Whitefoot v. Sheriff of Clay Cnty., CAUSE NO.: 1:14-CV-113-SA-DAS
| Decision Date | 22 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO.: 1:14-CV-113-SA-DAS |
| Parties | DAVID J. WHITEFOOT and ELENA R. WHITEFOOT PLAINTIFFS v. SHERIFF OF CLAY COUNTY, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
The Court addresses the following motions in this Memorandum Opinion: (1) Clay County's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and for Immunity [95]; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for the Court to Rule Clay County's Motion Null and Void [98]; (3) Clay County's Amended Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim [111]; and (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Judgment [115]. The Court addresses each of these in turn.
Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Judgment [115]
In an Order and Opinion dated March 29, 2016, the Court held that the statute of limitations as to the "First Incident" had expired prior to Plaintiffs' filing this cause of action. Plaintiffs challenge that finding on the ground that the magistrate judge assigned to this case "stayed" this cause of action pending resolution of the immunity issue. Because of the stay, Plaintiffs assert that the Court had no authority to rule on motions other than the ones for immunity.
The stay required once an immunity motion is filed operates to halt all "attorney conferences, disclosure requirements, and discovery." L.U.CIV.R 16(b)(3)(B). The entry of the Order and Memorandum Opinion in this case is not included in any category of actions stayed by the filing of the motion. Moreover, federal courts have the inherent authority to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of their dockets. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1991). Therefore, the Court has the lawful ability to rule on any outstanding motions despite the imposition of a stay. The Court the Motion to Alter or Amend is DENIED.
Clay County's Amended Motion to Dismiss or for Immunity [111]
Because the Amended Motion to Dismiss reiterates all arguments from the initial Motion to Dismiss [95], the original motion is dismissed as moot. Likewise, Plaintiffs' Motion to Nullify the Motion to Dismiss [98] is denied as well.
The only remaining claims in this case are against Clay County and the Sheriff's Deputies in their official capacities (the "County Defendants"). Plaintiffs have asserted a procedural due process claim as to the "First Incident," a procedural due process claim as to the "Second Incident," and state law claims.
Plaintiffs failed to indicate why the claims surrounding the "First Incident" on March 22, 2011, are not barred by the statute of limitations, as found earlier by the Court. The Court finds no reason why the statute of limitations would not also bar this claim against Clay County and the Deputies in their official capacities. As such, all claims surrounding the "First Incident" are dismissed.1
As to the "Second Incident," Plaintiffs complain that Sheriff's Deputies trespassed on their land to serve process for a state court case, Mississippi State University v. Elena Whitefoot. During the pendency of that lawsuit, Whitefoot filed a Motion to Dismiss in the state court on the grounds of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process. The claims against Whitefoot were then dismissed on December 20, 2013. According to County Defendants, that is all the process due Plaintiffs, and thus, their procedural due process assertions fail to state aclaim.
Motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure test the legal viability of a complaint. A court reviewing such a motion must afford "the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2007), and determine whether the averments comprise a "plausible" right to recovery. Id., 127 S. Ct. 1955. In addition to the pleadings, the Court may take judicial notice of documents in the public record without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See generally Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n. 9 (5th Cir. 2007); R2 Investments LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 640 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2005).2
A plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. See also, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (). The alleged facts must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. In short, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Id. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
All allegations against the Sheriff and Sheriff's Deputies in their official capacities, and Plaintiffs' claims against the Clay County Sheriff's Department are appropriately interpreted as claims against Clay County. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985). Local government agencies, such as sheriff's departments, can only be held liable for constitutional torts under Section 1983 "when execution of a government's policy orcustom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury." Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Thus, to succeed on a Section 1983 claim against a local government entity, the plaintiff must establish: (1) an official policy or custom, of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose "moving force" is that policy or custom. Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247-49 (5th Cir. 2003). Locating an official "policy" or "custom" ensures that a local government entity will be held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the governmental entity, and ensures that there is no risk of imposing respondeat superior liability. Bryan Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997).
An "official policy" may be established in one of three ways: (1) "when the appropriate officer or entity promulgates a generally applicable statement of policy and the subsequent act complained of is simply an implementation of that policy"; (2) "where no rule has been announced as 'policy' but federal law has been violated by an act of the policymaker itself;" and (3) "even where the policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, so long as the need to take some action to control the agents of the government is so obvious, and the inadequacy of existing practice so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymaker can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." Bryan Cnty. Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 417-18, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show 1) that he suffered a deprivation of aconstitutionally protected interest in "life, liberty, or property," and 2) that such deprivation occurred without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26, 110 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990) (citations omitted). "In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in 'life, liberty, or property' is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law." Id. at 125, 110 S. Ct. 975 (citation omitted). See also Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 749-50 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972). When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount. Id. at 570, 92 S. Ct. 2701. But the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite. Id., 92 S. Ct. 2701.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Id. at 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701. Rather "they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Id. at 578, 92 S. Ct. 2701.
Ordinarily, the state may not take property from an individual without providing pre-deprivation notice and a hearing. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127, 110 S. Ct. 975 (). However, the Parratt/Hudson doctrine provides that when a plaintiff alleges that he has been deprived of his property, without due process of law, by the negligent or intentional actions of a state officer that are "random and unauthorized," a postdeprivation tort cause ofaction in state law is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. Sheppard v. Louisiana Bd. of Parole, 873 F.2d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-35, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984)). The Parratt/Hudson doctrine is applicable if the following conditions exist: (1) the deprivation was...
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