White v. State
| Citation | 183 Md. App. 658,963 A.2d 222 |
| Decision Date | 03 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 1960, September Term, 2007.,1960, September Term, 2007. |
| Parties | Richard WHITE v. STATE of Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Henry L. Belsky (Schlachman, Belsky & Weiner on the brief, Baltimore, Kimberly A. Alley of Littleton, MA, on the brief), for appellant.
Carl N. Zacarias (Steven M. Sullivan, Donald E. Hoffman, Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before KRAUSER, C.J., SALMON and JAMES, S. GETTY, Retired, Specially Assigned, JJ.
Richard White was a member of the Thurmont Police force on October 24, 2002. On that date he was very severely injured when, in the course of his police duties, the vehicle he was driving went out of control and struck a tree. Officer White brought a suit for negligence in the Circuit Court for Frederick County and named as defendants William Henrickson, a State police communications officer, and Henrickson's employer, the State of Maryland.1
Trial commenced on September 18, 2007. At the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of the case, the trial judge granted the defendants' motion for judgment for two reasons: 1) recovery was barred based on the "Fireman's Rule" and 2) even if the claim was not barred by that Rule, White could not recover because, as a matter of law, his injuries were caused, in part, by his own contributory negligence. In this appeal White claims that the trial judge erred in granting judgment in favor of Henrickson and the State.
On the morning of October 24, 2002, Craig Main3 was working at the Ace Hardware store in Thurmont, Maryland when he noticed two men. The first man engaged Main in conversation while the second wandered through the store. Shortly thereafter, the second man was observed running from the store carrying a "tool power pack" worth $200.00. The man with whom Main had been talking ran into the parking lot and jumped into a get-away vehicle with the thief. Main stuck his hand in the vehicle through an opening in the window and told the men to give the merchandise back and that if they did so he would not call the police. With Main's arm still in the vehicle, the driver backed the car up, which required Main to hold on to the car in order to avoid being run over. Main finally let go and the two men sped away.
Main called 911 and was connected with the Frederick County 911 dispatcher. Main said: He was then transferred to William Henrickson, a communications officer for the Maryland State Police. The following exchange then occured:
Henrickson did not make further inquiry of Main to determine the exact nature of the crime that was committed at the hardware store. He nevertheless told Officer White that: "an armed robbery just occurred at the Ace Hardware in Thurmont."
Officer White located the suspects and initiated pursuit. As he did so, the emergency lights on his police cruiser were activated and this, simultaneously, activated a dash board video camera. When Officer White's car caught up with the suspect's vehicle, the driver of the get-away vehicle did not stop. Instead, the driver tried to elude Officer White, as well as several other officers who joined in the pursuit. The dash board camera showed that Officer White pursued the suspects over mostly rural, two-lane roads, with no shoulder. The camera at no point captured the image of the suspects' vehicle, but it is clear from the video and the communications made by Officer White through his radio dispatches to Henrickson, that White was in sight of the vehicle at times throughout the chase.
During the pursuit, Officer White radioed to Henrickson a corrected description of the suspects' vehicle as a "red Toyota MR2." He also reported that he saw one of the occupants throw something out the window during the chase.
Approximately nine minutes after the chase began, Officer White approached a sharp turn to the left on Yellow Springs Road, a two-lane roadway with a speed limit of 35 mph. Three vehicles approached the curve in the opposite direction from Officer White. The first is visible on the camera and is shown approaching about two seconds before Officer White entered the curve. When the officer entered the curve, he initially remained in his lane of traffic, but lost control of his cruiser. His car then fish-tailed off of Yellow Spring Road and struck a culvert, then flew through the air and collided with a tree. The severe injuries received by Officer White in the crash made it impossible for him to recall the chase or any of the events that immediately preceded it.
At trial, Henrickson admitted that one of the cardinal rules of his profession, which was emphasized in his training, was that a communications officer, when talking to a victim, must determine whether the perpetrator is armed. He further acknowledged that it is the responsibility of a communications officer to relay accurate information to the police officers with whom he is communicating, regardless as to whether the officer makes follow-up inquiries. He conceded that sometimes relaying accurate information can make the difference between life and death. Additionally, Henrickson conceded, shoplifting from a hardware store, without any use of force, would qualify as a lower-priority call for responding officers than would a report that the suspect had used a weapon in the commission of a crime. Therefore, when a dispatcher states that a suspect is "armed," the importance of the call is greater and can be expected to cause responding officers to alter the manner in which they handle the call.
Officer White testified that he is trained to rely on the information supplied to him by the dispatcher and that it is improper for him to try and second guess the information he receives. Officer White further testified that, in determining whether to engage in a high-speed chase of a suspect, he must conduct a balancing test in which he evaluates the seriousness of the crime and the possibility that the suspect is a threat to the public against the danger of the pursuit. In conducting such a balancing test, the more serious the crime or threat to the public, the more likely the need for a high-speed pursuit. Officer White was trained not to engage in a high-speed pursuit when a person was suspected only of shoplifting. On the other hand, he was trained to engage in high-speed pursuits to apprehend a fleeing armed robbery suspect. According to Officer White's testimony, if given an accurate report of the crime by Henrickson, Officer White would not have engaged in the high-speed pursuit that resulted in his severe injury.
Based on the evidence just summarized, it was Officer White's position at trial that Henrickson was negligent when he failed to find out from Main exactly what crime the suspects had committed. Mr. Henrickson was also negligent, it was alleged, when he told Officer White that the suspects had committed an armed robbery.
The sole issue to be decided in this case is whether the trial judge erred in granting appellees' motion for judgment.5 We shall hold that the trial judge correctly granted judgment in favor of appellees, based on the "Fireman's Rule." It therefore is unnecessary for us to decide whether recovery by Officer White was barred by his (alleged) contributory negligence.
In Southland v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 713, 633 A.2d 84 (1993), the Court said:
Our cases hold that the doctrine known as the Fireman's Rule generally prevents fire fighters and police officers injured in the course of their duties from recovering tort damages from those whose negligence exposed them to the risk of injury. See Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace, 308 Md. 432, 520 A.2d 361 (1987); Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d 76 (1978); Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md. 242,237 Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965); Steinwedel v. Hilbert, 149 Md. 121, 131 A. 44 (1925).
(Emphasis added.)
As can be seen, if the Fireman's Rule is accurately stated in the excerpt just quoted from the Southland opinion, Officer White cannot recover from appellees, because it was Henrickson's negligence that exposed Officer White to the risk of injury. Other cases from our sister states have applied the Fireman's Rule in cases analogous to the one here at issue. In McGhee v. State Police Department, 184 Mich.App. 484, 459 N.W.2d 67 (1990), McGhee, a Detroit Police Officer was on duty when he heard a broadcast by the Michigan State Police, that State Troopers were engaged in a high-speed chase of a vehicle driven by one Tawaine Jackson. After Officer McGhee joined the chase, Jackson's vehicle struck McGhee's cruiser head-on. Id. McGhee sued the State of Michigan and two of its State Troopers for his injuries and alleged that the troopers had negligently "began and continued" the pursuit of Jackson, which resulted in his injuries. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals said:
We are not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that the rule does not apply because Officer McGhee was injured on a public street. We acknowledge that one of the Supreme Court's primary policy reasons for adopting the rule was that it would be an unreasonable burden on landowners to require them to prepare for the...
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