BASCHAB, Judge.
On July 1, 1996, the appellant, Larry Wayne Whitehead, was convicted of three counts of capital murder in connection with the murder of Ernest Andrew Whitten. The murder was made capital because the appellant committed it during the course of a first-degree burglary, see § 13A-5-40(a)(4), Ala.Code 1975; because Whitten had testified before a grand jury that had indicted the appellant for first-degree theft of property, see § 13A-5-40(a)(14), Ala. Code 1975; and because Whitten had been subpoenaed to testify at the appellant's trial on the theft charge, see § 13A-5-40(a)(14), Ala.Code 1975. By a vote of 12-0, the jury recommended that the appellant be sentenced to death. On August 16, 1996, the trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced the appellant to death.
This court affirmed the appellant's convictions and sentences, see Whitehead v. State, 777 So.2d 781 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences, see Ex parte Whitehead, 777 So.2d 854 (Ala.2000); and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari review, see Whitehead v. Alabama, 532 U.S. 907, 121 S.Ct. 1233, 149 L.Ed.2d 142 (2001). This court issued a certificate of judgment on September 20, 2000.
On February 27, 2002, the appellant filed a Rule 32 petition, challenging his convictions. After the State responded, the circuit court summarily denied the petition. This appeal followed.
The appellant raises several arguments, including allegations that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial.
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that he was prejudiced as a result of the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
"`The appellant must show that his counsel's performance was unreasonable, considering all of the attendant circumstances. . . . "[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.'
"Duren v. State, 590 So.2d 360, 362 (Ala. Cr.App.1990), aff'd, 590 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, , 112 S.Ct. 1594, 118 L.Ed.2d 310 (1992).
"When this court is reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was appropriate and reasonable. Luke v. State, 484 So.2d 531, 534 (Ala.Cr.App.1985). The burden is on the appellant to show that his counsel's conduct was deficient. Luke.
"`Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.'
"Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66. (Citations omitted.) Ex parte Lawley, 512 So.2d 1370, 1372 ([Ala. ]1987).
"Initially we must determine whether counsel's performance was deficient. We must evaluate whether the action or inaction of counsel of which the petitioner complains was a strategic choice. `Strategic choices made after a thorough investigation of relevant law and facts are virtually unchallengeable. . . .' Lawley, 512 So.2d at 1372. This court must avoid using `hindsight' to evaluate the performance of counsel. We must evaluate all the circumstances surrounding the case at the time of counsel's actions before determining whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Falkner v. State, 586 So.2d 39 (Ala.Cr.App.1991)."
Hallford v. State, 629 So.2d 6, 8-9 (Ala. Crim.App.1992).
"In determining whether a defendant has established his burden of showing that his counsel was ineffective, we are not required to address both considerations of the Strickland v. Washington test if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one of the prongs. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. In fact, the Court explained that `[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.' Id. We defer to this guidance and address the `prejudice' prong, for `[w]ith respect to the prejudice component, the lack of merit of [Thomas's] claim is even more stark.' Id. at 699, 104 S.Ct. at 2070."
Thomas v. State, 511 So.2d 248, 255 (Ala. Crim.App.1987) (footnote omitted).
On direct appeal, this court summarized the relevant facts of the case as follows:
"The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following. Whitehead was an employee at Hudson Foods, Inc. He had been punching his time card when he arrived at work, leaving immediately thereafter, and then returning to work and punching the time card to indicate he had worked a full day. Whitehead's codefendants, James Matthew Hyde and Stephen Brookshire, had, on several occasions, helped Whitehead with his scheme to be paid without actually working, by punching Whitehead's time card for him, thus clocking him in and out of work. Hudson Foods eventually became aware of Whitehead's scheme, and Detective Andrew Whitten of the Albertville Police Department was assigned to investigate Whitehead and the theft allegations Hudson Foods had made against him. Whitten interviewed Whitehead concerning the theft allegations, and he was eventually arrested and charged with theft of property in the first degree. Specifically, he was charged with stealing approximately $12,000 from Hudson Foods.
"At the time of his arrest, Whitehead was on parole for a prior felony conviction. A parole revocation hearing was held, and Whitten testified at that hearing concerning his investigation of the Hudson Foods theft case. Upon conclusion of the hearing, however, Whitehead's parole was not revoked. Approximately one month later, in September 1994, Whitehead was indicted for theft of property in the first degree. Whitten testified before the grand jury that indicted Whitehead concerning his investigation of the theft charges. Whitten was also subpoenaed to testify at Whitehead's trial, which was set to begin on January 30, 1995. Whitten was shot on January 24, 1995, and on January 25, 1995, he died from injuries he sustained in the shooting.
"Whitehead's codefendant Stephen Brookshire testified that Whitehead approached him on the morning of January 24, 1995, and asked him if he would `drive for him' later that night, telling Brookshire that he had to `get rid of his witness.' (R. 1403.) Brookshire knew that Whitehead had been charged with theft. In fact, Brookshire testified at Whitehead's parole revocation hearing to the effect that he had clocked Whitehead in and out of work on several occasions.
"According to Brookshire, Whitehead and Hyde came to his mobile home on the evening of January 24, 1995, and at approximately 9:00 p.m. that night, the three men left in an automobile, with Brookshire driving. Brookshire testified that they drove to Whitten's neighborhood, and he parked the car near Whitten's house and turned off the headlights. Brookshire further testified
that Hyde got out of the car and that Whitehead told him, `Don't mess up.' (R. 1416.) Brookshire stated that Hyde had been gone for several minutes when he heard a single gunshot. According to Brookshire, Hyde came running back to the car, jumped in, and repeatedly told Whitehead that he was `sorry' because Whitten was not dead. Brookshire stated that Hyde told Whitehead that he was able to shoot Whitten only once because, after the first shot, his gun had jammed. Brookshire testified that Whitehead told Hyde it was okay, `we'll get him later.' (R. 1419.) Brookshire stated that he knew when they left his mobile home that night that they were going to `get rid of' Whitehead's witness; however, he stated that he did not know the identity of the witness.
"Numerous witnesses for the State testified that Whitehead talked frequently about filing a multimillion-dollar civil lawsuit against Hudson Foods for making false allegations of theft against him. On numerous occasions, Whitehead was heard by these witnesses saying that Whitten was the only witness in the theft case and that if Whitten was `out of the way,' he would be acquitted and he could win the civil lawsuit. Wanda Self, Whitehead's girlfriend, with whom he was living at the time of the murder, testified that shortly after the murder, Whitehead told her that `the deed was done.' (R. 1136.) There was further testimony that Whitehead had said, with regard to...
