White v. White

• Decision Date: 18 December 1900
• Citation: 47 A. 628,61 N.J.E. 629
• Parties: WHITE et al. v. WHITE et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

47 A. 628

61 N.J.E. 629

WHITE et al.

v. WHITE et al.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Dec. 18, 1900.

(Syllabus by the Court)

Appeal from court of chancery.

Bill by Patrick White and others against John P. White and others. Decree for complainants (45 Atl. 767), and defendants appeal. Dismissed.

Alan H. Strong, for the motion.

Willard P. Voorhees, opposed.

MAGIE, Chancellor. The appeal in this cause was taken from a final decree made upon a bill for relief respecting lands and real estate. In order that the filing of the bill and the proceedings thereunder, before final decree, should become constructive notice to purchasers or mortgagees of the land, the complainants were required to file in the county clerk's office a notice of the pendency of the suit by the provisions of section 57 of the chancery act of 1875, as amended in 1888 (1 Gen. St. p. 402). By a stipulation of counsel, it is admitted that the bill was filed July 17, 1899; that defendants filed answer, September 6, 1899; that the cause was heard before a vice chancellor, February 17, 1900; that he advised a final decree in favor of complainants, setting aside a deed, which decree was made February 26, 1900, and filed the next day; that a notice of lis pendens was duly filed February 14, 1900; and that the appeal was taken by the defendants, October 9, 1900. A motion to dismiss the appeal is now made on the ground that it was taken too late. This objection is based upon the provisions of section 114 of the chancery act (Gen. St. p. 394), which, after a general limitation of appeals from final decree to a period of three years after the decree is made, adds the following: "Unless a notice of lis pendens has, in the manner hereinbefore provided for, been filed in the county clerk's office, in which eases all appeals from final decrees shall be made within three months after filing the decree appealed from." It has always been conceded that the provisions of section 57 of the chancery act, as to all cases within it, restricted the effect of the doctrine of lis pendens theretofore applicable. Haughwout v. Murphy, 22 N. J. Eq. 531; Turner v. Houpt, 53 N. J. Eq. 526, 33 Atl. 28. The language of the clause above quoted from section 114 of the chancery act applies to the appeal before us, for it was not taken within three months from the filing of the final decree appealed from.

It is not contended that the legislature may not fix a period of limitation within which a review of a judicial determination must be sought in this court. The contention is that, in the statute before us, the words used to express the limitation in this class of causes are not to be interpreted in their plain and obvious meaning, but that a meaning is to be attributed to them restricting their operation to a portion of the class. The rule applicable to the construction of statutes in this respect was laid down in this court by Mr. Justice Elmer thus; "No principle is better settled or more important to be faithfully adhered to by court called upon to enforce written statutes than that, in the absence of ambiguity in the language used, no exposition shall be made which is in opposition to the express words, or, as the maxim is sometimes expressed, it is not allowed to interpret what has no need of interpretation." The learned justice then proceeded to quote with approbation the statement of the rule by Justice Washington in U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 2 L. Ed. 304, to this effect: "When a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. But if, from a view of the whole law or from other laws in pari materia, the evident intention is different from the literal import of the terms employed to express it in a particular part of the law, that intention should prevail; for that, in fact, is the will of the legislature." Rudderow v. State, 31 N. J. Law, 512. In the same line, Chief Justice Beasley declared that where the letter of the law is absolutely unambiguous and definite, and is susceptible of but a single meaning, the clause under construction must be read in such sense, no matter to what futility it may lead. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N. J. Law, 1. These doctrines have been repeatedly announced by our courts. Douglass v. Board, 38 N. J. Law, 214; Insurance Co. v. Parker, 35 N. J. Law, 576; Board v. Brewster, 42 N. J. Law, 125; Koch v. Vanderhoof, 49 N. J. Law, 619, 9 Atl. 771.

My examination of the act in which the words to be construed are included, and my consideration of the general doctrine...