evidence preponderates against the same. Kennon v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. (1963) 52 Tenn.App. 521, 376 S.W.2d 703. Where the evidence preponderates against the finding of the Chancellor it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to enter such decree as the law and the evidence warrant. Loftis v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. (1964) 54 Tenn.App. 371, 390 S.W.2d 722.

The evidence established that complainant was a farmer and that he approached defendant's agent Thornton and requested an insurance policy which would provide him full and complete liability coverage for his farming operations. At the time this application was made complainant did not own any farm land, but he rented about 250 acres from various people. All the rented land was in the 5th Civil District of Haywood County, but all of it was not on Poplar Corner Road. There is no proof of a listing of the farms made by the complainant. This initial contact resulted in the agent preparing a 'General Liability Application' form of defendant company on which the agent inserted the following information:

'Name: White, Glenn

Occupation: Farmer

General location of all farm premises: 7 miles east on Poplar Corner Road from Brownsville in 5th Civil District.

Use: Gen. farming

Acres: 419

Owner: (Left blank)

Rented: 250'

Complainant, White, signed the Application and paid the premium. Thereupon defendant company issued the policy which stated the named insured to be 'White, Glenn' and described the premises covered as '7 mi. E on Poplar Corner Rd. in 5th Civil District 419 Acres.'

The farm on which Watson was injured was a farm complainant rented from K. L. Page. At the time of the application, October 15, 1963, complainant had not rented the Page farm but was negotiating to rent about 50 acres from Page. This farm wasin the 5th Civil District but was not on Poplar Corner Road. Early in 1964 complainant did rent the 50-acre Page farm. Complainant did not report to defendant's agent that he had rented the Page farm.

Complainant testified over defendant's objection that agent Thornton told him that he was covered up to 419 acres total farming operation, and that he, complainant, understood this to be the total number of acres covered so long as the acreage was in the 5th Civil District. Complainant testified that at no time did his total acreage amount to 419 acres. Complainant stated that he did not know where Thornton got the figure of 419 acres but assumed it represented a break in the rate schedule and that he would be covered up to that total number of acres.

Agent Thornton testified that he understood that complainant was renting 250 acres and that he treated the farm owned by complainant's father as being operated by complainant, which farm was approximately 169 acres, thereby making the total of 419 acres. However, the proof established that complainant did not operate but a small portion of his father's farm.

We disagree with defendant's contention that this testimony of complainant relating to the number of acres involved and the premises covered is an attempt to vary the terms of a written contract by parol testimony. Rather, this testimony was competent to show complainant's understanding of the 419 acre figure inserted in the application by the agent. We hold that the preponderance of the evidence sustains the finding of the Chancellor that the Page farm was included in the premises covered, and that any ambiguity in this respect, any mistake or misunderstanding concerning the premises covered, is by a preponderance of the evidence established to be the mistake of the agent Thornton. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Paul (1951) 35 Tenn.App. 394, 245 S.W.2d 775.

After the issuance of the policy complainant, White, and one Billy Joe Manus entered into a business venture referred to as M & W Dozer Work. The parties purchased a bulldozer and a truck and were engaged in, and doing bulldozer work for the public which consisted of clearing land, digging ponds, or other work commonly performed on farmland by bulldozers. M & W Dozer Work did not engage in the enterprise of farming. When complainant, White, rented the farm from K. L. Page, it was necessary that certain portions thereof be cleared in order to cultivate the same. White and Page entered into an agreement whereby Page would pay M & W Dozer Work for bulldozing and piling the brush. Complainant, White, was to burn the piles of brush. The evidence established that intervenor, Watson, was injured while burning the piles of brush on the Page farm.

Considerable discussion has been expended by both sides of this litigation on the question of whether complainant, Glenn White, is individually liable under the judgment rendered in favor of Watson in the Circuit Court.

The Declaration in that Court states that the plaintiff, Wiley Watson, '* * * sues the defendants Glen White and Billy Joe Manus, who are residents and citizens of Haywood County,...

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