White v. White

Decision Date04 February 2020
Docket NumberNO. 2018-CA-00544-COA,2018-CA-00544-COA
PartiesPATSY B. WHITE APPELLANT v. WILLIAM T. WHITE D/B/A ROYERS ESTATES INC. APPELLEE
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/23/2018

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SUSAN RHEA SHELDON

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PIKE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: PAUL E. ROGERS

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: WILLIAM T. WHITE (PRO SE)

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 05/21/2019

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: 05/31/2019 - GRANTED; AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART, AND REMANDED - 02/04/2020

MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

MODIFIED OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

¶1. The motion for rehearing filed by Patsy White is granted. The previous opinions are withdrawn, and these opinions are substituted in their place.

¶2. This appeal arises from a son's refusal to transfer title to real property to his mother after agreeing to do so in return for her making payments on the deed of trust. The Pike County Chancery Court dismissed the mother's second amended complaint, determining that her breach-of-contract claim against her son was barred by the Statute of Frauds and untimely, among other reasons.

¶3. We affirm that the Statute of Frauds bars the breach-of-contract claim. We reverse and remand because a constructive trust may provide a remedy for the mother. We also reverse and render that the applicable statutory limitations periods have not passed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶4. In exchange for a deed of trust valued at $56,375, Royers Estates obtained about 22.5 acres of property in Pike County. The deed of trust was executed by William White, the owner of Royers Estates, and was security for a promissory note requiring him to pay the current landowner $882 per month until paid in full.

¶5. William faltered on the payments and asked for help from his family. Patsy, his mother, agreed to take over the payments in order to avoid foreclosure. Patsy later claimed that in exchange for making the payments, William verbally agreed to transfer his interest in the property to her. The mother and son did not reduce this agreement to writing. Patsy also took over payments for other properties under the same condition.

¶6. Patsy completed the payments. When she attempted to sell the Pike County land a few months after the payments were completed, she discovered that title had never been transferred to her. Her son had broken his promise.

¶7. So the mother filed a complaint for quiet title, injunction, and damages against her son. In essence, Patsy sought specific performance of the verbal agreement. Additionally, she asked for damages if the title defect could not be cured and for William to be prevented from transferring his interests in the property to anyone else. Patsy amended her complaint one month later to include the other properties she had agreed to pay for in return for title.

¶8. William filed an answer along with a motion to dismiss. Following a hearing, the chancery court allowed Patsy to again amend her complaint. The second amended complaint included a claim for breach of contract, as well as mandatory injunctive relief and the imposition of a constructive trust. Patsy also requested "that she be granted a lien against the subject property to secure said lien."

¶9. William again moved to dismiss, asserting that the Statute of Frauds and a statute of limitations barred Patsy's breach-of-contract claim. The chancery court granted William's motion to dismiss without specifying the basis for the dismissal. Patsy sought reconsideration, arguing the court's order failed to explain why the case was dismissed.

¶10. The chancery court then issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Patsy's motion for reconsideration. In that order, the court found that Patsy's breach-of-contract claim was barred by both the Statute of Frauds and the statute of limitations. Additionally, the court determined that Patsy failed to meet the requirements for injunctive relief and "fail[ed] to plead any of the requisite elements for the imposition of a constructive trust."

¶11. Patsy appeals, arguing that (1) her claim does not violate the Statute of Frauds; (2) her claim is not barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the chancery court wrongly dismissed her request for mandatory injunctive relief; (4) the chancery court wrongly denied the imposition of a constructive trust; and (5) the chancery court failed to grant her a lien against the subject property.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12. "When considering a motion to dismiss, this Court's standard of review is de novo." Scaggs v. GPCH-GP Inc., 931 So. 2d 1274, 1275 (¶6) (Miss. 2006). "[T]he allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim." Id.

DISCUSSION
I. The Statute of Frauds expressly bars Patsy's claim.

¶13. Patsy first argues that her second amended complaint should not have fallen prey to the Statute of Frauds. "The principal purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to require the contracting parties to reduce to writing the specific terms of their contract, especially an agreement affecting lands for more than one year, and thus to avoid dependence on the imperfect memory of the contracting parties, after the passage of time, as to what they actually agreed to some time in the past." Sharpsburg Farms Inc. v. Williams, 363 So. 2d 1350, 1354 (Miss. 1978) (citation omitted). The law expressly bars actions based on unwritten agreements for the sale of land. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-1(c) (Rev. 2012) ("An action shall not be brought whereby to charge a defendant or other party . . . upon any contracts for the sale of lands" except when "the promise or agreement" is "in writing, and signed by the party to be charged" or his agent.).

¶14. At the hearing for the motion to dismiss, counsel for Patsy strained to find a way out from under the Statute of Frauds, arguing that what was at stake was "clearly not a sale of land," and that not all agreements touching land are required to be in writing. See, e.g.,Allred v. Fairchild, 785 So. 2d 1064, 1069 (¶12) (Miss. 2001) (explaining that although related to land, "brokerage commissions (such as real estate brokers' fees) are not subject to the statute of frauds" since they are not for the sale of the land itself).

¶15. Yet Patsy did not file suit for a brokerage fee or non-land related relief. Instead, her second amended complaint specifically demanded her son convey the Pike County land to her, requesting the chancery court to "find Defendants to be in breach of the parties' agreement" and to "order Defendants to specifically perform their obligations under the parties' agreement by transferring title to Plaintiff." (Emphasis added).

¶16. As a result, the chancery court correctly concluded that "[t]he obligation [Patsy] seeks to impose upon [William] is the conveyance of an interest in real property based on an alleged oral agreement." Taking the allegations in Patsy's second amended complaint to be true, she and William had an agreement for the conveyance of the Pike County land. But by the express language of the Statute of Frauds, a claim for relief of this type must be based upon a written and signed agreement. It is undisputed that there was no written agreement regarding William's promise to transfer title to Patsy upon full payment of the note and deed of trust. Accordingly, we affirm that Patsy's breach-of-contract claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds.

¶17. Our straightforward application of the Statute of Frauds means two of Patsy's other assignments of error must also fail. Patsy requested mandatory equitable relief, seeking to force her son to deed the property to her via the injunctive powers of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 65. As our Supreme Court has held, "under the equitable doctrine that'equity follows the law,' courts of equity cannot modify or ignore an unambiguous statutory principle in an effort to shape relief." In re Estate of Smith, 891 So. 2d 811, 813 (¶5) (Miss. 2005). The chancery court properly denied the request for the injunction.

¶18. Similarly, Patsy demanded a lien against the Pike County property. "But an equitable lien is not appropriate to enforce a contract that otherwise fails to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds." Barriffe v. Estate of Nelson, 153 So. 3d 613, 620-21 (¶36) (Miss. 2014). The chancery court's dismissal of this claim was proper.

II. The remedy of a constructive trust is available.

¶19. Although the Statute of Frauds bars enforcing the mother's demand for title in the property, our law has long recognized an equitable solution to the exact scenario presented to us. In a request for alternative relief to receiving the land itself, Patsy sought a constructive trust.

¶20. "A constructive trust is a judicially imposed remedy used to prevent unjust enrichment when one party wrongfully retains title to property." Presbytery of St. Andrew v. First Presbyterian Church PCUSA of Starkville, 240 So. 3d 399, 405 (¶27) (Miss. 2018). As the Supreme Court has held, this "is a fiction of equity created for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment by one who holds legal title to property which, under principles of justice and fairness, rightfully belongs to another." McNeil v. Hester, 753 So. 2d 1057, 1064 (¶24) (Miss. 2000).

¶21. The remedy is broad:

A constructive trust is one that arises by operation of law against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commissionof wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy.

Id. "[E]xamples of wrongful conduct that may justify imposition of a constructive trust" include...

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