White v. Stewman, 2005-CA-00069-SCT.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Citation: 932 So.2d 27
• Docket Number: No. 2005-CA-00069-SCT.,No. 2005-IA-00022-SCT.,2005-CA-00069-SCT.,2005-IA-00022-SCT.
• Parties: Willie J. WHITE, Individually and as an Agent for National Linen Service Corporation d/b/a National Service Industries, Inc. and National Linen Service Corporation d/b/a National Service Industries, Inc. v. Willie Mae STEWMAN.
• Decision Date: 15 June 2006

932 So.2d 27 Willie J. WHITE, Individually and as an Agent for National Linen Service Corporation d/b/a National Service Industries, Inc. and National Linen Service Corporation d/b/a National Service Industries, Inc.
v.
Willie Mae STEWMAN. No. 2005-CA-00069-SCT. No. 2005-IA-00022-SCT. Supreme Court of Mississippi. June 15, 2006.

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George J. Nalley, Jr., P. Sharkey Burke, Jr., attorneys for appellants.

Nathaniel Alandas Armistad, Robert Shuler Smith, attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

EASLEY, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. This consolidated appeal arises from an order of the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Judge Winston L. Kidd, presiding, wherein the trial court set aside the jury verdict rendered in favor of the Defendants in this personal injury case, and granted the motion for a new trial filed by the plaintiff, Willie Mae Stewman. In addition to granting Stewman's motion, the trial court

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entered an order requiring that a peremptory instruction be given at the parties' new trial, thus instructing the jury that Willie J. White was negligent as a matter of law. The Defendants thereafter perfected a direct appeal pursuant to M.R.A.P. 4(a), and likewise petitioned us for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to M.R.A.P. 5(a). We granted the Defendants' petition for an interlocutory appeal and consolidated that appeal with the direct appeal.

¶ 2. The trial court's grant of a post-verdict peremptory instruction, that White was negligent as a matter of law, was the legal equivalent of a grant of a motion for J.N.O.V. The peremptory instruction at the new trial would inform the jury that White was negligent as a matter of law. After consideration, we find the trial court erred by setting aside the jury verdict in favor of the Defendants as the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence. The jury verdict in favor of the Defendants is hereby reinstated by this Court.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶ 3. On February 6, 2003, shortly after 6:00 a.m., Stewman was driving east on Highway 18, a four lane thoroughfare located in Hinds County, near the intersection of Greenway Drive. The highway was wet from rain earlier in the morning. On the opposite side of the highway, White, a driver for National Linen Service Corporation, was traveling west in the left-hand lane. With little or no warning, the unknown driver of a small white car, which was also traveling west on Highway 18, made a right-to-left lane change and pulled directly in front of White. In an effort to avoid a collision, White swerved his commercial vehicle through the left turn lane and into the grass median which separated the opposing lanes of traffic on Highway 18. Having lost control of his vehicle, White continued through the grass median and into the opposing lanes of the eastbound traffic where he collided with Stewman's vehicle. As a result of the collision, Stewman suffered severe injuries. Notably, the driver of the small white car did not stop at the scene of the accident and has never been identified.

¶ 4. Stewman commenced her action against White, individually and as an agent for National Linen Service Corporation, doing business as National Service Industries, Inc., and National Linen Service Corporation, doing business as National Service Industries, Inc. (National Linen) in the Circuit Court of Hinds County. At the four-day trial which ensued, the pivotal issue for the jury was whether White was negligent in the operation of his truck. Upon the close of White's case-in-chief, Stewman moved for a directed verdict, asserting that White's negligence was not a question of fact for the jury. Although Judge Kidd denied Stewman's motion for a directed verdict, he found that White's negligence and the negligence of the unknown driver of the small white car were the cause of the accident. The form of the verdict instruction which the trial court submitted to the jury contained three "questions:" (1) the amount of damages, if any, suffered by the plaintiff, Stewman; (2) the percentage of fault allocated between White (and National Linen) and the unidentified driver of the small white car; and, (3) an option to find in favor of the Defendants by using the form, "[w]e, the jury find for the Defendants." After deliberating, the jury returned a verdict which stated "[w]e, the jury find for the Defendants." By its verdict, the jury did not assess the amount of Stewman's damages, nor did it allocate fault between White and the unknown driver. Following the reading of the verdict, each juror was polled, and the polling revealed a ten-to-two vote

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in favor of the verdict as read. Thereafter, a final judgment was entered consistent with the jury verdict.

¶ 5. Subsequent to the entry of the final judgment, Stewman filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative for a new trial. The trial court thereafter entered an order denying Stewman's motion for a J.N.O.V., choosing instead to set aside the jury verdict and grant Stewman a new trial. In addition to entering an order granting a new trial, the trial court likewise entered an order directing that, upon a new trial, the jury would be peremptorily instructed that White was negligent as a matter of law. Thus, the order provided that the only issues to be resolved at a new trial were (1) apportionment of fault between White and the unknown driver, and (2) the amount of damages, if any, suffered by Stewman. The trial court ultimately determined that the overwhelming weight of the evidence presented at trial established that White was negligent as a matter of law and, as such, White should have been apportioned a percentage of the fault, when weighed and considered with the fault of the unknown driver of the small white car.

¶ 6. White filed an interlocutory appeal from the circuit court order granting Stewman a new trial and an appeal of right from the circuit court order granting Stewman a peremptory instruction regarding White's negligence. This Court granted White's interlocutory appeal and consolidated that matter with White's direct appeal.

¶ 7. The trial court erred by setting aside the jury verdict. This Court finds that the trial court's grant of a peremptory instruction was tantamount to granting a J.N.O.V. The trial court also erred by granting the peremptory instruction and a new trial. There was substantial credible evidence to support the jury verdict in favor of the Defendants, White and National Linen Services. As such, we reverse the trial court's decision to set aside the jury verdict and the grant of a peremptory instruction that White was negligent as a matter of law, and reinstate the jury verdict in favor of the Defendants.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8. Before addressing the issues presented in today's case, we must evaluate the nature of the rulings that form the bases of this consolidated appeal. Moreover, we must determine exactly what the trial court ordered when he ruled both to grant Stewman's motion for a new trial and to give a peremptory instruction as to White's liability. With this task in mind, and for the sake of clarity, we begin our discussion by examining judgments as a matter of law and the grant of a new trial. Ultimately, we look at the legal effect of these "judicial control devices" to determine their finality and appealability.

¶ 9. Judgments as a matter of law, which include directed verdicts, peremptory instructions — a procedural equivalent to a directed verdict — and judgments notwithstanding the verdict, all exist to challenge via motion the substance of a party's factual presentation vis-a-vis the law of the case.¹ In essence, when requested by way of a motion to grant one of these judgments as a matter of law, trial courts are provided an opportunity to assess the viability of the cases pending before them. By their very nature, these motions present purely legal questions, and therefore,

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once these motions are utilized by the parties and ruled on by a trial court, these issues are preserved for review and directly appealable upon final judgment.

¶ 10. Our standard of review of a trial court's grant of a J.N.O.V., a peremptory instruction and a directed verdict is de novo, and we apply the same criteria as that of the trial court:

[T]his Court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee [nonmovant], giving that party the benefit of all favorable inference [sic] that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant [movant] that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, we are required to reverse and render. On the other hand if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required. The above standards of review, however, are predicated on the fact that the trial judge applied the correct law.

Steele v. Inn of Vicksburg, Inc., 697 So.2d 373, 376 (Miss.1997) (citing Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.2d 248, 252 (Miss.1993)).

¶ 11. In essence, judgments as a matter of law present both the trial court and the appellate court with the same question-whether the evidence, as applied to the elements of a party's case, is either so indisputable, or so deficient, that the necessity of a trier of fact has been obviated. Stated differently, judgments as a matter of law go to the very heart of a litigant's case and test the legal sufficiency of that litigant's case. In this way, judgments as a matter of law put a party to its proof and are available through a motion at varying junctures of the judicial process before, during, and after trial.

¶ 12. We turn now to Miss. R. Civ. P. 50. While functionally the same...