White v. Univ. of Md. Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 23 November 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action RDB-22-671
• Parties: LATOYA WHITE, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

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LATOYA WHITE, Plaintiff,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.

Civil Action No. RDB-22-671

United States District Court, D. Maryland

November 23, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD D. BENNETT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case features civil rights and employment discrimination claims by Plaintiff Latoya White (“White” or “Plaintiff”) against Defendant, the University of Maryland Medical Center (“UMMC”), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) White claims UMMC engaged in a pattern of harassment and discriminatory behavior against her throughout her tenure as a nurse practitioner. (Id.) Specifically, she alleges that her supervisors discriminated against her for being pregnant and contracting COVID-19, and that they retaliated against her when she voiced her concerns to human resources. (Id.) White initially filed a complaint with the Baltimore Field Office of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 20, 2021. (Id. ¶ 6.) The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter only two days later, on December 22, 2021, enabling her to file the instant Complaint in this court. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) The issue before this Court is whether the EEOC was authorized to issue this Notice of Right to Sue without conducting any investigation, and without providing the defendant any opportunity to respond.

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Now pending is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15). In support of this motion, Defendant argues that White's Notice of Right to Sue was premature, as it was issued prior to the end of the 180-day waiting period prescribed by Title VII. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 3-8, ECF No. 15.) Defendant also contends that the EEOC regulation authorizing the agency to issue such notices is unlawful, as the plain text of Title VII requires the EEOC to investigate every charge. (Id.) The parties' submissions have been reviewed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without leave to amend, and her claims shall be remanded to the EEOC for further investigation. However, Plaintiff shall be granted leave to refile this action when the remainder of the 180-day period prescribed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) has run, or upon the EEOC's dismissal of her charges.

BACKGROUND

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wikimedia Found. v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015)). The following facts are derived from Plaintiff's Complaint and are accepted as true for the purpose of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff has been employed as a nurse practitioner at the University of Maryland Medical Center (“UMMC”) since January 27, 2020. (Compl. ¶ 18.) At the time she was hired, White was the only Black nurse practitioner in her department. (Id.) Throughout her tenure, White alleges that her supervisors exhibited a pattern of excluding her as an employee, and generally created an uncomfortable work environment. Specifically, White claims that her

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“personal leave [was] unlawfully taken from her,” (id. ¶¶ 19-21); that she was not being given ordinary assignments, (id. ¶¶ 24-26); that she was excluded from group recognition emails sent to her team as an effort to isolate her from her peers, (id. ¶¶ 29-30); that her supervisors retaliated against her by giving her a poor performance evaluation based on ambiguous metrics and false, “racially charged” accusations and comments, (id. ¶¶ 33-42); that she was denied telework accommodations during her pregnancy while her coworkers were given permission to work from home, (id. ¶¶ 43-50); and that she was denied accommodations after contracting COVID-19, (id. ¶¶ 56-72), among other allegations.

In response to the alleged discrimination and retaliation, White filed a complaint with the EEOC's Baltimore Field Office on December 20, 2021. (Id. ¶ 6.) Thereafter, White requested a Notice of Right to Sue, which the agency granted on December 22, 2021. (Id. ¶ 7.) White filed the instant Complaint in this Court on March 18, 2022, within the 90 days required under the terms of the Notice she received. (Id. ¶ 8.)

On May 2, 2022, Defendant filed a responsive Motion to Dismiss claiming that White failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before the EEOC. Specifically, Defendant claims that White's Notice of Right to Sue was premature, as the 180-day administrative review period prescribed by Congress had not yet expired when it was issued. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 3-8.) White's notice was issued pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2), an EEOC regulation that allows the agency to grant a claimant the right to sue if a relevant Director “has determined that it is probable that the Commission will be unable to complete its administrative processing of the charge within 180 days from the filing of the charge.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2). Defendant asserts that this regulation should be considered invalid, as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)

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“unambiguously directs the EEOC to investigate,” and provides that the complainant may only file suit if the charge is dismissed or the claim is not resolved within 180 days. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 6 (“Section 2000e-5(b) mandates that the EEOC ‘shall make an investigation' of a charge.”).) Per this argument, as the regulation allows the complainant to bring a private action in under 180 days, it effectively relieves the EEOC of its duty to continue to investigate a complainant's claims. (Id.) Plaintiff counters that this Court should defer to the EEOC's regulation, as other courts have found that the statute is ambiguous as to Congress's intent. (Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 2-4, ECF No. 16.)

This motion is ripe for review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is “to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

To survive a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl., Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Under the plausibility standard, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). A complaint need not include “detailed factual

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allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint must, however, set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to plead a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011).

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for the failure of a plaintiff to fully exhaust their administrative remedies under Rule 12(b)(6). See Hardy v. Lewis Gale Med. Ctr., LLC, 377 F.Supp.3d 596, 606 n.3 (W.D. Va. 2019) (citing Stewart v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 693, 702 (4th Cir. 2019)). “Failure to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to include a claim in the charge deprives a federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim.” Id. at 606 (citing Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009)). In filing a charge of employment discrimination, complainants are required to exhaust the administrative process before proceeding to federal court. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (f)(1); Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2005); Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2005). Courts in this circuit have found that the purpose of this exhaustion requirement is to ensure that an employer has notice of an employee's discrimination claim before litigation commences, and to provide an avenue for informal resolution of the dispute. Sydnor v. Fairfax County, Va., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012).

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiff Latoya White (“White”) claims that Defendant, the University of Maryland Medical Center (“UMMC”), engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory behavior against her throughout her tenure as a nurse practitioner. However, the merits of White's claims are not at issue. Rather, the parties litigate whether White's Notice of Right to Sue was premature. White filed her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 20, 2021, and the agency issued a Right to Sue letter only two days later, on December 22, 2021. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Defendant asserts that 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2), the regulation that authorizes the EEOC to issue a right to sue letter less than 180 days after the claim is filed, is an impermissible construction of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq., which serves as the EEOC's organic statute. (Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 3-8.) For the reasons set forth below, this Court concludes that the EEOC's regulation is invalid, and that White's Notice of Right to Sue is premature. Accordingly,...