White v. Yawkey

• Decision Date: 16 January 1896
• Citation: 108 Ala. 270,19 So. 360
• Parties: WHITE ET AL. v. YAWKEY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

19 So. 360

108 Ala. 270

WHITE ET AL. v. YAWKEY.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 16, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Geneva county; John R. Tyson, Judge.

Trover by W. C. Yawkey against F. J. White and others to recover damages for the conversion of pine logs. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed.

This was an action of trover brought by the appellee, W. C Yawkey, against the defendants, to recover damages for the conversion by the defendants of 130 pine logs, cut and taken away from the lands alleged to have been the property of the plaintiff. The defendants pleaded the general issue, and the following special pleas: "(2) That plaintiff was not the owner of the lands described in said complaint from which it is alleged said pine trees were cut; (3) that said plaintiff was not in actual possession of the lands from which it is alleged said 130 pine trees were cut, at or during the time of said alleged cutting; (4) that, at the time of the alleged cutting down and carrying away of the trees (130, as alleged in said complaint), defendants were engaged in cutting pine trees off lands adjacent to these described in said complaint, and not knowing where the true dividing line, and without any intention of taking or appropriating the said 130 pine to their own use, but believing that the same were on lands from which they had a right to cut, did cut said trees as alleged." Issue was joined upon these pleas, and the facts as disclosed on the trial of the cause, and the only ruling upon the evidence, which is reviewed on the present appeal, are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The court, at the request of the plaintiff, gave the following written charge to the jury: "If the jury believe the evidence they will find for the plaintiff." To the giving of this charge the defendants duly excepted, and also separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of the following written charges, requested by the defendants: (1) "The court charges the jury that, if the logs in suit were cut off lands not in the actual possession of plaintiff your verdict will be for the defendants." (2) "The court charges the jury that in no event is the plaintiff entitled to recover as damages more than the proven value of the logs, prior to the removal from the land." (3) "If the jury believe the evidence, they will find for the defendants." There were verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendants appeal, and assign as error the ruling of the court upon the evidence, the giving of the general affirmative charge in behalf of the plaintiff, and the refusal to give each of the charges requested by the defendants.

M. E Milligan, for appellants.

J. J. Morris, for appellee.

HEAD J.

The case was tried in the lower court upon the second count of the complaint, which was in trover, and claimed damages "for the conversion of 100 pine logs cut and taken away" from the lands of the plaintiff. The material facts are that, within a year prior to the commencement of the suit, one Jack Brewer cut the pine logs from the timber lands belonging to the plaintiff, and sold them to the defendants, to be delivered on the banks of Pea river, where he did in fact deliver them; and that neither he nor the defendants knew at the time the cutting was done that trespasses were being committed on the plaintiff's property, this fact not having been discovered until a survey was made, some time after the acts complained of had been performed. The defendants disposed of the logs, which were worth four cents per foot, at Pea river. These facts were established by the plaintiff's witness, and in regard to them there was no dispute. With a view to mitigating the damages, the defendants offered to prove the value of the logs prior to their removal from the land, accompanying the offer with the statement to the court that they expected to prove the logs were worth materially more after being transported to and placed on the banks of Pea river than they were before such removal. The court refused to allow this proof to be made, and to the ruling an exception was duly reserved. This presents the single question of merit to be decided upon the appeal.

It will be observed from the foregoing statement, that the record makes the case of a conversion by purchasers, innocent of wrongdoing, from an inadvertent trespasser, who, by the expenditure of time, labor, and, doubtless, money, had enhanced the value of the pine logs, after their severance from the freehold and transformation into chattels. The effect of the ruling of the circuit court was to exclude from the jury all evidence upon the subject of value, except that confined and limited to the place of delivery to the defendants, and thereby to necessitate a verdict for the value at that place, as being the only authorized measure of damages, justified by the facts of the case. If the law authorized or required the recovery to be calculated upon the basis of the lesser value, under the circumstances stated, it is obvious the ruling of the circuit court was erroneous and prejudicial to appellants. No Alabama case has been found or cited in which the question here presented has been adjudicated. In Riddle v. Driver, 12 Ala. 590 decided in 1847, where trover was brought for 1,500 bushels of coal, into which the wood of the plaintiff had been transformed by the defendant, it was suggested by the court as a possibility that the jury might consider the value of the defendant's labor on the rough material in estimating the damages; but no opinion was given upon the point, as no question upon the measure of damages had been made in the lower court, and hence the case did not call for an authoritative adjudication in respect of the amount of the plaintiff's recovery. No occasion seems, subsequently, to have arisen for a decision by this court as to the measure of damages which a plaintiff ought to recover in an action of trover against an unintentional trespasser or his innocent vendee, where, as frequently happens when portions of the realty are severed, the value has been enhanced by the labor of the trespasser in preparing and transporting the chattels to market. Many cases, however, are to be found upon this question, in the reports of other American states, and the English judges have likewise frequently considered and decided it. It would be tedious to review the numerous cases we have examined, and it is unnecessary to do so. It is sufficient to say that the modern authorities are practically unanimous in holding that the rule of just compensation for the injury sustained, which is the ideal measure of actual damages, does not require the assessment, against an inadvertent trespasser, of the accession to the value of the chattel which his labor has produced, but that he is entitled to an abatement therefor from the enhanced value. ...