White v. the County of Bond.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1871
• Citation: 1871 WL 7924,58 Ill. 297,11 Am.Rep. 65
• Parties: MARY ANN WHITE et al., Administrators, etc.,v.THE COUNTY OF BOND.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

58 Ill. 297

1871 WL 7924 (Ill.)

11 Am.Rep. 65

MARY ANN WHITE et al., Administrators, etc.,

v.THE COUNTY OF BOND.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1871.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Bond county.

Mr. DAVID GILLESPIE, for the appellants.

Messrs. HAY, GREENE & LITTLER, and Mr. JOHN M. PALMER, Jr., for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an action on the case in the Bond Circuit Court, by the administrators of Stephen D. White, deceased, against the county of Bond, for wrongful neglect in keeping a bridge over the east fork of Shoal Creek in good repair, by means of which the deceased lost his life.

To the declaration there was a general demurrer by the defendant, which the court sustained, and rendered judgment against the plaintiffs for costs, to be paid in due course of administration.

To reverse this judgment, the plaintiffs appeal.

This case must be governed by the Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346, and Bussell, Administrator v. The Town of Steuben, 57 Ill. 35, decided on the authority of Hedges v. County of Madison, 1 Gilm. 567, and other cases there cited, and overruling the case of South Ottawa v. Foster, 20 Ill. 296.

In the case first cited, it was held that such corporations as counties and towns were not liable to a private action, at the suit of a party injured by a neglect of its officers to perform a corporate duty, unless such action was given by statute for the violation. The distinction was recognized between those corporations created for their own benefit, and the incorporated inhabitants of a district, by statute invested with particular powers without their consent.

In regard to municipal corporations, acting under special charters, the privileges conferred are held to be a consideration for the duties which the charter imposes, and for the performance of which, like individuals, they must be responsible in an action. Neither counties nor towns become such at the special request of the people. Not so with those municipal corporations organized under special charters, or by the general law. Such organizations are the result of the action of the people, impelled thereto by considerations affecting, more or less, their private interests. They are solicited, while the former are imposed without the consent of the people.

In addition to what was said in The Town of Waltham v. Kemper, supra, considerations suggested by the counsel for appellee here, might have...