White v. United States, Criminal 18-cr-101-CG-MU
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
| Writing for the Court | CALLIE V. S. GRANAD, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE |
| Parties | ISAIAH JARROD WHITE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 08 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Criminal 18-cr-101-CG-MU,CIVIL 21-cv-113-CG |
ISAIAH JARROD WHITE, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
Criminal No. 18-cr-101-CG-MU
CIVIL No. 21-cv-113-CG
United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
March 8, 2022
ORDER
CALLIE V. S. GRANAD, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Petitioner Isaiah Jarrod White (hereinafter “White”), a federal prisoner proceeding without counsel (pro se), filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 84). The United States (hereinafter “the Government”) filed a timely response in opposition (Doc. 87), and White filed a Reply (Doc. 90). For the reasons set forth below, White's § 2255 motion is due to be denied without an evidentiary hearing.
I. Background
On April 26, 2018, the grand jury for this judicial district returned an indictment against White, charging him with seven counts of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) (Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9-11); four counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 924(c)(1)(C)) (Counts 2, 4, 6, 8); and one count of possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) (Count 12). On
February 11, 2019, White filed a Notice of Intent to Plead Guilty to Counts 2, 4, and 12 of the Indictment pursuant to a plea agreement. (Doc. 55).
A. Plea Hearing
On February 20, 2019, White appeared before the undersigned and informed the Court that he was 31 years old, and his education extended to the 12th grade. (Doc. 79 at p. 4). White also informed the Court that he had been addicted to opiates for a long time, but he was now clean, and he was not under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or medication. Id. at pp. 4-5. He also stated on the record that he had received a copy of the indictment for his case, and he had discussed the indictment and the case in general with his lawyer. Id. at p. 5. White also stated that he understood the charges pending against him and acknowledged receipt of his plea agreement and factual resume and informed the Court that he discussed both those documents with his lawyer before signing them. Id. at p. 6. Furthermore, White stated he understood that, by signing the factual resume, he was agreeing that the Government could prove the facts set forth in that document in support of his guilty plea. Id. at p. 15.
When asked whether there were any agreements with the Government that were not included in his plea agreement, White and his counsel informed the Court that there was a disagreement between White and the Government regarding the First Step Act and mandatory consecutive penalties for convictions brought in the same indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Id. at pp. 6-8. Aside from that dispute, White informed the Court that there were no side agreements that were not
included in his plea agreement. Id. at p. 8. White thereafter stated on the record that he understood the terms of his plea agreement, that no one had made any promise or assurance that was not in the plea agreement in order to persuade him to accept the plea agreement, that no one had threatened or forced him to accept the plea agreement, that no one had threatened or forced him to plead guilty, and that he was pleading guilty out of his own free will because he was guilty. Id. at pp. 8-9. White also informed the Court that he understood that certain terms of his plea agreement were merely recommendations to the Court, and the Court could reject those recommendations without allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty and impose a sentence that is more severe than he might anticipate. Id. at p. 9. White also stated that he understood he was pleading guilty to felony offenses, which may deprive him of certain civil rights. Id. at pp. 9-10.
The Court informed White of the charges and possible sentencing consequences for which he was pleading guilty. Specifically, the Court informed him that he was pleading guilty to three counts in his indictment: Counts 2, 4, and 12. Id. at pp. 9-11, 14-15. For Counts 2 and 4, the Court informed White that each count is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Id. at pp. 10-11, 14-15. White stated that he understood that in order to convict him of each offense, the Government would have to prove that he committed the crime of violence alleged in the indictment; that he knowingly used, carried, or possessed a firearm, or that he brandished the firearm during the commission of the crime of violence, and that he used the firearm in relation to, or carried it in relation to, or possessed it in
furtherance of, the crime of violence. Id. at pp. 14-15. White also acknowledged that for each of Counts 2 and 4 the maximum penalty the Court could impose was a mandatory minimum seven years up to life imprisonment consecutive to the sentence on any other count, a fine not to exceed $250, 000, a term of supervised release of five years which would follow any term of imprisonment, and, if he violated the conditions of supervised release, he could be imprisoned for that entire term, and a mandatory special assessment of $100 and forfeiture of the firearms involved. Id. at pp. 10-11.
The Court also informed White that in order to prove Count 12, the Government would have to prove that he knowingly possessed a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce and that before he possessed the firearm, he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for in excess of one year. Id. at p. 15. The Court informed White that the maximum penalty the Court could impose for Count 12 is ten years in prison, a fine not to exceed $250, 000, a term of supervised release of up to five years, which would follow any term of imprisonment, and if he violated the conditions of supervised release, he could be imprisoned for that entire term, a mandatory special assessment of $100, and forfeiture of the firearms. Id. The Court additionally informed White that an enhancement could apply to his case, and he could be found to be an armed career criminal, subjecting him to a mandatory 15 years to life imprisonment. Id. at p. 11. White also testified that he understood all of the possible consequences and sentences of the counts to which he was pleading guilty. Id. The Court determined
that White was fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that he was fully aware of the nature of the charges and consequences of the plea, and that his plea of guilty was a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of the offenses. Id. at p. 16. Accordingly, White's plea of guilty was accepted, and he was adjudged guilty of the offenses. Id.
B. Sentencing Hearing
On May 29, 2019, White appeared before the undersigned for sentencing. (Doc. 78). At the start of the sentencing hearing, White's counsel requested that the Court postpone sentencing until after the Supreme Court decided United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019). Id. at pp. 3-4. Counsel agreed, however, that White's case is only affected by the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) while the Supreme Court's decision in Davis would affect the only residual clause. Id.[1] The Court denied White's request to continue sentencing. Id. at p. 4.
The Court sentenced White to 46 months' imprisonment on Count 12 and 84 months on each of Counts 2 and 4, to be served consecutively to each other and to the sentence imposed on Count 12. Id. at p. 10. The Court also recommended that White be imprisoned at an institution where a mental health treatment program and residential comprehensive substance abuse treatment program are available to
him. Id. The Court found that the guideline range was appropriate to the facts and circumstances of White's case and that, given the statutory purposes of sentencing, it provided for a reasonable sentence. Id. at p. 12. The Court also found that the sentence addresses the seriousness of the offense and the sentencing objectives of punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation. Id.
After pronouncement of the sentence, White's counsel voiced two objections on the record: (1) an objection to the motion to postpone sentencing, and (2) an objection to the length and consecutiveness of the 46-month sentence imposed for Count 12. Id. at pp. 12-13. Counsel's objections were preserved on the record, and the remaining Counts in White's indictment (Counts 1, 3, 5-11) were dismissed. Id. at p. 13.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed White's sentence on May 8, 2020. United States v. White, 806 Fed.Appx. 936 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); (Doc. 80).
C. White's § 2255 Motion
White's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 claims that his convictions under Counts 2, 4, and 12 are invalid because the Government dismissed the substantive Hobbs Act robbery counts pursuant to his plea agreement. (See Doc. 84-1 at p. 3). Accordingly, White asserts four grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Ground One, White argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his counsel did not inform him about the elements of brandishing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Counts 2 and 4). (Doc. 84 at p. 5; Doc. 84-1 at pp. 4-5).
White asserts that because the Government dismissed the counts related to Hobbs Act robbery, his convictions were not supported by a crime of violence. (Doc. 84-1 at pp. 4-5).
In Ground Two, White argues that counsel was ineffective because he failed to “raise his pretrial motion to dismiss on Direct Appeal.” (Doc. 84 at p. 7; Doc. 84-1 at p. 5). Similar to the reasoning asserted in Ground One, White claims that the Hobbs Act robbery counts were dismissed, and thus, there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for brandishing a firearm. (Doc. 84-1 at p. 5).
In Ground Three, White asserts that his counsel was ineffective at the plea hearing...
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