White v. Wheeler
| Decision Date | 14 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–1372.,14–1372. |
| Citation | 193 L.Ed.2d 384,136 S.Ct. 456,577 U.S. 73 |
| Parties | Randy WHITE, Warden v. Roger L. WHEELER. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
577 U.S. 73
136 S.Ct. 456
193 L.Ed.2d 384
Randy WHITE, Warden
v.
Roger L. WHEELER.
No. 14–1372.
Supreme Court of the United States
Dec. 14, 2015.
PER CURIAM.
A death sentence imposed by a Kentucky trial court and affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court has been overturned, on habeas corpus review, by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. During the jury selection process, the state trial court excused a juror after concluding he could not give sufficient assurance of neutrality or impartiality in considering whether the death penalty should be imposed. The Court of Appeals, despite the substantial deference it must accord to state-court rulings in federal habeas proceedings, determined that excusing the juror in the circumstances of this case violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. That ruling contravenes controlling precedents from this Court, and it is now necessary to reverse the Court of Appeals by this summary disposition.
Warden Randy White is the petitioner here, and the convicted prisoner, Roger Wheeler, is the respondent.
In October 1997, police in Louisville, Kentucky, found the bodies of Nigel Malone and Nairobi Warfield in the apartment the couple shared. Malone had been stabbed nine times. Warfield had been strangled to death and a pair of scissors stuck out from her neck. She was pregnant. DNA taken from blood at the crime scene matched respondent's. Respondent was charged with the murders.
During voir dire, Juror 638 gave equivocal and inconsistent answers when questioned about whether he could consider voting to impose the death penalty. In
response to the judge's questions about his personal beliefs on the death penalty, Juror 638 said, "I'm not sure that I have formed an opinion one way or the other. I believe there are arguments on both sides of the—of it." App. to Pet. for Cert. 126a. When asked by the prosecution about his ability to consider
all available penalties, Juror 638 noted he had "never been confronted with that situation in a, in a real-life sense of having to make that kind of determination." Id., at 131a. "So it's difficult for me," he explained, "to judge how I would I guess act, uh." Ibid. The prosecution sought to clarify Juror 638's answer, asking if the juror meant he was "not absolutely certain whether [he] could realistically consider" the death penalty. Id., at 132a. Juror 638 replied, "I think that would be the most accurate way I could answer your question." Ibid. During defense counsel's examination, Juror 638 described himself as "a bit more contemplative on the issue of taking a life and, uh, whether or not we have the right to take that life." Id., at 133a. Later, however, he expressed his belief that he could consider all the penalty options. Id., at 134a.
The prosecution moved to strike Juror 638 for cause based on his inconsistent replies, as illustrated by his statement that he was not absolutely certain he could realistically consider the death penalty. The defense opposed the motion, arguing that Juror 638's answers indicated his ability to consider all the penalty options, despite having some reservations about the death penalty. The judge said that when she was done questioning Juror 638, she wrote in her notes that the juror " ‘could consider [the] entire range’ " of penalties. Id., at 138a. She further stated that she did not "see him as problematic" at the end of her examination. Ibid . But she also noted that she did not "hear him say that he couldn't realistically consider the death penalty," and reserved ruling on the motion until she could review Juror 638's testimony. Ibid. The next day, after reviewing the relevant testimony, the judge struck Juror 638 for cause. When she announced her decision to excuse the juror, the trial judge stated, "And when I went back and reviewed [the juror's] entire testimony, [the prosecution] concluded with saying, ‘Would it be accurate to say that you couldn't, couldn't consider the entire range?’ And his response is—I think was, ‘I think that
would be pretty accurate.’ So, I'm going to sustain that one, too." Id., at 139a–140a.
The case proceeded to trial. Respondent was convicted of both murders and sentenced to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the sentence. Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 173, 189 (2003). In considering respondent's challenges to the trial court's excusal of certain jurors for cause, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the trial judge "appropriately struck for cause those jurors that could not impose the death penalty.... There was no error and the rights of the defendant to a fair trial by a fair and impartial jury ... under both the federal and state constitutions were not violated." Id., at 179.
After exhausting available state postconviction procedures, respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. He asserted, inter alia, that the Kentucky trial court erred in striking Juror 638 during voir dire on the ground that the juror could not give assurances that he could consider the death penalty as a sentencing option. The District Court dismissed the petition; but a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, granting habeas relief as to respondent's sentence. Wheeler v. Simpson, 779 F.3d 366, 379 (2015). While
acknowledging the deferential standard required on federal habeas review of a state conviction, the Court of Appeals held that allowing the exclusion of Juror 638 was an unreasonable application of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), and their progeny. 779 F.3d, at 372–374.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), habeas relief is authorized if the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). This Court, time and again, has instructed
that AEDPA, by setting forth necessary predicates before state-court judgments may be set aside, "erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013). Under § 2254(d)(1), " ‘a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’ " White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ––––, ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) ).
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