Whitehead v. Viacom

Decision Date15 November 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. DKC 2002-1899.,CIV.A. DKC 2002-1899.
Citation233 F.Supp.2d 715
PartiesDavid L. WHITEHEAD v. VIACOM, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

David L. Whitehead, Oxon Hill, MD, pro se.

Paul R. Taskier, Dickstein Shapiro Morin and Oshinsky, LLP, Washington, DC, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution are several motions filed by Plaintiff David L. Whitehead and by Defendant Viacom, Inc. ("Viacom"). Among Plaintiff's pending motions is a motion for recusal by the court from this case. Among Defendant's pending motions are a motion to strike Plaintiff's first amended complaint (which is actually the second amended complaint), a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, and a motion for an injunction requiring that Plaintiff obtain court approval before filing future papers with the court. The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For reasons that follow, the court will deny Plaintiff's motion for recusal, grant Defendant's motion to strike the second amended complaint, grant Defendant's motion to dismiss, and grant Defendant's motion for an injunction. All other motions will be denied as moot.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed this suit pro se in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland on April 19, 2001, alleging copyright infringement, fraud, conspiracy, and other various claims against Defendant Viacom and "Unnamed Does 1-50 or more."1 This is not the first time Plaintiff has filed suit against a media defendant alleging infringement of various works and other vague claims. Indeed, Plaintiff has filed at least nine lawsuits in this court and 23 lawsuits in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against film companies, publishing companies, actors, producers, writers, and directors, as well as former President Bill Clinton, the CIA, and others. Every one of Plaintiff's suits has been dismissed or resolved in the defendants' favor.2 The court in the District of Columbia became so frustrated with Plaintiff's "opaque, nonsensical and frivolous" lawsuits and "egregious abuses of the judicial system" that, on February 23, 2001, it enjoined Plaintiff from filing anything with the court without prior court approval. See Whitehead v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 145 F.Supp.2d at 5. Shortly after the injunction was imposed by that court, Plaintiff filed the instant suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland alleging infringement of his copyrighted book Brains, Sex & Racism in the CIA and the Escape, among other things. On June 4, 2002, Defendant Viacom removed the suit to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, citing both federal question and diversity jurisdiction.

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges a pattern, practice and scheme by Defendant to "misappropriate, plagiarize and disseminate" Plaintiff's works.3 Plaintiff also appears to allege a conspiracy against him by various judges. On June 14, 2002, Plaintiff filed a motion for recusal of the sitting judge. On June 19, 2002, Defendant Viacom filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice. On September 6, 2002, Defendant filed a motion to enjoin Plaintiff from filing additional motions and papers with the court absent the court's prior approval. The court will now address these pending motions.

II. Analysis
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal

Plaintiff filed a motion for the court to be recused from this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b). Section 455(a) provides that a judge or justice "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The critical question presented by this sub-section "`is not whether the judge is impartial in fact. It is simply whether another, not knowing whether or not the judge is actually impartial, might reasonably question his impartiality on the basis of all the circumstances.'" United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1137, 119 S.Ct. 1793, 143 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1999) (quoting Hathcock v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 53 F.3d 36, 41 (4th Cir.1995); Aiken County v. BSP Division of Envirotech Corp., 866 F.2d 661, 679 (4th Cir.1989)). The Fourth Circuit has thus adopted an objective standard which asks whether the judge's impartiality might be questioned by a reasonable, well-informed observer who assesses "all the facts and circumstances." Id. (citation omitted). See also Sao Paulo State of the Federative Republic of Brazil v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., et al., 535 U.S. 229, 122 S.Ct. 1290, 1292, 152 L.Ed.2d 346 (2002) (per curiam) (reaffirming the holding in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) that § 455(a) "requires judicial recusal `if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge would have actual knowledge' of his interest or bias in the case"). Section 455(b) sets forth five particular circumstances that also require recusal.

Plaintiff's motion appears to allege three bases for recusal: (1) that the court transferred one or more actions brought by Defendant to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where they were assigned to Judge Paul Friedman, (2) that the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives is reviewing cases which were before this court; and (3) that the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, of which the sitting judge's husband was a judge, was "unfair to the plaintiff and his aunt Linda J. Smith." Pursuant to the standard adopted by the Fourth Circuit with respect to Section 455(a), the court must assess whether a reasonable observer, cognizant of all relevant information, might reasonably question the court's impartiality in this matter. The court finds that a reasonable, well-informed observer could not reasonably question the court's impartiality in this matter based on the allegations made by Plaintiff. First, the fact that this court transferred cases filed by Plaintiff to the District of Columbia has no bearing whatsoever on impartiality. "Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). Second, the fact that the House of Representatives is reviewing cases which were before this court, even if true, is wholly irrelevant to an impartiality determination in this case.

Finally, the allegation that the Circuit Court has been "unfair" to Plaintiff and his aunt, and that such unfairness is somehow imputed to this court because of a spousal relationship with a former judge on the Circuit Court is highly unreasonable. No reasonable observer would question the court's impartiality on this basis especially since there has been no allegation that the spouse ever dealt with Plaintiff or his aunt, let alone treated them unfairly. Further, the provisions of Section 455(b) dealing with spouses, sub-sections 4 and 5, are irrelevant to the instant case. Section 255(b)(4) pertains to a spouse's financial interest in the subject matter, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. Section 255(b)(5)(iii) simply restates the second half of sub-section (b)(4). The circumstances delineated in these sub-sections clearly do not exist in the instant suit. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for recusal is denied.

B. Defendant's Motion to Strike the "First" Amended Complaint

Defendant filed a motion to strike what Plaintiff labeled as his "First Amended Complaint," which was filed on October 22, 2002. In its motion, Defendant notes that Plaintiff already filed a first amended complaint in this case in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, prior to removal to this court on June 4, 2002. Defendant argues that the filing of the October 22 amended complaint in this court therefore violates Local Rule 103(6)(a) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) because it was made without leave of court and after Plaintiff had already amended once as of right.4 Plaintiff appears to argue that he does not need leave of court to file a second amended complaint in this court because the first amended complaint was filed in state, not federal, court.

This argument is without support in the law. In fact, this argument was advanced and rejected in nearly identical circumstances in Armstrong v. Unc-Lear Siegler, Inc., Civ.No. 98-736, 1999 WL 123512 (N.D.N.Y. March 1, 1999). In that case, a pro se plaintiff filed a complaint in state court and subsequently amended that complaint in state court. After the action was removed to federal court, the plaintiff attempted to file a second amended complaint, arguing that it was a matter of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The court in that case rejected the plaintiff's argument, noting that "`[f]ollowing removal, federal courts recognize all prior pleadings, orders and other proceedings in the state court action and presume them valid' ... Thus, the Second Amended Complaint could only be filed after plaintiff first sought leave of court." Id. at *3 (quoting the magistrate judge's order). The court agrees with that reasoning. Allowing Plaintiff to amend his complaint again without leave of court would require this court not to recognize the original state court complaint as valid, which the court is unwilling to do. Accordingly, the court will grant Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's second amended complaint, which is labeled "first amended complaint."

C. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment

Defendant argues in its motion to dismiss that the claims in the amended complaint are substantially the same as claims that have already been litigated and adjudged and are, therefore, barred as res judicata.5 Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which ...

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