Whitehouse v. Sullivan

Decision Date25 November 1991
Docket NumberNo. 91-1113,91-1113
Citation949 F.2d 1005
Parties, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 16364A, 2 NDLR P 158 Thomas WHITEHOUSE, Appellant, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

John Bowman, Davenport, Iowa, argued, for appellant.

Michael Fry, HHS Counsel, Kansas City, Mo., argued (John Beamer, Asst. U.S. Atty., Des Moines, Iowa, on brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Whitehouse appeals from the district court's 1 order affirming the Secretary's denial of disability benefits. We affirm.

I.

Whitehouse applied for disability benefits in 1986, claiming that his multiple health problems had disabled him since July 1, 1984. The Social Security Administration denied benefits, and Whitehouse requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. During the hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to give the number of jobs available to a hypothetical job applicant with Whitehouse's physical and emotional limitations. The expert testified that there were several types of jobs which Whitehouse could perform and that several thousand of those jobs existed in the national economy. The ALJ found that Whitehouse was not disabled, basing his decision on the vocational expert's testimony. The Appeals Council denied Whitehouse's request for review, and the district court affirmed the ALJ's decision.

II.

Whitehouse now appeals to this court, arguing that the ALJ did not properly take his residual functional capacity into account. He also claims that the Secretary failed to produce evidence of any jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which Whitehouse could perform because the vocational expert did not correlate the job titles in the United States Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) with the job titles from the Iowa Job Summaries.

We will uphold the Secretary's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the Secretary's conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Beasley v. Califano, 608 F.2d 1162, 1166 (8th Cir.1979). We may not reverse "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision." Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir.1984) (citations omitted).

III.

Because Whitehouse showed that his impairments prevent him from performing his previous occupation, the burden shifted to the Secretary to show that Whitehouse can perform other types of work which exist in the national economy, taking into account his residual functional capacity, age, work experience, and education. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1561. Whitehouse first claims that the ALJ failed to take his residual functional capacity into account. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546. The record reveals otherwise. In framing his questions to the vocational expert, the ALJ specifically asked the expert to assume a job applicant with Whitehouse's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. Even though the expert did not specifically recite those factors in his answers, the ALJ could properly assume that the expert framed his answers based on the factors the ALJ told him to take into account.

Whitehouse next argues that the Secretary did not show that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy which Whitehouse could perform, as required by the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560, 404.1561. He bases this argument on the vocational expert's answer to a post-hearing interrogatory in which the expert stated that the job titles from the DOT do not correlate with the job titles from the Job Service statistical summaries of jobs.

The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
89 cases
  • Stephens v. Astrue
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • May 14, 2012
    ...assume that the vocational expert "framed his answers based on the factors the ALJ told him to take into account." Whitehouse v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 1991). Where an ALJ's hypotheticals included all of a claimant's impairments as supported by the record, and the expert li......
  • Kovach v. Apfel, 2:99CV0052 (MLM).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • September 28, 2000
    ...evidence is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence may also support an opposite conclusion. Whitehouse v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir.1991); Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th To determine whether the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substa......
  • Eiting v. Apfel
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • March 29, 1999
    ...evidence is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence may also support an opposite conclusion. Whitehouse v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir.1991); Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th To determine whether the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substa......
  • Monier v. Apfel
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • September 23, 1998
    ...reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the Secretary's conclusion." Onstead, 962 F.2d at 804 (quoting Whitehouse v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir.1991)). The role of the Court on review of the ALJ's decision is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT