White v. Taylor Distributing Co., Inc.
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Citation | White v. Taylor Distributing Co., Inc., 753 N.W.2d 591, 482 Mich. 136 (Mich. 2008) |
| Decision Date | 23 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | Calendar No. 6.,Docket No. 134751. |
| Parties | Sherita WHITE and Derrick White, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. TAYLOR DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC., Penske Truck Leasing Company, LP, and James J. Birkenheuer, Defendants-Appellants. |
At issue is whether the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant on the basis of his claim that he experienced a sudden emergency. Defendant,1 James Birkenheuer, rear-ended plaintiff, Sherita White, while she was stopped for a red light. By statute, the driver of a vehicle that strikes another from behind is presumed negligent.2 But defendant claims that, as a matter of law, the statutory presumption should not apply to him because he experienced a sudden emergency when he blacked out seconds before the collision. We disagree. We conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding defendant's claim of a sudden emergency. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of the trial court's grant of summary disposition to defendant.
On March 15, 2004, defendant was driving from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Novi, Michigan. He stated that he stopped at a rest area in Canton, Michigan, because he experienced an urgent onset of severe diarrhea. After the diarrhea episode, defendant stated that he waited about 20 minutes at the rest area to see how he felt. Not experiencing further illness, he continued his trip.
Defendant stated that as he took the Novi Road exit ramp some 30 minutes later, he began to feel dizzy and broke into a sweat. He recalled seeing plaintiff's car about 250 to 300 yards in front of him, stopped at a red light at the end of the ramp. Defendant applied his brakes, began gearing down, and then blacked out. He has no recollection of events that occurred before the impact with plaintiff's vehicle jarred him to consciousness. After the collision, he applied his emergency brake, set his emergency flashers, and got out of his truck, but blacked out again in the road. He was assisted by other motorists and then treated by emergency medical personnel at the scene.
Defendant was taken to a hospital by ambulance. He was diagnosed as having experienced a "syncopal episode," meaning that he blacked out. While at the hospital, he described the accident to a police officer and was ticketed for violating MCL 257.627(1)—failure to maintain an assured clear distance ahead. The next day, defendant visited his family doctor, who diagnosed defendant as having experienced "viral enteritis with syncopal spell secondary to hypovolemia" (intestinal inflammation with secondary blackout).
Plaintiff filed a suit alleging that defendant was presumed negligent under MCL 257.402(a) because he had struck plaintiff's vehicle from the rear.3 Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that he was not negligent under the circumstances because his illness created a sudden emergency. Defendant submitted his deposition testimony, the accident report, and related medical reports in support of his motion. Plaintiff argued that questions of fact existed regarding whether defendant had actually blacked out before the accident and whether defendant knew or should have known that he was not in a condition to drive when he left the rest area after experiencing severe diarrhea. The trial court granted defendant's motion. Plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that summary disposition was not appropriate because the key evidence was within defendant's exclusive knowledge. White v. Taylor Distributing Co., Inc., 275 Mich.App. 615, 630, 739 N.W.2d 132 (2007). We granted defendant's application for leave to appeal. 480 Mich. 961, 741 N.W.2d 382 (2007).
"We review de novo decisions on summary disposition motions." AFSCME v. Detroit, 468 Mich. 388, 398, 662 N.W.2d 695 (2003) (quotation omitted). A court reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) "must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party." Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 374, 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993). The statutory presumption of negligence under MCL 257.402(a) may be rebutted by showing the existence of a sudden emergency. Vander Laan v. Miedema, 385 Mich. 226, 231, 188 N.W.2d 564 (1971). The sudden-emergency doctrine applies "when a collision is shown to have occurred as the result of a sudden emergency not of the defendants' own making." Id., citing McKinney v. Anderson, 373 Mich. 414, 419, 129 N.W.2d 851 (1964).
Defendant asserts that he experienced a sudden emergency when he became dizzy and blacked out on the exit ramp seconds before he collided with plaintiff's vehicle; thus, the statutory presumption should not apply. We agree that a sudden, unexpected blackout could present a sudden emergency sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption.4 But a sudden emergency sufficient to remove the statutory presumption must be "totally unexpected." Vander Laan, supra at 232, 188 N.W.2d 564. There is evidence that defendant may have known or should have known that he was not feeling well when he continued driving after his urgent stop at the Canton rest area. This creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendant's emergency was totally unexpected.5
Defendant testified that after experiencing a severe episode of diarrhea at the rest area, "I hung around a while, walked around to make sure I was finished and felt fine so I continued on to where I had to go because it wasn't far away." This emphasized statement could imply that defendant was aware he was not feeling well, but chose to continue driving his tractor-trailer because he felt he could make the short trip despite his condition.
Defendant states that he "felt great" while driving some 30 minutes between the Canton rest area and the Novi Road exit. But this statement is called into question by the medical records and deposition testimony submitted to the trial court. The emergency room (ER) physician who treated defendant stated that
Defendant's family physician diagnosed defendant with viral enteritis severe enough to cause a blackout. Viral enteritis is an inflammation of the intestines with symptoms including nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, cramps, and abdominal pain. So, the independent opinions of the two doctors treating defendant within 24 hours of the accident agree that defendant's condition would have caused ongoing symptoms such as cramps and pain. Further, the officer who responded to the accident noted that defendant "states he `blacked out,' possibly from being ill." It is unclear from this statement whether defendant was referring to his diarrhea at the rest area or to illness at some time more immediately before the accident. If defendant experienced ongoing symptoms or felt ill after his first onset of urgent illness at the rest stop, then any subsequent emergency was not...
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...270 (1976). To rebut the presumption, defendant argued that he experienced a sudden emergency. See White v. Taylor Distrib. Co., Inc. , 482 Mich. 136, 139-140, 753 N.W.2d 591 (2008) (discussing the sudden-emergency exception to presumptions of negligence). Specifically, he claimed that he p......
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