White v. State
Decision Date | 13 December 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 11518,11518 |
Citation | 603 P.2d 1063,95 Nev. 881 |
Parties | Danny Ray WHITE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
A jury found the appellant, Danny Ray White, guilty of burglary. NRS 205.060. On appeal he contends: (1) That the trial court committed error in its comments to the jury during their deliberations; (2) That the giving of an additional non-statutory instruction regarding reasonable doubt constituted reversible error; and, (3) That the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We find each contention to be without merit.
During deliberations, the jury foreman sent a note to the trial court stating that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict after numerous votes. In addition, the note indicated that "a better understanding of the term reasonable doubt would be helpful." Pursuant to NRS 175.451, the court thereafter convened in the presence of the defendant, both counsel, and the jury, whereupon the following discussion occurred:
The trial court then gave the following instruction on reasonable doubt:
Immediately thereafter, the statutory definition of reasonable doubt, previously given to the jury, was repeated. NRS 175.211(1). 1
In Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 25 S.Ct. 243, 49 L.Ed. 482 (1905), the Supreme Court condemned the judicial inquiry into the numerical standing of a jury during deliberations. Burton did not decide, however, whether the numerical inquiry was reversible error. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926), resolved the issue, holding that a numerical inquiry constituted reversible error Per se. Recognizing that such an inquiry tends to be coercive, the Supreme Court said: "We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal." Id. at 450, 47 S.Ct. at 135.
The Supreme Court has never held, or intimated, that the Brasfield rule of Per se prejudicial error is a rule of constitutional law binding on the states. Indeed, there are explicit holdings that Brasfield merely created a federal procedural rule incident to the Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal courts. See Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir. 1979); State v. Cornell, 266 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa), Cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 340, 58 L.Ed.2d 338 (1978).
Although a number of jurisdictions have followed the reasoning in Brasfield, e. g., People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1973); See Taylor v. State, 17 Md.App. 41, 299 A.2d 841 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1973), other courts have held that the trial court may make inquiry respecting the numerical division of the jury. People v. Carter, 68 Cal.2d 810, 69 Cal.Rptr. 297, 300, 442 P.2d 353, 356 (1968); Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591, 596 (Miss.1976). Finally, some states have required that there be a showing of prejudice based on the circumstances of each case. People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989, 993-94 (1974).
Our approach to this type of claimed judicial error, in general, resembles the position of the Colorado court. Id. at 993-94. We have held that the alleged error should be examined in the context of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. See Redeford v. State, 93 Nev. 649, 652-53, 572 P.2d 219, 220-21 (1977) ( ); State v. Clark, 38 Nev. 304, 308-10, 149 P. 185, 187-88 (1915) ( ). We opt to follow our precedent and reject the harsh Brasfield rule of automatic reversal.
In the instant case, the trial judge requested the jury to disclose its numerical standing. No answer, however, was given. The conversation between the judge and the jury foreman was limited to whether there had been substantial changes in the balloting during deliberations. Moreover, the judge did not urge the jury to reach a verdict, nor in any other manner apply pressure to minority jurors. Cf. Ransey v. State, 95 Nev. 364, 594 P.2d 1157 (1979) ( ). In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, Cf. Farmer v. State, 95 Nev. ---, 603 P.2d 700 (1979) ( ), we conclude that the inquiry was neither an abuse of discretion nor error of any sort.
We have often expressed our view that the reasonable doubt instruction contained in NRS 175.211 is adequate, and that no further instruction need be given. Although it is unnecessary, we have also held that the negative...
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