White v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 02 January 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 23126,23126 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Sam B. WHITE, Molly White Welter, and Ann F. White as Executrix of the Estate of Jesse A. White, Jr., Respondents, v. Corinne H. STEPHENS, Appellant. |
Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., and Frederick A. Crawford of Richardson, Plowden, Grier & Howser, Columbia, for appellant.
Joel W. Collins, Jr., and G. Wells Dickson, Jr. of Collins & Lacy, Columbia, for respondents.
The sole issue on appeal is whether South Carolina can exercise personal jurisdiction over Corinne Stephens ("Stephens"), a Georgia resident, in this action for breach of contract and for an accounting on an alleged constructive trust. We find that there is a lack of personal jurisdiction and, therefore, reverse.
Corinne Stephens ("Stephens"), a Georgia resident, is the daughter of Mabel White ("Mabel") by her first marriage. The respondents (the "White children") are the children of Jesse A. White, Sr. and the stepchildren of Mabel. 1
After the death of her first husband, Mabel married Jesse A. White, Sr., a widower. Subsequently, in 1968, Jesse deeded his residence on Lancaster Road in Chester County to Mabel. After Jesse's death, Mabel sold the Lancaster Road property and bought a smaller house on Sunset Drive in Chester. The excess proceeds from the sale of the property were voluntarily distributed by Mabel to the White children.
On September 30, 1977, while living in Chester, Mabel executed a will bequeathing the Sunset Drive property to the White children. On June 17, 1982, Mabel executed a Power of Attorney and appointed Stephens as her attorney-in-fact. The Power of Attorney was filed in the Chester County Courthouse, but was never exercised in South Carolina.
In May 1983, Mabel moved to Georgia. On October 7, 1983, Mabel sold the Sunset Drive property. Although Stephens did not sign any documents involved in the sale, she did attend the closing and was involved with the sale of furniture from the house. A check in the amount of $51,219.84 was issued from the attorneys' escrow account to Mabel and was deposited in a bank in Georgia. The White children claim that an oral agreement was made between Stephens and themselves providing that the sale proceeds would be held in trust. The interest from the trust was to be used for the health, care and maintenance of Mabel. Upon Mabel's death, the principal and any accrued interest was to be distributed among the White children. This alleged trust agreement is the source of the underlying controversy in this action.
The White children claim that they were legally and equitably entitled to these funds under Mabel's 1977 will. In 1985, however, Mabel executed a new will in Georgia leaving her entire estate to Stephens. Mabel died on August 13, 1987, and her will was probated in Georgia. The White children made no claim against Mabel's estate.
The party seeking to invoke personal jurisdiction against a nonresident by utilization of our long-arm statute has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. McComb v. Tiburon Aircraft, Inc., 276 S.C. 683, 281 S.E.2d 482 (1981). At the pretrial stage of determination of jurisdiction, the plaintiff needs only to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction by his pleadings and affidavits that the trial court should exercise jurisdiction. Askins v. Firedoor Corp. of Florida, 281 S.C. 611, 316 S.E.2d 713 (Ct.App.1984); Fields v. INA Filtration Corp., 292 S.C. 614, 358 S.E.2d 160 (Ct.App.1987).
The determination of whether a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident involves a two step analysis. First, in order for the courts to have statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction, the nonresident's conduct must meet the requirements of South Carolina's long-arm statute. Second, the nonresident must have sufficient contacts with South Carolina so that the constitutional standards of due process are not violated. Stephens argues that her conduct does not fall within the long-arm statute and that she has no contacts with South Carolina upon which personal jurisdiction may be based. We agree.
South Carolina's long-arm statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's
(a) transacting any business in this State;
....
(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this state.
S.C.Code Ann. § 36-2-803 (Law Co-op.1976).
The trial court found that the White children had made a showing of jurisdiction by the pleadings and affidavits. The lower court also cited § 36-2-803(1)(a) in support of its ruling. The Order does not mention subsection (g); however, both parties discussed it in their briefs.
Stephens argues that her conduct does not constitute the transaction of business in South Carolina. We agree. The pleadings and affidavits show that Stephens' only contacts with this state included the following:
(1) She attended the closing on the sale of her mother's home.
(2) She tended to the sale of some of her mother's furniture.
(3) She was given a Power of Attorney which authorized her to transact business in South Carolina. It was executed and recorded here, but was never exercised in this state.
(4) She made two trips to South Carolina since 1983 without explaining the purpose of the trips.
(5) She allegedly made an oral trust agreement with the White children.
The only actions that could possibly constitute the "transaction of business" in South Carolina for the purposes of the long-arm statute would be the receipt of the Power of Attorney and the making of the alleged oral trust agreement.
Although the Power of Attorney was executed and recorded in South Carolina, it was never exercised in this state. Nor was it alleged that Stephens made the oral agreement as the Attorney-in-Fact for Mabel. Therefore, we find that the mere receipt of a Power of Attorney does not constitute the transaction of business for jurisdictional purposes.
In addition, we find that the making of the oral trust agreement could not constitute the transaction of business in South Carolina since it was not alleged that the contract was entered into or that it was to be performed in this state.
To find personal jurisdiction based on § 36-2-803(1)(g), it is not necessary to demonstrate a binding contract existed; but rather, the White children need only make a prima facie showing that the trial court should exercise jurisdiction. Askins v. Firedoor Corp. of Florida, 281 S.C. 614, 316 S.E.2d 713 (Ct.App.1984)....
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